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ARTICLE
ARTICLE II VESTS THE EXECUTIVE POWER, NOT THE
ROYAL PREROGATIVE
Julian Davis Mortenson∗
Article II of the United States Constitution vests “the executive power”
in the President. For more than two hundred years, advocates of presidential power have claimed that this phrase was originally understood
to include a bundle of national security and foreign affairs authorities.
Their efforts have been highly successful. Among constitutional originalists, this so-called “Vesting Clause Thesis” is now conventional wisdom.
But it is also demonstrably wrong.
Based on an exhaustive review of the eighteenth-century bookshelf,
this Article shows that the ordinary meaning of “executive power” referred unambiguously to a single, discrete, and potent authority: the
power to execute law. This enforcement role was constitutionally crucial.
Substantively, however, it extended only to the implementation of legal
norms created by some other authority. It wasn’t just that the executive
power was subject to legislative influence in a crude political sense; rather,
the power was conceptually an empty vessel until there were laws or
instructions that needed executing.
There was indeed a term of art for the Crown’s nonstatutory powers,
including its various national security and foreign affairs authorities.
But as a matter of well-established legal semantics, that term was “prerogative.” The other elements of the prerogative—including those
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relating to national security and foreign affairs—were possessed in
addition to “the executive power” rather than as part of it.
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INTRODUCTION
What would happen if the President had no qualms about violating
the law? Suppose he is ﬁghting terrorism and wants to deploy wiretaps
prohibited by the statutory surveillance framework1 and an interrogation
program that violates federal criminal law. 2 Or imagine he wants to
1. Cf. Offices of Inspectors Gen., Unclassiﬁed Report on the President’s Surveillance
Program 11, 13 (2009), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7H5-SV29]
(quoting an unreleased Office of Legal Counsel memo’s assertion that the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act “cannot restrict the President’s ability to engage in warrantless searches that protect the national security” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. Cf. Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. 18–19 (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Office of Legal Counsel
Torture Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/
memo-combatantsoutsideunitedstates.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ4A-VHSV] (contending
that “if an interrogation method arguably were to violate” federal statutes criminalizing
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conduct an unauthorized humanitarian intervention but runs into a
statutory time limit requiring him to cease hostilities.3 What if a statute
requires U.S. passports to include a diplomatically provocative term, but
the President wants the State Department to leave it out?4 Different
though the stakes and speciﬁcs of these questions may be, their underlying structure is identical. In each hypothetical, a presidential policy—to
wiretap, torture, bomb, or scriven—is prohibited by existing legislation.
In each hypothetical, the prohibition is too clear to be ﬁnessed by clever
statutory interpretation. And in each hypothetical, lawyers have to decide
what will give way. Does the statute constrain the President? Or does executive power trump the statute?
A leading scholarly view—shared by at least one current member of
the Supreme Court5 and asserted with increasing persistence by the executive branch itself6—is that cases like these often turn on the President’s
assault, maiming, and war crimes, then those statutes “would be unconstitutional as applied
in this context”).
3. Cf. Dep’t of State & Dep’t of Def., United States Activities in Libya 25 (2011),
https://fas.org/man/eprint/wh-libya.pdf [https://perma.cc/M53X-JW2N] (“The President
is of the view that the current U.S. military operations in Libya are consistent with the War
Powers Resolution . . . .”).
4. Cf. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2082–83, 2096 (2015) (permitting the
Administration to ignore a statute that entitled a Jerusalem-born U.S. citizen to have his
passport list his place of birth as “Israel”).
5. See id. at 2097–99 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (“Founding-era evidence reveals that the ‘executive Power’ included
the foreign affairs powers of a sovereign State. . . . This view of executive power was
widespread at the time of the framing of the Constitution.”).
6. See, e.g., Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel to Att’y Gen., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 2011 WL
(OLC) 1459998, at *5–6 (Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Office of Legal Counsel Libya
Memorandum] (arguing that the President has “independent authority” deriving from the
President’s “‘unique responsibility,’ as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, for
‘foreign and military affairs,’ as well as national security” (emphasis added) (quoting Sale
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993))). The Obama Administration
further argued that under the “historical gloss” on the executive power vested in Article II,
the “President bears the ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign
relations’” and accordingly holds “independent authority in the areas of foreign policy
and national security.” Id. at *7 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414,
429 (2003)). In Zivotofsky, the Administration grounded the President’s recognition power
in the “assignment of the bulk of foreign-affairs powers to the President” and asserted that
“Article II provides that ‘[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.’” Brief for the Respondent at 16, Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (No. 13-628),
2014 WL 4726506 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 1); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“The Solicitor General seeks the power of seizure in [the Article
II Executive Power Clause]. Lest I be thought to exaggerate, I quote the interpretation
which his brief puts upon it: ‘In our view, this clause constitutes a grant of all the executive
powers of which the Government is capable.’”); Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Trump v. Int’l
Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (No. 16-1436), 2017 WL 3475820
(“‘The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty’ that both is an aspect of the
‘legislative power’ and also ‘is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs
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constitutional possession of “the executive power.” Usually called the
Vesting Clause Thesis, this view is said to date to a post-ratiﬁcation pamphlet written by Alexander Hamilton.7 It rests on a simple claim about
the original understanding of the Constitution. Specifically: “[T]he executive power” was a term of art for a particular bundle of substantive
powers held by the British Crown. In the same way that bestowing agency,
guardianship, or bailment powers would convey a well-understood package of powers to an agent, guardian, or bailee, the vesting of “executive
power” is said to have conveyed a bundle of authorities usually associated
with kingship.8
From that starting point, the Vesting Clause Thesis derives the following rule: The constitutional President was understood to possess the
same powers and privileges as the eighteenth-century British Crown,
except when speciﬁcally limited by other provisions of the Constitution.9
In its strongest form—which suggests that any limitation or reassignment
would require very clear constitutional text—the Vesting Clause Thesis
yields a powerful presumption of indefeasible10 presidential authority in
of the nation.’” (emphasis added) (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950))).
7. See Alexander Hamilton, Paciﬁcus No. 1 (1793), reprinted in 15 The Papers of
Alexander Hamilton 33, 39 (Harold C. Syrett ed., digital ed. 2011) (“The enumeration [of
speciﬁc presidential authorities later in Article II] ought rather therefore to be considered
as intended . . . to specify and regulate the principal articles implied in the deﬁnition of
Executive Power [in the Executive Power Clause]; leaving the rest to ﬂow from the general
grant of that power . . . .”).
8. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 561 n.69 (1994) (“‘[T]he executive Power,’ . . . is
probably not so much a type of power as it is a grab bag of many speciﬁcally enumerated
powers, all of which we think of as belonging to the Executive . . . .”). The standard title for
this claim is unhelpful. The first sentence of Article II is definitely a “clause” that “vests”
something. The question is what was vested. In the body of this Article, I will refer to the
dominant view as the “Royal Residuum” Thesis, to differentiate it from other possible
readings of the Executive Power Clause.
9. See infra notes 40–45 and accompanying text (discussing the Vesting Clause Thesis
in greater detail).
10. This Article shows that the Executive Power Clause is incapable of giving rise to
any substantive foreign affairs authority, much less an indefeasible one. I note that here
because there are versions of the Vesting Clause Thesis that view the powers it conveys as
defeasible by legislative action—treating them as valid only in Youngstown Zone Two. See
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (deﬁning Zone Two as presidential
action that has been neither authorized nor prohibited by Congress). But most modern
Royal Residuum theorists view the suite of authorities as indefeasible—that is, valid even in
Youngstown Zone Three. See id. at 637–38 (deﬁning Zone Three loosely as presidential
action that has been prohibited by Congress). This is not surprising: “If the President
really has constitutional authority [under some express grant of power] to engage in
certain conduct, it is very unclear why Congress should be allowed to limit its exercise,
much less to make its exercise turn on the approval of other governmental actors.” Gary
Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 375,
393 (2008); see also, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take
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the arenas of foreign affairs and national security. In a world where
originalism is so inﬂuential, that’s a big deal—especially since executive
branch interpretation often proceeds either out of sight or without a
clear path to judicial review.11 Certainly the thesis loomed large in the
real-world version of each controversy ﬂagged above.
This Article lays the foundation for demonstrating that, as a historical claim about the document adopted by the Founders, the Vesting
Clause Thesis is wrong. Historically speaking, there was a term of art for
the basket of nonstatutory powers held by the British Crown. But that term
was “royal prerogative.” Article II’s reference to “the executive power,” by
contrast, referenced only one specific item in a very long list of royal authorities. Speciﬁcally, it meant the narrow but potent authority to carry out
projects deﬁned by a prior exercise of the legislative power. As the leading English theorist of royal absolutism explained—with unmistakable
disdain—the “executive power” was nothing more than “a power of putting [the] laws in execution.”12 To be clear, even radical Whigs knew that
the Crown had other powers besides the merely “executive.” But as a
matter of well-established legal semantics, those powers were possessed in
addition to “the executive power” rather than as part of it. For this reason,
the first sentence of Article II simply cannot bear the weight of the Vesting
Clause Thesis. It vests the executive power, not the royal prerogative.
If this is right, then three conclusions follow:
• First, the opening sentence of Article II vested exactly what it
says: the power to execute the law, both by enforcing its negative prohibitions and by carrying out its affirmative projects.
Care Clause, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 781, 856 (2013) (arguing that the President is entitled to refuse
to comply with a law that “would interfere materially with the exercise of [a] constitutional
power of the President (such as that over foreign affairs and national security)”);
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian
Executive: A Defense, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1591, 1593 (2005) [hereinafter Prakash & Ramsey,
The Jeffersonian Executive] (“[T]he President has unilateral control . . . of those
executive foreign affairs powers that are not otherwise allocated or shared.”); Saikrishna
Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 215, 227, 236 (2005) (reviewing Harold J. Kent, Presidential Powers (2005)) (“[N]othing in the [Necessary and Proper
Clause] even hints that executive powers derived from the general grant are more susceptible of congressional regulation.”). For the most usefully rigorous classiﬁcation of the
clashing taxonomies in play here, see Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Taxonomy of
Presidential Powers, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 327, 328 (2008).
11. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106
Colum. L. Rev. 1189, 1196–97 (2006) (noting that in “a great many instances” of executive
branch interpretation, the “question of judicial review does not arise” because of justiciability issues or because the matters implicate foreign affairs or national security).
12. Robert Filmer, The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy (1648) [hereinafter
Filmer, The Anarchy], reprinted in Patriarcha and Other Writings 131, 136 (Johann P.
Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). Filmer elaborated: “By these words of
legislative, nomothetical and architectonical power, in plain English, [is understood] a
power of making laws. And by gubernative and executive, a power of putting those laws in
execution by judging and punishing offenders.” Id.
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This was a mighty charge for a majestic office, and the manner of its delegation caused much anxiety. But it extended
only to the implementation of substantive legal requirements
and authorities that were created somewhere else. It wasn’t
just that the use of executive power was subject to legislative
inﬂuence in a crude political sense. Rather, the power itself
was fundamentally derivative. It was incapable of providing
even a defeasible source of independent substantive authority,
let alone one that was immune from legislative revision.
• Second, the Vesting Clause Thesis gets the original default
rule of constitutional preeminence backward. Far from presuming that law cannot bind the President on questions of
national security and foreign affairs, the Founders’ Constitution
presumed that the President must obey duly enacted statutes
in those areas too—unless some other grant of Article II
authority speciﬁcally rebutted that presumption. The contrary claim isn’t just wrong; it’s conceptually confused.
• Third, arguments that the President possesses a free-ﬂoating
and indefeasible foreign affairs power cannot rest on
historical claims about the Founding. They must rest instead
on some form of what originalists call living constitutionalism—and in particular on a meticulous demonstration that
such powers have in fact emerged over time.
Because the Vesting Clause Thesis is so entrenched in our constitutional culture, we must uproot it systematically—ﬁrst by examining the
intellectual currents of the late eighteenth century, and then by attending to what the Founders actually said and did before, during, and after
the ratiﬁcation debates. This Article lays the foundation for that project.
Left for another day is a discussion of how the standard understanding of
executive power was reﬂected—as it demonstrably was—in discussion
and debate throughout the Founding and early Republic. 13 But the
indispensable foundation for that forthcoming work is laid here: While
the canonical commentators disagreed vigorously about how best to
allocate the powers of government, the eighteenth-century grammar of
their debate—both conceptually and semantically—was well established.
Absent some evidence that the Founders ignored this background and
adopted a basically unprecedented meaning of “executive power,” the
ﬁrst sentence of Article II would have been understood as vesting the
wholly derivative authority to execute the laws, and nothing else.

13. See, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, U. Pa. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause] (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (showing that the conceptual framework explained in this Article
was not just adopted but simply presumed by the Founders as they proposed, wrote,
discussed, debated, and ratiﬁed the Constitution).
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This Article is organized as follows. Part I outlines three competing
views of the Executive Power Clause: the “Cross-Reference” theory, the
“Law Execution” theory, and the “Royal Residuum” theory. Part II
surveys the political and theoretical backdrop for eighteenth-century
debates about the separation of powers. Part III turns to the legal semantics of constitutional law proper. It shows that the standard term for the
bundle of nonstatutory powers held by the Crown was “royal prerogative”
and that “executive power” referred to one distinct branch of the prerogative: the authority to execute the law. Part IV explores some reasons that
Royal Residuum proponents have misunderstood the historical evidence.
Part V concludes with a survey of Founding-Era dictionaries, showing that
they offer unanimous support for reading “executive power” as “the
power to execute.”
I. THREE VIEWS OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER CLAUSE
To a lay audience, the questions we started with may seem easy: Surely
the President isn’t above the law? Under the U.S. Constitution, however,
the legislative code only frames the question about legality; it doesn’t necessarily answer it. Consider by contrast a jurisdiction where the answer
really is that simple. In the United Kingdom, statutes control the Crown—
full stop. Whether courts trace the origins of the proposition to dictum
from the Case of Proclamations, 14 the statutory abrogation of royal
suspension and dispensation,15 or the evolution of political conventions
after the Glorious Revolution,16 the principle of legislative sovereignty
has now been established for centuries:
[T]he most fundamental rule of UK constitutional law is that
the Crown in Parliament is sovereign and that legislation
enacted by the Crown with the consent of both Houses of
Parliament is supreme . . . . Parliament can, by enactment of primary legislation, change the law of the land in any way it chooses.
There is no superior form of law than primary legislation . . . .17
14. See R (Miller) v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5,
[44] (“In the early 17th century Case of Proclamations, Sir Edward Coke CJ said that ‘the
King by his proclamation or other ways cannot change any part of the common law, or
statute law, or the customs of the realm.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Case of Proclamations
(1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, 1353; 12 Co. Rep. 74, 75 (KB))). Although Coke’s statement
“may have been controversial at the time, it had become ﬁrmly established by the end of
the century.” Id.
15. See id. at [40]–[47] (explaining that the prerogative powers of the Crown “were
progressively reduced” in “a number of seminal events,” chief among which were “a series
of statutes enacted in the twenty years between 1688 and 1707” that included the Bill of
Rights, the Act of Settlement, the Claim of Right, and the Acts of Union).
16. See R (Miller) v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC
(Admin) 2768 [26], overruled by [2017] UKSC 5.
17. Id. at [20]. See also A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution 3–4 (Liberty Fund reprint 1982) (8th ed. 1915) (“Parliament . . . has, under
the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that
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There is thus no such thing as an indefeasible residuum of royal power
that is immune from legislative interference: The Crown cannot act in defiance of the statutory framework.
It’s more complicated in the United States. American sovereignty is
famously divided—ﬁrst between the federal government and the states,
and then among the branches of the federal government itself. It’s not
just that no single entity possesses unitary authority over the coercive
power of the state. Even if the political institutions were to act in perfect
cooperative concert, they still couldn’t exercise genuinely plenary control—not even as a collective. That’s because all of them are bound by
the U.S. Constitution, which puts some kinds of policy choices completely off limits—such that sovereignty (whatever exactly that means)
resides not in any set of political institutions but “in” the American
people (whoever exactly they are) on terms currently deﬁned by the
Constitution itself (whatever exactly that is).
The point here isn’t the metaphysics of nationhood but the pragmatics of turf wars. No American political entity possesses anything like
Parliament’s plenary authority and legal supremacy. To the contrary, at
the federal level, the Constitution parcels out discrete legal authorities—
and only those authorities—to the various players in the system. Like a
corporation’s founding charter or an international organization’s constitutive treaty, the Constitution conveys only those powers that the stakeholders choose to convey. This gives rise to a foundational principle of
American governance: Any federal action that cannot trace its authority
to some constitutional grant of power is, by deﬁnition, ultra vires.18
And that brings us back to the questions outlined above. Unlike the
U.K. prime minister, the American President can’t ﬁgure out whether he
gets to act without legislative authorization—much less in violation of a
statute—by making grand inquiries about the locus of sovereignty.
no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set
aside the legislation of Parliament.”). For the most part, scholars now really only debate
the extent to which Parliament could revise its own internal “manner and form” rules to
restrict its own future ability to enact legislation. Compare Ivor Jennings, The Law and the
Constitution 152–53 (5th ed. 1959) (“[T]he ‘legal sovereign’ may impose legal limitations
upon itself, because its power to change the law includes the power to change the law
affecting itself.”), with Dicey, supra, at 24 n.48 (“[A] sovereign power cannot, while retaining its sovereign character, restrict its own powers by any particular enactment.”). The U.K.
courts do apply a clear-statement rule to these questions: Statutes do not bind the Crown
unless that feature is either express or a necessary implication of their structure and
function. R (Black) v. Sec’y of State for Justice [2017] UKSC 81 [36]–[37], [2018] AC 215.
18. That does not necessarily mean there must be some subjects the federal
government can’t regulate. Compare Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519,
534 (2012) (“The enumeration of powers is also a limitation of powers, because ‘[t]he
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824))), with Richard Primus, The Limits of
Enumeration, 124 Yale L.J. 576, 580 (2014) (“[W]hether the powers of Congress have as
great a scope in practice as a general police power is a matter of contingency, not a matter
of principle.”).
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Instead, the conversation begins with a small-bore question: Is there
some constitutional grant of presidential authority over this kind of
wiretapping, torturing, bombing, or scrivening?19 If there isn’t, then he
can’t.20 That conclusion follows necessarily: Either he has no legal authority at all (and so lacks the power ab initio), or he has only statutory authorization (and so his power is necessarily limited by the statute’s restrictions).
Either way, the President can’t ignore the law.
So for questions like ours, the enumeration problem is central: What
powers does the Constitution grant to the President? Well, it’s a grab
bag—and not a terribly big one. Article II begins by vesting “the executive Power” in the President.21 After specifying the details of eligibility
and election, the Constitution then names the President “Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States” and of the state militias
“when called into the actual Service of the United States.”22 In the realm
of foreign affairs, the President has the power to “make Treaties” if two
thirds of the Senate concurs, to “receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers,” and to “nominate” and “appoint” U.S. diplomats with senatorial consent. 23 On “extraordinary Occasions,” the President has the
authority to convene both houses of Congress.24 Finally, the President has
an overarching obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed” and must take an oath to “preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States.”25 When it comes to the provisions of
Article II plausibly bearing on the questions at issue, that’s more or less
it.26
This Article focuses on the ﬁrst of these enumerations. Its text has all
the romance of a human resources circular: “The executive power shall

19. Note that even if the answer is yes, the power in question might still be subject to
at least certain kinds of statutory restraint. But presidentialist claims about preclusive
power over wiretapping, torturing, bombing, or scrivening don’t even get off the ground
without at least pointing to a constitutional enumeration that starts the argument.
20. Of course, the statute might be unconstitutional for reasons other than that it
interferes with an indefeasible power of the President. Perhaps it violates some provision
of the Bill of Rights. Or perhaps it exceeds the legislative authority granted by Article I to
the national government.
21. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
22. Id. § 2.
23. Id. §§ 2–3.
24. Id. § 3.
25. Id. §§ 1, 3.
26. To focus analytical attention, I am including only those powers that could plausibly be relevant to a presidential power to wiretap, torture, bomb, or scriven. Omitted from
this list are the President’s pardon power; the President’s power to make various kinds of
appointments of judges and other officers of the United States; and the President’s power
to “require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.” Id. § 2. I also
haven’t mentioned the veto, which is a legislative power granted in the President’s capacity
as a participant in the legislative process. See id. art. I, § 7.
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be vested in a President of the United States of America.”27 Yet this ﬁrst
sentence of Article II presents what Gary Lawson calls “one of the most
important questions of any kind, on any subject, under the Federal
Constitution.”28 That’s because “the executive power” is the last best
hope of Presidents who want to take action without legislative authorization.29 (The other enumerations are of course relevant to—and possibly preclusive of—statutes touching on the kinds of activities they
authorize.30 But the universe of such activities is not large.)
There are at least three ways to understand Article II’s reference to
the executive power. The first is what I will call the “CrossReference” theory, which understands “the executive power” as a
content-free referent to the rest of Article II. This thin reading of the
Executive Power Clause has been embraced by Supreme Court Justices,31
27. Id. art. II, § 1.
28. See Lawson, supra note 10, at 383; see also Michael W. McConnell, The President
Who Would Not Be King 124 (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (“[W]hether that Clause imparts any power to the President is one of the most
contested questions in constitutional law.”).
29. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1984, at 211
(Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter Corwin, The President]
(noting the tendency in constitutional interpretation to “regard[] the ‘executive power’
clause as an always available peg on which to hang any and all unassigned powers in
respect to foreign intercourse”); Charles C. Thach, Jr., The Creation of the Presidency,
1775–1789: A Study in Constitutional History 139 (1922) (“[W]hether intentional or not,
[the Executive Power Clause] admitted an interpretation of executive power which would
give to the President a ﬁeld of action much wider than that outlined by the enumerated
powers.”); Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The President and the Law, 67 Pol. Sci. Q. 321, 333
(1952) (“[T]he defenders of residual power [argue that] . . . the President has been granted by the Constitution itself a legal power to act in emergencies. If it be asked where in the
Constitution this power is to be found, the questioner is referred to the opening sentence
of Article II . . . .”).
For originalists, the practical importance of this escape valve has only increased since
work by Marty Lederman, David Barron, and Ingrid Wuerth has demonstrated that the
Commander in Chief power was historically subordinate to legislative instructions on
military policy, strategy, and tactics alike. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original
Understanding, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 696 (2008); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International
Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered,
106 Mich. L. Rev. 61, 65–66 (2007).
30. Take a statute prohibiting presidential nomination of ambassadors. Most people
would think the President legally entitled to ignore that statute and nominate ambassadors
to his heart’s content. It should be noted that—strangely to modern ears, and at obvious
odds with our assumptions about constitutional textualism—a persistent thread in the
Founding debates suggests that at least some of the President’s textual powers could be
eliminated by statute. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 73, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian
Shapiro ed., 2009) (“Without [a veto], . . . [h]e might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote.”).
31. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (“I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic
powers thereafter stated.”); id. at 632–33 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Article II which vests
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legislators,32 and a number of academics.33 On this view, the term is a
convenient lexical handle for a grab bag of powers. The full contents of
that grab bag are set out in the remainder of Article II. And nothing else
goes in the bag. While this approach reads the Executive Power Clause as
substantively prefatory, it does leave the clause with one signiﬁcant job:
clarifying that the listed powers belong to the President and no one else.
That speciﬁcation is more signiﬁcant than it might seem. Repulsed by
even the suggestion of kingship, some early state constitutions vested
such powers in a committee rather than in one individual34—producing
exactly the kinds of indecision, ineffectiveness, and delay that you would
expect. And so on the Cross-Reference theory, a muscularly centralizing
Constitution responded by using the Executive Power Clause to preclude
the possibility of devolution to governance by committee.

the ‘executive Power’ in the President deﬁnes that power with particularity.”). The
majority opinion in INS v. Chadha gestures at this view as well: “When the Executive acts,
he presumptively acts in an executive or administrative capacity as deﬁned in Art. II.” 462
U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (emphasis added).
32. See Daniel Webster, Speech on the Appointing and Removing Power (Feb. 16,
1835), in 4 The Works of Daniel Webster 179, 187 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 18th ed.
1881) (“By the executive power conferred on the President, the Constitution means no more
than that portion which it itself creates, and which it qualiﬁes, limits, and circumscribes.”).
33. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 49–52 (1994) (arguing that the President’s constitutional powers do
not extend beyond Article II’s explicit provisions); Robert G. Natelson, The Original
Meaning of the Constitution’s “Executive Vesting Clause”—Evidence from EighteenthCentury Drafting Practice, 31 Whittier L. Rev. 1, 35 (2009) (concluding that historical
evidence suggests that Article II, like Article I, was a mere designation clause rather than a
conferral of power); Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 Am. U. L. Rev.
259, 263–64 (2009) (“This Article rejects the position that the Vesting Clause is a residual
source of plenary presidential powers beyond those enumerated in Article II.”); see also
Corwin, The President, supra note 29, at 177.
34. See, e.g., Md. Const. of 1776, art. XXVI, reprinted in 3 The Federal and State
Constitutions Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and
Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 1686, 1695–701
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter Federal and State Constitutions] (creating an executive council with veto power over many of the governor’s executive functions);
N.H. Const. of 1784, pt. II, reprinted in 4 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 2453,
2465–66 (adding a council to the existing legislature, but no chief magistrate); Pa. Const.
of 1776, § 3, reprinted in 5 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 3081, 3084 (“The
supreme executive power shall be vested in a president and [twelve-person] council.”); Vt.
Const. of 1777, ch. II, §§ 3, 17, reprinted in 6 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at
3737, 3742, 3744 (“The supreme executive power shall be vested in a Governor and
[twelve-person] Council.”); see also, e.g., Del. Const. of 1776, art. 7, reprinted in 1 Federal
and State Constitutions, supra, at 562, 563 (establishing a chief magistrate elected by
legislature); Ga. Const. of 1777, art. II, reprinted in 2 Federal and State Constitutions,
supra, at 777, 778 (creating a governor selected by legislature); S.C. Const. of 1776, art. III,
reprinted in 6 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 3241, 3243 (providing for the
chief magistrate’s election by legislature); cf. N.Y. Const. of 1777, art. XXIII, reprinted in 5
Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 2623, 2633–34 (vesting appointment power in a
council).
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The second understanding, which I will call the “Law Execution”
theory, gives the opening clause its own independent substantive content.
On this view—which has found support among Presidents,35 Supreme
Court Justices,36 and scholars37—“the executive power” is exactly what it
sounds like: the power to execute the law. The executive power thus authorizes the President to bring that law—which before execution exists only
on paper—into effect in the real world. Sometimes this might mean
coercing obedience from private parties, like ticketing jaywalkers. Other
times it might mean implementing an affirmative project of the legislature, like picking up the garbage. Either way, the executive power enables
the President to spearhead the project of connecting legal imperative to
physical reality: “Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement
the legislative mandate,” the Supreme Court tells us, “is the very essence
of ‘execution’ of the law.”38 And no other provision of the Constitution
gives it to the President as an affirmative enforcement authority rather
than as a Take Care compliance obligation.39

35. Cf. William Howard Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers 139–40 (1916)
(“The true view of the Executive functions is . . . that the President can exercise no power
which cannot be . . . traced to some speciﬁc grant of power or justly implied . . . within
such express grant as . . . necessary to its exercise. . . . There is no undeﬁned residuum of
power which he can exercise . . . .”).
36. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment) (equating the executive power with “energetic, vigorous, decisive, and speedy
execution of the laws”).
37. See, e.g., Wilmerding, supra note 29, at 334 (arguing that the Founders intended
Article II’s Executive Power Clause to confer only the limited power to carry into
execution Congress’s laws); cf. Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in
Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 309, 314, 344–59 (2006) (discussing the
“executive Power” vested in the President and concluding that “the Constitution does not
vest in the president a general, independent lawmaking power in foreign affairs”). For
some legal historians who appear to embrace this view, see, for example, William B. Gwyn,
The Meaning of the Separation of Powers 5 (1965) (“[S]eparation of powers . . . distinguishes between law-making and the implementation of the law in particular instances.”);
M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 32 (1998) (citing several
seventeenth-century sources in support of the claim that contemporaries understood executive power to mean “the machinery by which the law was put into effect”); Francis Wormuth,
The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism 61–62 (1949) (ﬁnding that a binary legislative–
executive separation of powers doctrine—with the judicial function acting as a subset of
the latter—persisted through the middle of the eighteenth century); cf. Curtis A. Bradley
& Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev.
545, 581 n.146 (2004) (“[W]e do not necessarily disagree . . . that the term ‘executive
power’ might have been understood by the Founders to refer generically to the authority to
implement the laws.”).
38. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732–33 (1986). Michael McConnell draws a nice
distinction between “executing a law and executing a power.” McConnell, supra note 28, at
27. As he puts it, “[t]he former entails carrying into effect policies set by the lawmaker,
and the latter entails both the making of policy and its execution.” Id.
39. For a terriﬁc examination of the historical meaning of the Take Care Clause, see
Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article
II, 132 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming June 2019) (manuscript at 9) (on ﬁle with the Columbia
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The third understanding is what I will call the “Royal Residuum”
Thesis. 40 (It’s often called the Vesting Clause Thesis, but that is an
unhelpful description. All three theories have a Thesis about what is
Vested by the Clause.) As described above, this understanding takes “the
executive power” as a term of art referring to a well-understood bundle
of authorities that went well beyond the speciﬁc enumerations elsewhere
in Article II. “Because supreme executives in other countries had a similar basket of powers,” Royal Residuum theorists argue, “it became common to speak of an ‘executive power’ that encompassed an array of powers
commonly wielded by monarchs.”41 Here’s a typical modern description of
what went in the basket:
Traditionally, the “executive power” was understood at the time
of the framing as including the power of war and peace, and all
external relations of the nation. . . .
But the President was left with whatever remained of the
traditional “executive power” in matters of war, peace, and
foreign affairs, diminished to a signiﬁcant extent, but not completely, by the re-allocation of some very important, traditionally
executive, powers to Congress.42
Leaning heavily on two eighteenth-century writers to whom I will return
below,43 Royal Residuum theorists conclude that “[b]y using a common
phrase infused with that meaning, the Constitution establishes a presumption that the President will enjoy those foreign affairs powers that
were traditionally part of the executive power.”44 For judges who subscribe to these claims, the doctrinal implications are straightforward: “[T]he
Law Review) (“Our history . . . supports readings of Article II that tend to subordinate
presidential power to congressional direction . . . .”).
40. I am open to other names for this third understanding. On one hand, Royal
Residuum proponents may feel mine stacks the deck by associating their position with
monarchy. On the other hand, its royal roots are literally the only theory on which the
President possesses such power, such that objectively this title is a simple descriptive observation about a necessary logical step in the claim. I welcome suggestions for an alternative
that is distinctive, substantively signiﬁcant, and accurate.
41. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning: The Constitution
of the Original Executive 31 (2015). Royal Residuum theorists often note that law
execution is among the authorities conveyed by the Executive Power Clause. See, e.g.,
Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 701,
701–04 [hereinafter Prakash, Essential Meaning] (“[T]he phrase ‘executive power’ comes
from the principal or essential power of an executive—the power to execute the law.”).
42. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 Const. Comment. 215, 237–
38 (2002) (footnote omitted); see also John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace 19 (2005)
(citing “political theory” and “Anglo-American constitutional history” to claim that “the
executive power was understood at the time of the Constitution’s framing to include the
war, treaty, and other general foreign affairs powers”).
43. See infra section IV.B (discussing how modern Royal Residuum theorists have
misunderstood Montesquieu and Thomas Rutherforth).
44. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231, 234 (2001) [hereinafter Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs].

1182

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119:1169

‘executive Power’ vested in the President by Article II includes the residual foreign affairs powers of the Federal Government not otherwise allocated by the Constitution.”45
The Royal Residuum Thesis has been remarkably successful. Besides
support from Supreme Court Justices,46 prominent federal legislators,47
leading executive branch officials,48 and at least one President,49 it is easily
the dominant historical account among modern commentators.50 Certainly,
45. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2099 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
46. See id.; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 680–84 (1952)
(Vinson, J., dissenting) (rejecting proposition that “[t]he broad executive power granted
by Article II . . . cannot, it is said, be invoked to avert disaster”); cf. United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (“The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is
inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.”).
47. See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. S2640 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(“[T]he President’s powers include inherent executive authorities that are unenumerated
in the Constitution. Thus, any ambiguities in the allocation of a power that is executive in
nature—particularly in foreign affairs—should be resolved in favor of the executive
branch.”).
48. See, e.g., Exercising Congress’s Constitutional Power to End a War: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 73 (2007) (statement of Bradford
Berenson, former Associate Counsel to the President) (“The Vesting Clause provides the
President a vast reserve of implied authority to do whatever may be necessary in executing
the laws and governing the nation.”); cf. Memorandum from Bill Barr to Rod Rosenstein,
Deputy Att’y Gen. & Steve Engle, Assistant Att’y Gen. 13 (June 8, 2018) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (“The authority to . . . remove principal Executive officers . . . [is]
quintessentially Executive in character and among the discretionary powers vested exclusively in the President by the Constitution.”).
49. See Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography 357 (1903) (discussing Roosevelt’s
belief that “the executive power was limited only by specific restrictions” in the Constitution
or “imposed by Congress” and that it was both the President’s “right” and “duty” to do
anything demanded by the nation unless the “action was forbidden by the Constitution or
by the laws”). Roosevelt elaborated that “[u]nder this interpretation of executive power, I
did and caused to be done many things not previously done.” Id.
50. See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional Monarch?
6 (1989) (“The international powers of the nation are . . . to be deduced . . . from their
matrix in international law . . . . In this [area] . . . , Congress is entrusted with speciﬁed
legislative powers and the President with ‘the’ executive power of the United States, save
for a number of exceptions noted in the document itself . . . .”); Phillip R. Trimble,
International Law: United States Foreign Relations Law 21 (2002) (“[T]he Framers well
understood the concept of executive power in British practice, [and] they . . . parcelled
out its components to different branches of the new government, but they retained the
residual executive power in the President. Unless the Vesting Clause is meaningless it
incorporates the unallocated parts of Royal Prerogative.”); Robert F. Turner, Repealing the
War Powers Resolution 54–56 (1991) (“[T]he Founding Fathers intended to grant the
president exclusive control over foreign affairs, subject only to certain very important but
limited exceptions spelled out in the text of the Constitution.”); Charles J. Cooper et al.,
What the Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 165, 177 (1988)
(explaining that “the founding generation understood executive power as conferring a
broad authority that extended beyond the mere execution of the laws” and that the
Founders believed Article II to include “the conduct of foreign relations”); Gary Lawson &
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the historical claim is expressed with sufficient frequency and conﬁdence
that, particularly in the wake of its seminal modern summation by
Saikrishna Prakash and Michael Ramsey,51 I had long assumed at least
some version of it to be correct. The consequences of that success are
stark, at least for originalists willing to stick with the full logical consequences. If the Executive Power Clause really is a royal residuum, then
the President is endowed—it would seem indefeasibly—with those aspects
of kingly authority that have not been reallocated to other actors.
Take, for example, the now-retracted memo in which the Office of
Legal Counsel advised George W. Bush’s Defense Department that it was
legally entitled to torture suspected terrorists. The first sentence of Article
II was front and center in explaining why the relevant criminal statutes
would be unconstitutional as applied to torture by federal officials:
First, we discuss the constitutional foundations of the President’s
power, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, to conduct
military operations during the current armed conﬂict. . . .
....
. . . The decision to deploy military force in the defense of
U.S. interests is expressly placed under Presidential authority by
the Vesting Clause and by the Commander-in-Chief Clause. . . .
[T]he structure of the Constitution demonstrates that any power
traditionally understood as pertaining to the executive—which
includes the conduct of warfare and the defense of the nation—
unless expressly assigned to Congress, is vested in the President.
Article II, Section 1 makes this clear by stating that the “executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America.”52
Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 41 (“[T]he ‘executive
Power’ also includes foreign affairs powers that are not otherwise allocated to speciﬁc
institutions by the Constitution.”); Michael D. Ramsey, The Textual Basis of the President’s
Foreign Affairs Power, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 141, 141 (2006) (“[T]he eighteenthcentury meaning of ‘executive’ power included foreign affairs powers as well as the more
familiar power to execute the law. Thus, Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution . . .
grants, in eighteenth-century terms, the power to execute the law plus foreign affairs
powers.”); John C. Yoo, Rejoinder, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of
Delegation, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1305, 1309 (2002) (“Article II’s Vesting Clause establishes a
rule of construction that any unenumerated executive power, such as that over treaty
interpretation, must be given to the President.”); McConnell, supra note 28, at 43
(“‘[E]xecutive’ power in the British system was whatever governmental power was left after
subtracting the powers of the Parliament and of the courts.”); cf. Gordon S. Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787, at 155 (2d ed. 1998) (“[F]unctions that in
the English constitutional tradition [were] executive [included] the proroguing and
adjourning of the assembly, the declaring of war and peace, the conduct of foreign relations, and . . . the exclusive right of pardon.”).
51. See Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 44, at
252–56.
52. Office of Legal Counsel Torture Memorandum, supra note 2, at 2, 4–5 (footnote
omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 1). The memorandum devoted
most of the first paragraph of a section titled “Commander-in-Chief Authority” to arguments
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In the same vein, the Office of Legal Counsel later advised the Attorney
General that, because of the President’s “‘unique responsibility,’ as
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, for ‘foreign and military affairs’ as well as national security,” Barack Obama had constitutional
authority to initiate the use of force against Libya without congressional
approval.53 And Justice Thomas argued that the Executive Power Clause,
standing alone, justiﬁed presidential deﬁance of a statute that required
the United States to issue a passport listing “Israel” as the place of birth for
a young boy born in Jerusalem.54
To be sure, the Royal Residuum Thesis has met strong resistance as a
basis for modern doctrine—certainly it has never commanded a majority
on the Supreme Court. The principal textual criticism has been the redundancy it creates within Article II.55 Other resistance has focused either on
disputing the size of the historical bundle or contesting its methodological relevance today. As a historical matter, there are ongoing disputes
even among proponents of the Royal Residuum Thesis about just how far
the package of powers was understood to extend.56 There is likewise at
least some disagreement among advocates of the theory about whether
the royal residuum sits in Youngstown Zone Two or Zone Three—that is,
whether its contents were defeasible by an otherwise appropriate act of

grounded in the Executive Power Clause. Id.; see also id. at 11 (“Because both ‘[t]he executive power and the command of the military and naval forces is vested in the President,’
the Supreme Court has unanimously stated that it is ‘the President alone [] who is
constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile operations.’” (alterations in original)
(quoting Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 87 (1874))).
53. Office of Legal Counsel Libya Memorandum, supra note 6, at 6 (quoting Sale v.
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993)) (citing U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1;
id. § 2, cl. 2).
54. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2097–98 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
55. If “the executive power” presumptively includes the military and diplomatic
authorities of the king, for example, then why should the Constitution specify the
President’s role as the Commander in Chief or his authority to receive ambassadors?
Residuum theorists have responses to some, but not all, of these surplusage concerns. For
example, they explain Article II’s speciﬁc reference to the President’s treaty power and
appointments power (both of which were included in the royal prerogative) as being
instances not of redundancy but of qualiﬁcation. I’m not sure how much this back and
forth is worth; either way it seems unlikely that the Framers were the superhumanly
“fastidious draftsmen” of our fondest imaginings. See Raoul Berger, The Presidential
Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1972).
56. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 8, at 569 n.108 (“Professor
Calabresi . . . emphasizes that any constitutional residuum that exists is very limited in
scope and reﬂects the fact that the President’s powers are necessarily something of a historical grab bag of anomalies that could not be given to anyone else.”); cf. Harold Hongju
Koh, The National Security Constitution 76 (1990) (discussing “that nebulous grant” of
executive power); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum.
L. Rev. 1, 22 (1993) (“[D]efenders of the ‘residuum’ position must be awarded the palm. . . .
The real question, however, is the size of the palm.”).
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Congress.57 And as a methodological matter, some critics deny that the
original understanding (even where discernible) should decide modern
separation of powers controversies. They emphasize, with strong support
in Supreme Court doctrine, that considerations like functionalism and
evolving historical practice also play an important role.58
Among constitutional originalists, however, the Royal Residuum
Thesis remains dominant. At most, criticism of the historical claim—
exempliﬁed by the work of Martin Flaherty and Curt Bradley59—challenges particular bits of evidence offered by Royal Residuum theorists
and contends that the Founders had more amorphous and varying views
than the Thesis recognizes.60 The real mistake of the Royal Residuum
57. As noted in the introduction, this Article focuses on the content of the powers
conveyed by the Executive Power Clause, rather than the subsequent question of whether
any such powers are defeasible. If the President has no inherent power to wiretap, bomb,
torture, or scriven, it follows a fortiori that he can’t do so in violation of a statutory
prohibition. For Royal Residuum theorists who appear to view at least some Executive
Power Clause authorities as defeasible, see Monaghan, supra note 56, at 23–24 (“[A]n
acceptable residuum argument . . . provides no basis for a claim that the President can disregard the will of Congress . . . .”); McConnell, supra note 28, at 164 (“The defeasible
character of this power follows from its status as residual: [O]nly authority not otherwise
allocated is left to the President, so when Congress exercises one of its enumerated
powers, it displaces presidential authority.”); see also Roosevelt, supra note 49, at 357
(“[T]he executive power was limited only by speciﬁc restrictions and prohibitions
appearing in the Constitution or imposed by Congress under its Constitutional powers.”).
58. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 2076 at 2086; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
688 (1981); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued
to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a
gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”); Taft, supra note 35, at
135 (“Executive power is sometimes created by custom, and so strong is the inﬂuence of
custom that it seems almost to amend the Constitution.”); cf. Robert Scigliano, The
President’s “Prerogative Power,” in Inventing the American Presidency 236, 247 (Thomas
E. Cronin ed., 1989) (“This is not the place to settle the dispute between Hamilton and
Madison over the scope of the executive power—whether it relates to the execution of the
laws . . . [or] also to foreign affairs. [But] Hamilton’s conception has largely won out in the
practice of American government . . . .”).
Note here, however, that even the Supreme Court’s discussion of evolving practice
appears to lash that practice to the textual hook of “executive power”: “[T]he historical
gloss on the ‘executive Power’ . . . has recognized the President’s ‘vast share of responsibility
for the conduct of our foreign relations.’” Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414
(2003) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
59. E.g., Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 37, at 551–52 (rejecting “executive power
essentialism,” deﬁned as “the proposition that the Founders had in mind, and intended
the Constitution to reﬂect, a conception of what is ‘naturally’ or ‘essentially’ within executive power”); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1729
(1996) [hereinafter Flaherty, Most Dangerous Branch] (seeking “to construct a narrative
of constitutional development based not solely or even principally on primary materials,
but rather on the wealth of historical scholarship that has recently been devoted to the
Founding”).
60. See, e.g., Natelson, supra note 33, at 35 (arguing that a structural comparison to
power-granting charters from the Founding Era supports the Cross-Reference theory of
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Thesis, Flaherty and Bradley argue, is what they consider an ahistorical
decision to seek an “essential” deﬁnition of executive power in the ﬁrst
place. In their view, that whole enterprise is misconceived from the getgo, partly because of “complexity within eighteenth-century political
theory” and partly because “the constitutional Founders were [demonstrably] functionalists, willing to deviate from pure political theory and
essentialist categories.”61 As Flaherty has written elsewhere, “the sweep of
events [following the American Revolution] belies the assumption that
the formalist conception was a constant and renders improbable the notion
that it became the consensus.”62 It verges on law-office history to suggest
otherwise.
In practice, this fundamentally equivocal criticism reduces to a caution ﬂag of uncertainty, contingency, and historical contestation—a sort
of standard historian’s warning that likely underwhelms executive branch
lawyers and judges who must reach a binary yes-or-no decision. As Aziz
Huq explains in his generally sympathetic account of the arguments
advanced by scholars like Bradley and Flaherty as well as Peter Strauss,
Lawrence Lessig, and Cass Sunstein:
[T]he leading work [criticizing the Royal Residuum thesis and
associated theories] ﬁnds the text inescapably ambivalent. Such
work instead situates the Constitution in what is described as a
ﬂuid, contested, and unstable eighteenth-century debate about
the appropriate internal organization of government . . . . In
consequence, [these scholars] decline to draw a strong conclusion from the Constitution’s text, preratiﬁcation practice, or

executive power); Reinstein, supra note 33, at 307–09 (arguing that the Constitution’s
explicit textual allocation of other royal prerogatives supports the Cross-Reference theory
of executive power). Given the lead their work takes in challenging the affirmative evidence offered by Residuum theorists, I am especially grateful to Curt and Marty for their
close engagement with earlier drafts of this Article. While this Article suggests that they
have erred in some important respects, they have the “music” of the Founding right—our
bottom line on the separation of powers framework is quite close—and I have immense
respect for the precision and care of their work.
61. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 37, at 551–52. This commitment frames their
work as a careful series of engagements with individual elements of evidence previously
offered by Royal Residuum theorists, seeking in each instance to show how that evidence
does not necessarily bear the weight of Residuum theorists’ argument. Bradley and Flaherty
aim, in other words, to negate or at least problematize the affirmative evidence offered by
Royal Residuum theorists, and in particular to reject “a conception of ‘executive power’ as
a deﬁned category that can be distinguished from legislative powers.” See id. at 592; see
also Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 70–71 (enlarged
ed. 1992) (“The clarity of modern assumption of a tripartite division of the functions of government into legislative, executive, and judicial powers did not exist for the colonists . . . .”).
62. Flaherty, Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 59, at 1774; see also id. at 1734
(“Formalist catechism posits three discrete branches, each exercising one of three distinct
powers. . . . No less importantly, formalist precepts consider legislative, executive, and judicial powers, which mark the proper domains of their respective branches, to be readily
identiﬁable.”).
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Founding-era interpretative conventions about the precise contours of each branch’s authority.63
This Article goes beyond previous work in two ways: first, in the scope
and systematic treatment of the evidence reviewed. In contrast to a brief
engagement with four or ﬁve works of early modern political theory, this
Article relies on more than a thousand contemporaneous published texts
by hundreds of commentators, with a research methodology that involved
reviewing every instance of the word root “exec-” and reading most of
the texts cover to cover with the topic of presidential power squarely in
mind. That immersion in the evidence enables the second distinctive
feature of this project: the confidence with which this Article can not only
refute the Royal Residuum Thesis, but also offer an affirmative
replacement theory that is both historically and theoretically coherent—
and that cannot be caricatured as so much carping about a thicket of
contestation and uncertainty.
To be clear, this Article does not engage nonoriginalist arguments
for an Article II residuum. The thesis defended here rests neither on the
mistaken textualist premise that the Constitution must be read to avoid
surplusage, nor on a contestable methodological commitment to custom
and tradition as a source of constitutional meaning. Instead, the Article
63. Aziz Z. Huq, Separation of Powers Metatheory, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 1517, 1530–31
(2018) (reviewing Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the
Separation of Powers (2017)) (footnotes omitted); see also Lawson & Seidman, supra note
50, at 41 (“[T]he term ‘executive Power’ clearly did not have a single, well-deﬁned, universally understood meaning in the founding era . . . .”); id. at 42 (“[But] [a]t the risk of
engaging a 144-page discussion in a few sentences: it does not suffice to say, as Professors
Bradley and Flaherty convincingly say, that ‘executive Power’ was a messy, contested
concept in the late eighteenth century.”); Victoria F. Nourse & John P. Figura, Toward A
Representational Theory of the Executive, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 273, 290 n.118 (2011)
(reviewing Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential
Power from Washington to Bush (2008)) (endorsing Bradley and Flaherty’s thesis “that
executive-power essentialism ‘errs . . . in its presumption that America’s constitutional
practitioners mechanically applied European political and legal theory’” (quoting Bradley
& Flaherty, supra note 37, at 572)). For better or worse, Prakash and Ramsey put it more
pointedly: “[W]hile Bradley and Flaherty devote much energy to the Constitution’s
creation, . . . [o]n the most important points they either concede our view, make only
conclusory statements, or say nothing.” Prakash & Ramsey, The Jeffersonian Executive,
supra note 10, at 1661.
As I will show, Bradley and Flaherty seem wrong in concluding that the Founders had
contested, uncertain, or otherwise difficult-to-pin-down views on the conceptual content of
“the executive power” as a speciﬁc authority of government. But the effective substance of
what could be read as their ultimate (though unsubstantiated) conclusion—namely, that
Royal Residuum theorists have not amassed enough evidence to dislodge what would
otherwise appear to be the meaning of a word whose root is “execut-”—is certainly
consistent with the meaning that I affirmatively establish here. See Bradley & Flaherty,
supra note 37, at 581 n.146 (“[W]e do not necessarily disagree with Professor Prakash that
the term ‘executive power’ might have been understood by the Founders to refer
generically to the authority to implement the laws.”). But see Flaherty, Most Dangerous
Branch, supra note 59, at 1778 (“[T]he Vesting Clause should not be read to grant the
executive branch a prepackaged set of powers.”).
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targets the Royal Residuum Thesis where it lives: as a descriptive
historical assertion about the semantic content of a standard eighteenthcentury legal concept. In that respect, the piece begins by agreeing with
Royal Residuum theorists—thereby diverging sharply from Bradley and
Flaherty—that the Founders did “ha[ve] in mind, and intend[] the
Constitution to reﬂect, a conception of what is ‘naturally’ or ‘essentially’
within executive power.”64 This project will show, however, that the meaning was unambiguously limited to law execution. And it will offer a fully
worked-out explanation of how that authority operated in an integrated
constitutional context.
II. POLITICAL THEORY
The Article’s methodology is motivated by a metaphor: standing in
front of James Madison’s bookshelf and pulling texts off the wall to ask,
what was the foundation on which the Founders were building? First,
normatively: What did the canonical works of political, philosophical,
and legal theory have to say about the functions and powers of government, particularly its head magistrate? Second, semantically: What words
did the canonical authors use when talking about these various functions
and powers?
I have not, of course, literally identiﬁed every book in Madison’s
possession or limited myself to the holdings of one man. Rather, the man
and his bookshelf stand in for the educated American public and the
corpus of materials from which its understandings were drawn. That said,
the bookshelf conceit is not entirely metaphorical. We know a lot about
what the Founders were reading, partly from statistical analysis of citations in political debates and the contemporary press,65 and partly from
inventories of real bookshelves, often in the form of library catalogs, probate records, and purchase orders. 66 On the background of such
64. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 37, at 551–52 (rejecting this claim); see also id. at
685 (“There are a number of weaknesses in Madison’s analysis [as Helvidius]. . . . First,
Madison, atypically for him, relies on essentialist reasoning . . . . Madison talks as if there
are pure categories of executive and legislative power, and he simply disagrees with
Hamilton about what those categories should look like.”). I’m with Madison here in two
ways. I too think there were pure categories of executive and legislative power. And I too
simply disagree with the Royal Residuum theorists about what those categories should look
like.
65. See Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Inﬂuence of European Writers on Late
Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 189, 190–92 (1984)
(analyzing 916 American political writings published during the Founding Era between
1760 and 1805).
66. See Trevor Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual
Origins of the American Revolution 11–24 (Liberty Fund 1998) (1966) (surveying library
catalogs during the eighteenth century); David Lundberg & Henry F. May, The Enlightened
Reader in America, 28 Am. Q. 262, 262–64 (1976) (detailing the reception in America of
major European Enlightenment authors); Minor Myers, Jr., A Source for EighteenthCentury Harvard Master’s Questions, 38 Wm. & Mary Q. 261–62 (1981) (analyzing the
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evidence—as processed by decades of painstaking work by archivists and
intellectual historians—American historian Jack Rakove sketches the
scholarly consensus about “those intellectual sources of inﬂuence that
shaped the mental world of the revolutionary generation”:
There is no question that politically articulate eighteenth-century
Americans—and certainly members of the political elite—were
eclectically conversant with the works of luminaries like Hobbes,
Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, and Blackstone. They were also
well-versed in the richly polemical literature of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century English politics; the moral philosophy and
faculty psychology of the Scottish enlightenment; the disquisitions on public law of such European authorities as Grotius,
Pufendorf, and Delolme; and, one might add en passant, the
inheritance of English jurisprudence. American thinking about
politics was no doubt also shaped by reading in the classics, the
legacy of Newtonian science, and even the emphasis on sympathy in eighteenth-century philosophy and literature (which
resonates strongly in their notions of representation). All of
these writings shaped the intellectual context in which the
Framers and Ratiﬁers acted. Whether we think of these ideas as
big concepts whose evolution can be traced in a classic historyof-ideas mode, or as elements of ideologies like republicanism
or liberalism, or as competing Foucauldian discourses, it seems
evident that they were essential elements of the original language of American constitutionalism.67
The consequence for any intellectually serious version of originalism is clear.
Confronted by a question about the Founders’ constitutional arrangement,
sources of the master’s quaestiones at Harvard College as a barometer of political
sentiment); see also, e.g., Eldon Revare James, A List of Legal Treatises Printed in the
British Colonies and the American States Before 1801, at 5–6 (1934); Herbert A. Johnson,
Imported Eighteenth-Century Law Treatises in American Libraries 1700–1799, at ix–xiv
(1978); Loren E. Smith, The Library List of 1783: Being a Catalogue of Books, Composed
and Arranged by James Madison, and Others, and Recommended for the Use of Congress
on January 24, 1783, with Notes and an Introduction 1–6 ( Jan. 30, 1969) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School), https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1089&context=cgu_etd [https://perma.cc/KQ3J-8V5R].
67. See Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1587,
1598–99 (1997) [hereinafter Rakove, Fidelity Through History] (footnotes omitted). For
two classic accounts of intellectual inﬂuences on the Founders, see generally Bailyn, supra
note 61; J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton Classics ed. 2016) [hereinafter Pocock,
Machiavellian Moment]. For two excellent recent treatments of executive authority in the
American political tradition, see generally Clement Fatovic, Outside the Law: Emergency
and Executive Power (2009); Benjamin A. Kleinerman, The Discretionary President: The
Promise and Peril of Executive Power (2009). For a good summary of the tradition
surrounding the legal treatises relied on so heavily in this Article, see generally A.W.B.
Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal
Literature, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 632 (1981). For a marvelously detailed survey of key
Founding-Era sources, including some of the sources relied on in this project, see
generally William Baude & Jud Campbell, Early American Constitutional History: A Source
Guide (Oct. 31, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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we must start by turning to material like this to “reconstruct the
underlying assumptions and concerns and the manifest events and experiences that presumably explain both authorial intentions and Ratiﬁer
understandings.”68
None of this will necessarily lead to a straightforward interpretive
conclusion in any case. Madison’s bookshelf was stocked with wildly varying visions of political legitimacy and good government. And that variation was well suited to the tumult and uncertainty faced by the Founders
themselves. They had shattered their relationship with the English
sovereign. They had experimented with a variety of new forms of governance. And they were facing the challenge of writing a new constitutional
charter that would both empower and constrain a national government
in a way never before achieved. Forget the vexations of federalism, the
Founding generation was profoundly uncertain even about how to structure the national entities in their own right—and how best to allocate
responsibilities and authorities among them once created.
This Article does not resist that standard picture of contestation and
uncertainty.69 There is no question that—like the intellectual legacy to which
they were heir—the colonists, revolutionaries, Philadelphia drafters,
ratiﬁcation polemicists, and state ratiﬁers expressed radically diverging
views on the best allocation of national power. There is no question that
the Constitution’s terms are abstract and incomplete in most respects,
and nowhere more so than the allocation of foreign affairs powers. And
68. See Rakove, Fidelity Through History, supra note 67, at 1598. Rakove describes
some of the “fairly obvious” bodies of evidence that “set the intellectual and political background upon which the Framers and ratiﬁers acted.” Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman
Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 San Diego L.
Rev. 575, 581–82 (2009). These included “the sources that shaped the vocabulary and
grammar of political discussions, or the traditions and texts that historians sometimes
describe as political languages.” Id. Rakove identiﬁes Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke,
Harrington, Montesquieu, Hume, Blackstone, and other authorities as having “their
place” among these sources, as do “other modes of reasoning associated . . . with classical
learning or the Commonwealth or Real Whig Tradition for which Trenchard and Gordon
remain the most representative ﬁgures.” Id.
69. As Martin Flaherty has argued, we should be skeptical of any account that would
require us to set aside the professional historical consensus about the Founders’ legal–
political culture. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 523 (1995) (citing canonical work by, inter alia, Willi
Paul Adams, Bernard Bailyn, Edward Corwin, Jack P. Greene, Forrest McDonald, J.G.A.
Pocock, Jack Rakove, John Philip Reid, and Gordon Wood). On this score, Flaherty is
clearly correct that the historiography “reveals . . . people groping as best they could
toward a workable conception of government from which only broad purposes can safely
be inferred.” See Flaherty, Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 59, at 1755. He is also
surely right that “the complex, messy, and at times contradictory ferment in constitutional
thinking renders it unlikely at best that, by 1787, Americans had reached a consensus on
the doctrine in anything like the precise, thoroughgoing manner that modem formalists
prescribe.” See id.; see also id. at 1775 (“What strikes anyone who examines the era in any
depth, especially those historians who have devoted years to the exercise, is its complexity,
contradictions, and, at times, confusion.”).
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it is obviously the case that both the ratiﬁers themselves and the politicians of the early Republic disagreed on a great many particular problems of application—if and when those problems even occurred to them
in the ﬁrst place.
And yet.
Even amidst this intellectual chaos-slash-ferment, some things were
clear. If the Founders’ goals were often irreconcilable, the words they used
to describe and debate their proposals, criticisms, and counterproposals
were—at least on some points—strikingly consistent. Of particular relevance here is how their disputes about institutional structure were consistently framed around what they often called the “complete” or “perfect”
triad of legislative, executive, and judicial power as three conceptual
phases in the life cycle of law.70 This Article shows that formulation to
have been a straightforward reflection of standard eighteenth-century
understandings. If that’s right, then the negotiated settlement of the
Executive Power Clause did have a clear meaning. That meaning is the
one that leaps off the face of the text: “[T]he executive power” meant “the
power to execute.” My hope is that even unsympathetic readers will wind
up ﬁnding this hard to unsee.
A.

The Historical Background

The Founders came of age in the aftermath of a long constitutional
struggle in the mother country. It is a fool’s errand to offer even the most
apologetically caveated summary of England’s multicentury wobble
toward parliamentary supremacy. But the political imaginary of that
struggle was deeply entrenched in the Founders’ minds, by way of schoolrooms, the political press, and widely published histories from authors
across the political spectrum.71 So we should begin by chalking out some
70. See, e.g., James Wilson, Remarks at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention:
Summary of Objections to the Constitution (Dec. 4, 1787) [hereinafter Wilson, Summary
of Objections to the Constitution], reprinted in 2 The Documentary History of the
Ratiﬁcation of the Constitution 465, 468 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., digital ed. 2009)
[hereinafter Documentary History] (“This is not a federal government, but a complete
one, with legislative, executive, and judicial powers. It is a consolidating government.”); see
also infra note 302 and accompanying text. For an in-depth exploration of the Founder’s
conception of “complete government,” see Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, supra
note 13, at 33–39.
71. Histories and memoirs of the great struggle abounded. For some of the most
important accounts available to the Founders, see generally 3–4 Oliver Goldsmith, The
History of England, from the Earliest Times to the Death of George II (London, printed
for T. Davies et al. 1771); 5–6 David Hume, The History of England, from the Invasion of
Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688 (Liberty Fund 1983) (1778) [hereinafter Hume,
History of England]; Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and
Civil Wars in England (Oxford, printed at the Theater 1704); Catherine Macaulay, The
History of England, from the Accession of James I to That of the Brunswick Line (London,
printed for J. Nourse et al. 1763–1783); Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, Remarks
on the History of England (London, printed for R. Francklin 1743) [hereinafter
Bolingbroke, Remarks on the History of England].
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rudimentary context for the legal and political concepts that are
discussed in depth below.72
The American Founders told themselves a story of English constitutionalism in which Parliament (and especially the Commons) led the
struggle to wrest individual freedom from increasingly oppressive monarchs.73 The path to that outcome was winding. While many Americans
followed the English Whigs in imagining that Parliament’s institutional
identity was central to the “ancient constitution” of England,74 it is now
understood that English parliaments emerged not so much as institutions
in their own right as ad hoc gatherings summoned by the Crown,
especially when approval for taxation was needed.75 During the long
72. For some seminal accounts of the historical emergence of parliamentary
sovereignty over the Crown, see generally J.W. Allen, English Political Thought: 1603–1660
(1938); Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution (1993); Jeffrey
Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament (1999); Margaret Judson, Crisis of the
Constitution (1949).
73. Hamilton’s Federalist 71 offers a typical summary:
[The] British House of Commons, from the most feeble beginnings,
from the mere power of assenting or disagreeing to the imposition of a new tax,
have, by rapid strides, reduced the prerogatives of the crown and the
privileges of the nobility within the limits they conceived to be
compatible with the principles of a free government; while they raised
themselves to the rank and consequence of a coequal branch of the
legislature; . . . [T]hey have been able, in one instance, to abolish both
the royalty and the aristocracy, and to overturn all the ancient establishments, as well in the Church as State . . . .
The Federalist No. 71, supra note 30, at 364 (Alexander Hamilton).
74. See J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of
English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century 47–53 (2d ed. 1987) (“[A]s the
century progressed[,] assertions that the law was immemorial tended to be replaced by
assertions that parliament, and especially a house of commons representing the property
owners, was immemorial.”); see also Burgess, supra note 72, at 60–76 (agreeing that
these arguments had rhetorical traction, but challenging Pocock’s readings of speciﬁc
commentators).
75. Thus, the famous words of Magna Charta:
No scutage nor aid shall be imposed in our kingdom, unless by common counsel of our kingdom . . . .
....
And for obtaining the common counsel of the kingdom [before]
the assessing of an aid . . . or of a scutage, we will cause to be summoned
the archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and greater barons . . . .
Magna Carta ch. 12, 14 (1215), reprinted in William Sharp McKechnie, Magna Carta: A
Commentary on the Great Charter of King John 274, 291 (1905). For an excellent recent
account of how the medieval English parliament evolved, see generally J. R. Maddicot, The
Origins of the English Parliament 924–1327 (2010); F. W. Maitland, The Constitutional
History of England 177–90 (1920); K.B. McFarlane, England in the Fifteenth Century:
Collected Essays 1–20 (1981). For a classic though now disfavored “Whig history” account
sketching a more institutionally cohesive view of medieval parliaments—one that more
closely matches the Founders’ sense of historical development than the modern
historiography sketched in main text—see 2–3 William Stubbs, The Constitutional History
of England: In Its Origin and Development (Oxford, Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1877–1878).
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transition to modernity, a complicated variety of economic, religious, and
political developments led parliamentary elections and debate to channel larger and more systematic ideological disputes among members of
the British political elite.76 And Parliament—or at least, signiﬁcant factions within Parliament—began to develop a more particularized sense of
institutional identity once assembled. With the arrival of the Stuarts in
1603, tensions between the Crown and Parliament as such increasingly
crystallized around suspicion of the new dynasty’s Catholic sympathies;
dissatisfaction with the costs of court, government, and military adventures; and anxiety about the new King’s pretensions to a divine-right
absolutism.77
The end of the resulting struggle is well known. Certainly by the middle
of the eighteenth century, the legislative institution of “the King-inParliament” had been recognized as conceptually sovereign and legally
supreme over all competing institutions, and the Crown’s direct participation in statutory enactment had been reduced to an empty formality.78
76. For a good review of some of the social, economic, cultural, and religious pressures during this period, see generally Conrad Russell, The Crisis of Parliaments: English
History 1509–1660 (1971). Historians disagree on the extent to which Parliament developed a genuinely oppositional identity during the Tudor period. For works emphasizing
the cooperative nature of Parliament’s relationship with the Tudor Crown, see generally
G.R. Elton, The Parliament of England, 1559–1581 (1986); J.S. Roskell, Perspectives in
English Parliamentary History, in 2 Historical Studies of the English Parliament 296 (E.B.
Fryde & Edward Miller eds., 1970). For works giving more emphasis to an emerging
sensibility of institutional conﬂict, see generally Jennifer Loach, Parliament Under the
Tudors (1991); J.E. Neale, Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments 1584–1601 (1957); Josh
Chafetz, “In the Time of a Woman, Which Sex Was Not Capable of Mature Deliberation”:
Late Tudor Parliamentary Relations and Their Early Stuart Discontents, 25 Yale J.L. &
Human. 181 (2013).
77. For a classic account of the interwoven causes, see generally Conrad Russell, The
Causes of the English Civil War (1990). For accounts focusing on the religious element,
see generally David Cressy, England on Edge: Crisis and Revolution, 1640–1642 (2006);
England’s Wars of Religion, Revisited (Charles Prior & Glenn Burgess eds., 2011). For
accounts emphasizing the politics of nationhood and state formation, see, for example,
Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in
European Context (2000); Austin Woolrych, Britain in Revolution: 1625–1660 (2002).
For accounts exploring socioeconomic change as a principal factor, see, for example,
Lawrence Stone, The Causes of the English Revolution 1529–1642, at 26–41 (ARK Publ’g
Co. 1986) (1972). For a dated but still classic account emphasizing the institutional–
constitutional features typical of “Whig history,” see generally Samuel Rawson Gardiner,
The First Two Stuarts and the Puritan Revolution 1603–1660 (New York, Charles Scribner’s
Sons 1893).
78. Recall that under English constitutional theory the Crown was itself “a constituent part of the supreme legislative power.” See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *261.
By the Founding, the royal negative was absolute in theory but defunct in practice—1708
marked the last time it was used against a bill that had passed both houses of Parliament.
See 18 HL Jour. 504, 506 (Mar. 11, 1708) (recording Queen Anne’s withholding of royal
assent to the Scottish Militia Bill); see also Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution 48
(Paul Smith ed., Cambridge Texts 2001) (1867) (“[The Queen] must sign her own deathwarrant if the two Houses unanimously send it up to her. It is a ﬁction of the past to
ascribe to her legislative power.”). For a terriﬁc account of key legal conﬂicts between
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The intermediate steps were complicated.79 Over the course of the 1600s,
the king clashed with (some) judges and (many) parliamentarians over
royal interference with parliamentary privileges; over the promulgation
of proclamations purporting to have the force of law; over judges’
authority to interpret the law differently from the Crown; and over
Parliament’s power to restrict the operations of the Crown and its
apparatus of government.80 It took a civil war, a republican interregnum,
and a tentative royal Restoration before the Glorious Revolution of
1688—involving the ﬂight of James II and Parliament’s installment of
William and Mary in his place—led to a formal settlement that entailed
(it quickly became clear) the total capitulation of any claim to constitutionally indefeasible royal authority.81
Certainly by the Founding period, it was well-settled that English law
had no separation of powers doctrine in the sense that American lawyers
understand it today. The Crown simply had no powers that the legislature
was bound to respect.82 The analogy to common law is almost exact. For
instance, eighteenth-century students of English law learned, correctly,
that “the law” required contracts to include at least a peppercorn in consideration.83 But—notwithstanding aggressive statutory interpretation and
occasional vague rumblings of judicial review84—they also learned that if
“the common law and a statute differ, the common law gives place to the
statute.”85 William Blackstone, whose landmark treatise on English law
probably inﬂuenced the Founders more than any other single source,86

Parliament and the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English Crown, see generally Josh
Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution (2017).
79. For a recent survey of this period, see generally Peter Ackroyd, Rebellion: The
History of England from James I to the Glorious Revolution (2014).
80. See id. at 147–48 (parliamentary privileges); id. at 37–38, 175–77 (royal proclamations); id. at 23–25 (judicial authority); id. at 243, 288 (parliamentary restrictions on the
Crown).
81. See id. at 453–70.
82. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
83. Compare Pillans & Rose v. Van Mierop & Hopkins (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1035,
1038; 3 Burr. 1663, 1669–70 (KB) (challenging the doctrine), with Rann v. Hughes (1778)
2 Eng. Rep. 18, 21; 4 Bro. PC 27, 30–31 (HL) (reaffirming it).
84. Closely related to the problem of parliamentary sovereignty vis-à-vis royal
prerogative is the problem of parliamentary sovereignty vis-à-vis natural law. But with some
exceptions, see Goldsworthy, supra note 72, at 6–21 & passim, the two issues are typically
explored as separate questions. For a concise discussion of the historiography of the relationship between Parliament and natural or fundamental law, see Thomas C. Grey, Origins
of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30
Stan. L. Rev. 843, 849–65 (1978); see also T.R.S. Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal
Foundations of British Constitutionalism 135–62 (1993); J. W. Gough, Fundamental Law
in English Constitutional History 80–97 (1955).
85. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *89.
86. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“Blackstone . . . constituted
the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation . . . .”); Baude &
Campbell, supra note 67, at 22 (listing Blackstone’s Commentaries among the “most
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generalized the point: “[T]here is no court that has power to defeat the
intent of the legislature, when couched in such evident and express
words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the legislature or
no.”87 Indeed, the English treatises taught that not just common law but
all of English constitutional law existed only at the continued sufferance of
Parliament: “[Parliament] can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom and of parliaments themselves . . . .”88

important English legal treatises” used by Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries); see also infra notes 188–189 and accompanying text.
87. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *91. For expressions of this view from both sides
of the Founding debates, see, for example, Wilson, Summary of Objections to the
Constitution, supra note 70, at 471 (“It has not been, nor, I presume, will it be denied, that
somewhere there is, and of necessity must be, a supreme, absolute and uncontrollable
authority. . . . Blackstone will tell you, that in Britain it is lodged in the British
Parliament . . . .”); Agrippa XII, Mass. Gazette, Jan. 15, 1787, reprinted in 5 Documentary
History, supra note 70, at 720, 722 (“A legislative assembly has an inherent right to alter
the common law, and to abolish any of its principles, which are not particularly guarded in
the constitution.”). For a concise discussion of both the original sources and the modern
debate about Blackstone’s views on parliamentary supremacy, see John M. Finnis, Note,
Blackstone’s Theoretical Intentions, 12 Nat. L.F. 163, 163 (1967) (“The methodology of
the Commentaries has been ignored in recent discussion. But reﬂection on it establishes,
contrary to received interpretations, both that Blackstone’s interest in natural law was real
and sustained, and that his deﬁnition of municipal law was free from any reference to
natural law.” (emphases omitted) (footnote omitted)).
88. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *161 (“[Parliament] can, in short, do every thing
that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call it’s power, by
a ﬁgure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament. True it is, that what the
parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo.”); see also Henry Finch, A
Description of the Common Laws of England bk. II, ch. I, at 59 (London, printed for A.
Millar 1759) (offering a similar observation). See generally Julian Hoppit, A Land of
Liberty?: England 1689–1727, at 50 (2000) (“[E]very political society had to have a ﬁnal
arbiter. Few dissented that in the English case absolute authority resided only in legislative
action, that is the agreed deliberations of Crown, Peers . . . and Commons.”); Paul Langford,
A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727–1783, at 704 (2010) (“It would be difficult
to exaggerate the overwhelming importance of Parliament in eighteenth-century England,
hackneyed though it is as a historical theme.”).
This all led some commentators to conclude that England didn’t actually have a constitution in any legally signiﬁcant sense. See, e.g., Letter IV, in Four Letters on Interesting
Subjects 18 (Philadelphia, Styner & Cist 1776) (“The truth is, the English have no ﬁxed
Constitution. . . . [T]he legislative power, which includes king, lords and commons, is
under [no restrictions]; and whatever acts they pass are laws, be they ever so oppressive or
arbitrary.”); Thomas Paine, Rights of Man 97–98 (Gregory Claeys ed., Hackett Publ’g Co.
1992) (1791) (arguing that the British political arrangement is “merely a form of government without a constitution”); A Countryman II, New Haven Gazette, Nov. 22, 1787,
reprinted in 3 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 471, 472 (“The famous English
Magna Charta is but an act of Parliament, which every subsequent Parliament has had just
as much constitutional power to repeal and annul as the Parliament which made it had to
pass it at ﬁrst.”); James Wilson, Speech at Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 24,
1787) (Thomas Lloyd version), reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 350,
361 (“The British constitution is just what the British Parliament pleases.”).
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By the time of the American Revolution, this had long since been
true of royal authority in particular.89 The previously sacrosanct jus regium
of “dispensing with penall Lawes”90 was the ﬁrst item in the crosshairs of
the Bill of Rights that deﬁned the Glorious Revolution.91 Starker still was
the 1701 Act of Settlement’s dictation of succession 92 and marriage
rights,93 which even many pre–Civil War parliamentarians had understood as “inseparable prerogatives of the Crown and king.”94 The seismic
89. See, e.g., David Lieberman, The Mixed Constitution and the Common Law, in
The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought 319 (Mark Goldie &
Robert Wokler eds., 2006) (noting the persistence of Jacobitical dissent, but emphasizing
the “near complacency mid-[eighteenth-]century commentators displayed in treating
once ﬁercely contested issues concerning the nature and authority of England’s monarch
and parliament”); see also Peter Jupp, The Governing of Britain 1688–1848, at 83–102
(2006) (discussing the organic emergence of conventions around parliamentary supremacy in the decades following the Glorious Revolution).
90. See Edward Bagshaw, The Rights of the Crown of England, as It Is Established by
Law 114 (London, printed for Simon Miller 1660); cf. Case of Non Obstante, or
Dispensing Power (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 1300, 1300; 12 Co. Rep. 18, 18 (KB) (“No Act can
bind the King from any prerogative which is sole and inseparable to his person, but that
he may dispense with it by a non obstante; . . . this solely and inseparably is annexed to his
person; and this Royal power cannot be restrained by any Act of Parliament . . . .”).
91. See An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the
Succession of the Crown (Bill of Rights) 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 2 (Eng.) (stating as its ﬁrst
substantive provision that “the pretended Power of Suspending of Laws or the Execution
of Laws by Regall Authority without Consent of Parlyament is illegal”). In a discussion of
the controversial approval in Godden v. Hales of James II’s Test Act dispensations, Sir
Robert Atkyns noted that:
[S]everal Acts of Parliament have been made in divers Cases, with
express Clauses inserted in those Acts, to make void all Non obstante’s to
the contrary of those Laws (which one would have thought would have
been strong enough) and yet they all came to nothing: for the Judges
heretofore have resolv’d that if the King grant a Dispensation from such
Laws, with a Special Non obstante to any such Special Law, mentioning
the very Law, that presently the force of that Law vanishes.
Robert Atkyns, An Enquiry into the Power of Dispensing with Penal Statutes 5 (London,
printed for Timothy Goodwin 2d ed. 1689).
92. See An Act for the Further Limitation of the Crown and Better Securing the
Rights and Liberties of the Subject (Act of Settlement) 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2, § 1
(Eng.) (“That the most Excellent Princess Sophia[,] Electress and Dutchess Dowager of
Hannover . . . be and is hereby declared to be the next in Succession in the Protestant
Line to the Imperiall Crown . . . .”).
93. See id. § 2 (prohibiting “all and every Person and Persons . . . who shall profess
the Popish Religion or shall marry a Papist” from ascending the throne).
94. See Edward Coke, Speech in Parliament (Dec. 3, 1621), reprinted in 3 The
Selected Writings of Sir Edward Coke 1213, 1213 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) [hereinafter
Selected Writings of Coke] (“[I]nseparable prerogatives of the Crown and king. Marriage
and leagues, war and peace, they are arcana imperii and not to be meddled with. If they
were a petition of right that required an answer, I would never prefer it or give my consent
to the preferring of it . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also Edward Coke, Conference with
the Lords in the Painted Chamber (Mar. 8, 1621), reprinted in 3 Selected Writings of
Coke, supra, at 1201, 1201 (“I will not meddle with the King’s prerogative, which is
twofold: 1, absolute, as to make war, coin money, etc.; 2, or in things that concern meum et
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implications of stripping such “prerogatives absolute” were well understood; earlier generations’ search for a theory to justify and describe
some essential core of indefeasible royal authority simply ended.95 This
radical reworking of English parliamentary theory was thoroughgoing.96
The prerogative was demystiﬁed. 97 It was no longer subdivided into
aspects that were indefeasible (“prerogative absolute,” “prerogative
indisputable,” or “jus majestatis”) and those that were not (“prerogative
disputable” or “jus praerogativae”).98 And it was shorn of its extralegal
tuum, and this may be disputed of in courts of parliament.” (footnote omitted)). It’s possible that the ambiguity of Coke’s formulations—“not to be meddled with” and “I will not
meddle with”—was no accident.
95. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hall (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1047–48; 1 Cowp. 204,
208–09 (KB) (recognizing full defeasibility of the king’s foreign affairs prerogative); see
also, e.g., David Hume, Essay VI: Of the Independency of Parliament (1777) [hereinafter
Hume, Independency of Parliament], reprinted in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary 42,
44 (Eugene F. Miller ed., 1987) (“The share of power, allotted by our constitution to the
house of commons, is so great, that it absolutely commands all the other parts of the government.”). Hume further explained that “though the king has a negative in framing
laws[] . . . this, in fact, is esteemed of so little moment, that whatever is voted by the two
houses, is always sure to pass into a law, and the royal assent is little better than a form.” Id.
96. Compare, e.g., Robert Filmer, The Free-holders Grand Inquest (1679)
[hereinafter Filmer, The Free-holders Grand Inquest], reprinted in Patriarcha and Other
Writings, supra note 12, at 100 (resting claims about the king’s powers on “invincible
reason from the nature of monarchy itself, which must have the supreme power alone”),
and Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 113–14 (dividing “Jus Regium” into “Jus Majestatis,” which
“is that which belongs to him as King, common to him, with other Princes, by the Law of
Nature and Nations” and “Jus Praerogativae,” which “is that which belongs to him as King
of England, and given to him by that Law alone”), with Edward Coke, Speech in the
Committee of the Whole House (Apr. 26, 1628), reprinted in 3 Selected Writings of Coke,
supra note 94, at 1266, 1267–68. Coke dismissed of the concept of “intrinsical” prerogative, which was, ostensibly, “entrusted [to the king] by God,” due “jure divino,” and was
thus indefeasible by law: “[Those who use it] mean[] that intrinsical prerogative is not
bounded by any law, or by any law qualiﬁed. [They say] we must admit this intrinsical
prerogative an exempt prerogative, and so all our laws are out.” Id. (cautioning that “[w]e
cannot yield to this”). For similar skepticisim of the divine right of kings, see Philip
Hunton, A Treatise Of Monarchy pt. I, ch. I, § 1, at 3–4 (London, printed for Richard
Baldwin 1689) [hereinafter Hunton, A Treatise of Monarchy] (denying a divine “scriptum
est” for “the endowing this or that person . . . with Soveraignty over a Community”);
Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government ch. I, § 1, at 4 (London, n. pub.
1698) (describing the royalist position that the “[p]rerogative” was “[t]he Royal Charter
granted to Kings by God”).
97. For more on the mystical aspects of the prerogative, see generally Ernst H.
Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (1997);
Francis Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant, and Order (1984); Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward
White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American
Implications, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 600–03 (2008).
98. See, e.g., Case of Non Obstante, or Dispensing Power (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 1300,
1300–01; 12 Co. Rep. 18, 18–19 (KB) (“No [Act] can bind the King from any Prerogative
which is sole and inseparable to his person . . . . [B]ut in things which are not incident
solely and inseparably to the [King], but belong to every subject, and may be severed, an
Act of Parliament may absolutely bind the King . . . .”); Case of Penal Statutes (1605) 77
Eng. Rep. 465, 465; 7 Co. Rep. 36, 36 (KB) (“[T]his conﬁdence and trust is so inseparably
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pretensions.99 Following the lead of the parliamentarian jurist Edward
Coke, English law had worked its way from the milder proposition that
“the Common law hath so admeasured the prerogatives of the King, that
they should not take away, nor prejudice the inheritance of any [man]”100

joined and annexed to the [King] in so high a point of sovereignty . . . for it was
committed to the King by all his subjects for the good of the commonwealth.”); Edward
Coke, Speech in the Committee of Grievances (Feb. 19, 1621) [hereinafter Coke, Speech
in the Committee of Grievances], reprinted in 3 Selected Writings of Coke, supra note 94,
at 1199 (“There is prerogative indisputable, and prerogative disputable. Prerogative indisputable, is that the king hath to make war: disputable prerogative is tied to the laws of
England; wherein the king also hath divers prerogatives as nullum tempus.”); 2 Henry de
Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England 166–67 (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel
E. Thorne trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (“Those connected with justice [and] peace
belong to no one save the crown alone and the royal dignity, nor can they be separated
from the crown, since they constitute the crown . . . . [P]rivileges, . . . though they belong
to the crown, may nevertheless be separated from it and transferred to private persons . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). See generally Burgess, supra note 72, at 115–44, 161–62
(describing Jacobean consensus regarding a “duplex view of kingship” grounded in the
distinction between “legal (or ordinary) prerogative” and “absolute (or extraordinary)
prerogative”).
99. Locke struck confusion into generations of American constitutional commentators by using the English legal term “prerogative” to name the discretionary conceptual
space wherein governing magistrates under any system of social organization might
sometimes need to go beyond the laws. See John Locke, The Second Treatise: An Essay
Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government (1690) [hereinafter
Locke, Second Treatise], reprinted in Two Treatises of Government and A Letter
Concerning Toleration ch. XIV, §§ 159–168, at 171–75 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press
2003).
In this regard, compare the Tory politician Bolingbroke’s narrowing of the Lockean
formulation to include only unauthorized (rather than prohibited) action: “Q. What do’st
thou mean by the Royal Prerogative? A. A Discretionary Power in the King to act for the Good
of the People where the Laws are silent, never contrary to Law, and always subject to the
Limitations of Law.” Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, The Freeholder’s Political
Catechism 6 (London, printed for J. Roberts 1733) (second emphasis added). Locke, by
contrast, had famously included both unauthorized and prohibited action within his
deﬁnition. See Locke, Second Treatise, supra, § 160, at 172 (“This power to act according
to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even
against it, is that which is called prerogative . . . .”). Compare also the Earl of Strafford’s
formulation when defending himself against charges of treason, in particular by arguing
that he had been following the king’s command. See The Tryal of Thomas, Earl of
Stafford: The Fourth Article (Mar. 26, 1641), in 8 John Rushworth, Historical Collections
of Private Passages of State, Weighty Matters in Law, Remarkable Proceedings in Five
Parliaments, 1618–1648, at 175, 182 (London, printed for John Wright & Richard Chiswell
1680) (statement of the Earl of Strafford) [hereinafter Historical Collections] (“[T]he
Prerogative, as long as it goes not against the Common Law . . . is the Law of the Land,
and binds, as long as it transgresses not the Fundamental Law of the Land, being made
provisionally for preventing . . . a Temporary Mischief, before an [Act] can give a
Remedy.”).
100. See Case of Proclamations (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, 1353; 12 Co. Rep. 74, 75
(KB) (“[T]he King by his Proclamation or other ways cannot change any part of the
common law, or statute law, or the customs of the realm.”); see also Edward Coke, The
Second Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England (1642), reprinted in 2 Selected
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to the more radical conclusion that “the King hath no prerogative, but
that which the law of the land allows him.”101
Never again could a king say “you neither mean [to] nor can hurt
My Prerogative.”102 To the contrary, William and Mary recognized the
full implications of the Glorious Revolution by “solemnly Promis[ing]” at
their coronation to “[g]overne the People of this Kingdome of England
and the Dominions thereto belonging according to the Statutes in
Parlyament Agreed on and the Laws and Customs of the same.” 103
Eighteenth-century legal commentators followed suit, contrasting the
king’s “divers Prerogatives which the Law gives unto him” with the sovereign supremacy of Parliament’s “absolute Power in all Cases . . . to make
Laws,” noting that “if the Parliament itself err, as it may, this may not be
Writings of Coke, supra note 94, at 745, 886 (“[T]he best inheritance that the Subject
hath, is the Law of the Realme.”).
101. See Case of Proclamations, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1354; 12 Co. Rep. at 75. Even before the
Glorious Revolution, Matthew Hale—no mild proponent of royal authority—was cautiously but unmistakably embracing the point:
[T]hose rights which the king hath are in him absolutely, perpetually
and hereditarily, whereby as he or his issues inheritable cannot, upon
any pretence whatsoever either of abuse in him or public good of the
state, either be deprived of the whole power regal, which is a deposition,
or of any spark of that gem, any prerogative or power which he hath in
right of his regality, without his consent.
Matthew Hale, The Prerogatives of the King 15 n.1 (D.E.C. Yale ed., Selden Soc’y 1976)
[hereinafter Hale, Prerogatives of the King] (emphasis added). In other words, the king
could not be deprived of his prerogative unless Parliament enacted a statute without his
veto. See id. In his preface to the 1736 edition of Hale’s History of the Pleas of the Crown,
legal writer Sollom Emlyn noted that upon Charles II’s reinstatement as monarch, Hale—
who was “no inconsiderable promoter” of the Restoration—was “not for making a surrender of all, and receiving the king without any restrictions; on the contrary he thought this
an opportunity not to be lost for limiting the prerogative, and cutting off some useless
branches, that served only as instruments of oppression.” Sollom Emlyn, Preface to 1
Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae: The History of the Pleas of the Crown, at ii
(London, E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 1736) [hereinafter Hale, History of the Pleas of the
Crown].
The royalist Edward Bagshaw was to the same effect: “That this Kingly Government be
according to the Laws of the Land, . . . by legal, not by arbitrary power.” See Bagshaw,
supra note 90, at 101. Bagshaw argued that because the Crown was so “encircled with good
Laws,” it was “scarce possible for a King of England to fall into Tyranny, for he neither
speaketh, nor acteth, nor judgeth, nor executeth, but by his Writt, by his Laws, by his
Judges, and Ministers, and both these sworne to him . . . to execute justice to his People.”
Id. at 105. Accordingly, it was plain that the king—“in respect of his Duty and Office, in
respect of his Oath, in respect of the Dignity and Honour of his Crown, and the good of
his People”—would govern his people “by the Laws of the Land.” Id. at 122.
102. See Charles I, Response to the Petition of Right, 3 HL Jour. 841, 844 (June 7,
1628) (emphasis added); see also HC Jour. 622 (Nov. 1601) (statement of Sir George
Moore) (“We know the power of her Majesty cannot be restrained by any Act, why
therefore should we thus talk? Admit we should make this Statute with a Non obstante, yet
the Queen may grant a Patent with a Non obstante, to cross this Non obstante.”).
103. See An Act for Establishing the Coronation Oath 1688, 1 W. & M. c. 6, § 3 (Eng.).
Thanks to Andrew Kent for this reference.
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reversed in any Place but in Parliament.”104 Even political theorists who
were generally sympathetic to monarchy felt no need to hedge:
[T]hough in [the King’s] political capacity of one of the constituent parts of the Parliament, that is, with regard to the share
allotted to him in the legislative authority, the King is undoubtedly Sovereign, and only needs alledge his will when he gives or
refuses his assent to the bills presented to him; yet, in the
exercise of his powers of Government, he is no more than a
Magistrate, and the laws, whether those that existed before him,
or those to which, by his assent, he has given being, must direct
his conduct, and bind him equally with his subjects.105
This hard-won legacy of subjecting the Crown to the rule of law was
key to the Founders’ self-image as heirs to a revolutionary tradition of liberty, seized by “that patriotic spirit which prompted the illustrious English
barons to extort Magna Charta from their tyrannical king, John.”106 However much the Founders otherwise disagreed, they tended to share the
104. See Finch, supra note 88, bk. II, ch. I, at 57, 59 (footnote omitted). Oliver
Goldsmith’s vision of the Long Parliament choosing which elements of prerogative to keep
and which elements to chuck was typical:
Hitherto we have seen the commons in some measure the patrons
of liberty and of the people; boldly opposing the stretches of illegal
power, or repressing those claims which, tho’ founded on custom, were
destructive of freedom. . . . Had they been contented with resting here,
after abridging all those privileges of monarchy which were capable of
injuring the subject, and leaving it all those prerogatives that could
beneﬁt, they would have been considered as the great benefactors of
mankind, and would have left the constitution pretty nearly on the same
footing on which we enjoy it at present.
3 Goldsmith, supra note 71, at 239.
105. Jean de Lolme, The Constitution of England bk. I, ch. IV, at 71 (London, printed
for G. Robinson & J. Murray 4th ed. 1784) [hereinafter de Lolme, The Constitution of
England]. In the original French, de Lolme wrote:
Mais, au lieu qu’en sa capacité politique de l’un des ordres du
parlement, c’est-à-dire, par rapport à la portion qui lui compète de la
puissance législative, il est souverain, & n’allegue que sa volonté lorsqu’il
donne ou refuse son consentement; chargé de l’administration publique,
il n’est que magistrat, & les loix, soit celles qui existoient avant lui, soit
celles auxquelles par son assentiment il a donné l’existence, doivent
diriger sa conduite, & l’obligent aussi bien que ses sujets.
1 Jean de Lolme, Constitution de l’Angleterre 65 (Geneva, Barde, Manget & Co. 1789)
[hereainfter de Lolme, Constitution de l’Angleterre]. On Genevan and British political
theorist Jean de Lolme’s monarchical sympathies, see Iain McDaniel, Jean-Louis DeLolme
and the Political Science of the English Empire, 55 Hist. J. 21, 30–38 (2012). For typically
stirring American rhetoric on this point, see Patrick Henry’s speech to the Virginia
Ratifying Convention: “[I]f the King of England attempted to take away the rights of
individuals, the law would stand against him.—The acts of Parliament would stand in his
way—The Bill, and Declaration of Rights would be against him. The common law is
fortiﬁed by the Bill of Rights.” Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention
(June 19, 1788), reprinted in 10 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 1387, 1394.
106. See Tar and Feathers, Indep. Gazetteer (Philadelphia), Oct. 2, 1787, reprinted in
2 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 152, 153.
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view that the spirit of parliamentary liberty was less corrupted in the New
World than in the home country and to think any new government would
be measured by its ability to embody and protect that spirit.107
B.

The Execution Problem

On this historical backdrop, the legal and political theory on Madison’s
bookshelf was as varied and quarrelsome as the Founding generation
itself. Within the array of contested values and competing priorities, it is
hard to identify any single concern as dominant. But the need for vigorous execution of the law loomed especially large. That was certainly true
in the ineffective politics of the post-revolutionary Confederation. And it
was every bit as central to the writings on Madison’s bookshelf.
A longstanding challenge for governance theorists was the problem
of closing the gap between law and reality. Like the classical philosophy108 and Christian theology109 on which it drew, English jurisprudence

107. See Bailyn, supra note 61, at 122–43; Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, supra note
67, at 506–47; Wood, supra note 50, at 91–124. For an account emphasizing the Founders’
interest in establishing an independent executive branch, see Eric Nelson, The Royalist
Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding 184–203 (2014).
108. E.g., Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea bk. X, in 9 The Works of Aristotle 1172a, 1179a
(W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (“[A]rguments . . . are not able to encourage the
many to nobility and goodness. For these do not by nature obey the sense of shame, but
only fear, and do not abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but through fear of
punishment . . . . What argument would remould such people?”); Plato, Laws bk. III, in 5
The Dialogues of Plato 676, 689 (London, B. Jowett trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed.
1892) (“[W]hen the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or reason, . . . that I call
folly, just as . . . when the multitude refuses to obey their rulers and the laws; or, . . . in the
individual, when fair reasonings have their habitation in the soul and yet do . . . the
reverse of good.”).
109. Punishment for violating God’s law was a central concern in the first Anglo-American
Great Awakening. See, e.g., Jonathan Edwards, God’s Sovereignty in the Salvation of Men,
in 8 The Works of President Edwards with a Memoir of His Life 105, 110 (New York, S.
Converse 1830) [hereinafter Works of Edwards] (“The justice of God requires the punishment of sin.”); Jonathan Edwards, Safety Fullness, and Sweet Refreshment, to Be Found in
Christ, in 8 Works of Edwards, supra, at 355, 359 (“Every jot and tittle of the law must be
fulﬁlled, heaven and earth shall be destroyed, rather than justice should not take place;
there is no possibility of sin’s escaping justice.”); John Wesley, Upon Our Lord’s Sermon
on the Mount: Discourse 1, in 5 The Works of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M. 247, 247–48
(London, John Mason 3d ed. 1829) (“[T]he Lord our Governor, whose kingdom is from
everlasting, and ruleth over all; the great Lawgiver, who can well enforce all his laws, being
‘able to save and to destroy,’ yea, to punish . . . .”).
Relatedly, the uncertain relationship between sin and consequence was one of the
oldest and hardest problems of Judeo–Christian theology:
According to the Will of a Legislator God cannot permit Sin: For that would be,
as if he should declare Sin to be Lawful, which implies a Contradiction.
But God as Decreeing Events does at least permit Sin; that is, he does not
do all he can to hinder it from being. . . . [A]ll Laws are about possible
things. But God that he may execute his Decreeing Will, prepares and sets in
order the Means.
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had long marked a distinction between law’s content in theory and its
enforcement on the ground. By the Founding Era, the classic English
formulation was summarized in Matthew Hale’s pathbreaking treatise:
[W]e must observe a threefold effect of law. (1) The obligation
on conscience. (2) The penalty. (3) The irritation or making
void of an act done contrary to the direction of the law. The ﬁrst
proceeds from the directive power of the law; the two latter from
the coercive power of the law.110
This distinction between directive and coercive (or “coactive”) power
had long been central to discussions of governance and administration.111 Directive power was understood as that quality of rules which
makes them legally binding on their objects. But both in theory112 and in
Samuel Pufendorf, The Divine Feudal Law: Or, Covenants with Mankind, Represented
§ 71, at 159–63 (Simone Zurbuchen ed., Theophilus Dorrington trans., 2002) (1695)
(quoting Pierre Jurieu, De Pace inter Protestantes ineunda consultatio (Utrecht, 1688));
see also St. Augustin, The City of God bk. 1, ch. 8, in 2 A Select Library Of The Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church 1, 5 (Buffalo, Philip Schaff ed., Marcus Dods
trans., Christian Literature Co. 1887) (“For if every sin were now visited with manifest
punishment, nothing would seem to be reserved for the final judgment; on the other hand,
if no sin received now a plainly divine punishment, it would be concluded that there is no
divine providence at all.”); Job 38:2, 4 (King James) (“Who is this that darkeneth counsel
by words without knowledge? . . . Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?
[D]eclare, if thou hast understanding.”).
110. Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 176; see also id. at 14 (“There are
three powers in laws, (1) Potestas coercens or coactiva. (2) Potestas directiva, [and (3) Potestas]
irritans actus contrarios.” (alterations in original)). The “irritans” power included the ability
of courts to refuse to give effect to unlawful acts, including those of the Crown. See, e.g.,
Henry Parker, Observations upon Some of His Majesties Late Answers and Expresses 44
(n.p., n. pub. 1642) (“[I]n all irregular acts where no personall force is, Kings may be disobeyed, their unjust commands may be neglected, not only by communities, but also by
single men sometimes.”). While Hale’s works on royal power appear not to have been
published until the twentieth century, they were kept in the library at Lincoln’s Inn where
they served as a standard teaching and research reference for many, including Blackstone,
who cited Hale extensively. See Introduction to Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note
101, at ix–xi, lvix–lxi. Their inﬂuence might be analogized to that of the Hart & Wechsler
teaching materials before their publication.
111. Thomas Aquinas was a standard referent in the English discourse:
The sovereign is said to be “exempt from the law,” as to its coercive
power; since[] . . . law has no coercive power save from the authority of the
sovereign. . . . [This does not mean that] the sovereign is . . . exempt from
the law, as to its directive force; but [that] he should fulﬁl it to his own
free-will and not of constraint.
See Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica pt. I-II, question 96, art. 5, Reply to
Objection 3, at 2327 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. ed.
1947), digitized in Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Christian Classics Ethereal
Library n.d.).
112. The classic example was the Crown. Henry Parker observed that “[t]he King as to
His own person, is not to be forcibly repelled in any ill doing, nor is He accountable for ill
done, Law has only a directive, but no coactive force upon his person . . . .” Parker, supra
note 110, at 44. Similarly, Hale noted that the king was regularly “bound in conscience to
observe all such laws as either by the common law or statutes extend[ed] to him.” Hale,
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practice,113 not all rules can be enforced against the people to whom they
are directed. As the leading seventeenth-century theorist of royal power
put it, “[g]overnment as to coactive power was after sin, because coaction
supposeth some disorder, which was not in the state of innocency.”114 The
problem of disobedience thus required government to have not only the
power to formulate rules directing people’s behavior but also the power
to force people to comply.
In addition to a power of making rules, then, any not-perfectly-virtuous
society required a power of enforcing rules—a power of execution.
Bracton, the great medieval English treatise, was unequivocal: “[I]t is
useless to establish laws unless there is someone to enforce them.”115 The
immensely inﬂuential Coke exhorted similarly in his much-admired
Charge at the Norwich Assizes: “The life and strength of the Laws,
consisteth in the execution of them: For in vaine are just lawes Inacted, if
not justly executed.”116 This observation became a standard opening move
for virtually any ambitious discussion of law and government.117 Proliﬁc
Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 176. However, the king was “not subject to the
penalty of law, at least where the penalty [was] personal” and so “acts by him done or
omitted contrary to the tenor of those laws or customs” made him “not liable to any personal loss or damage.” Id. at 177.
113. See, for example, your local highway.
114. Filmer, The Anarchy, supra note 12, at 145. As for the directive power, Filmer
observed that “the condition of human nature requires it, since civil society cannot be
imagined without power of government.” Id. As long as “men continued in the state of
innocency,” they might not “need the direction of Adam in those things which were
necessarily and morally to be done, yet things indifferent—that depended merely on their
free will—might be directed by the power of Adam’s command.” Id.
From the opposite end of the political spectrum, Parker invoked a similarly Christian
theological framework to make the same point:
Man being depraved by the fall of Adam grew so untame and uncivill a
creature, that the Law of God written in his brest was not sufficient to
restrayne him from mischiefe, . . . and therefore without some magistracy to provide new orders, and to judge of old, and to execute according to justice, no society could be upheld, without society men could not
live, and without lawes men could not be sociable, and without authority
somewhere invested, to judge according to Law, and execute according
to judgement, Law was a vaine and void thing . . . .
Parker, supra note 110, at 13.
115. 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 166; see also id. at 19 (“[I]f laws fail, justice will be
extirpated . . . .”); id. at 304 (“Nor does it suffice [for a judge] to have jurisdiction unless
he has the power of coercion . . . .”). For a terriﬁc overview of the historiography on the
treatise known as Bracton, see Thomas McSweeney, English Judges and Roman Jurists: The
Civilian Learning Behind England’s First Case Law, 84 Temp. L. Rev. 827, 831–36 (2012).
116. Edward Coke, Speech and Charge at the Norwich Assizes (1607) [hereinafter Coke,
Speech and Charge at the Norwich Assizes], reprinted in 2 Selected Writings of Coke, supra
note 94, at 523, 554.
117. See, e.g., Cesare Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments 5 (London, printed
for J. Almon 1767) (“Laws are the conditions, under which men, naturally independent,
united themselves in society.”); id. at 6 (“But it was not sufficient only to establish [laws]; it
was also necessary to defend [them] . . . . Some motives . . . were necessary[] to prevent
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writer Daniel Defoe’s formulation serves well as a précis of conventional
eighteenth-century wisdom: “[T]he Vigour of the Laws consists in their
Executive Power; Ten thousand Acts of Parliament signify no more than
One single Proclamation, unless the Gentlemen, in whose hands the
Execution of those Laws is placed, take care to see them duly made use
of . . . .”118
Metaphors for the point were varied and colorful: the motion of bodies, the speaking of thoughts, and the voicing of melodies. The famous
cartoon Leviathan on the frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes’s masterwork
drew on a long tradition of such corporeal imagery, 119 its author
describing “Publique Ministers . . . that have Authority . . . to procure the
Execution of Judgements given” as providing “service, answerable to that
of the Hands in a Bodie naturall.”120 Other commentators deployed more
the despotism of each individual from plunging society into its former chaos. Such
motives are the punishment established against the infractors of the laws.”); 2 Jean Jacques
Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law pt. III, ch. IV, at 416–17 (Peter
Korkman ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2006) (1748) (“[T]he right of executing . . . [laws], and . . . punishing [violators], belongs originally to society in general, and
to each individual in particular; otherwise . . . laws, which nature and reason impose on
man, would be entirely useless . . . if no body had the power of putting them in execution,
or of punishing [their] violation.”); John Cowell, The Institutes of the Lawes of England 2
(London, Tho. Roycroft 1651) [hereinafter Cowell, Institutes] (“[I]t is requisite likewise,
[t]hat there be Magistrates ordained, [so that] the Lawes may be put in execution; for it
were to little purpose that there should be Lawes, if there were not some to govern by
those Lawes.”); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 147–48 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1996) (1651) (“Lawes are of no power to protect them, without a Sword in the hands
of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution.”); Henry Home, Lord
Kames, The Hereditary and Indefeasible Right of Kings, in Essays upon Several Subjects
Concerning British Antiquities 193 (Edinburgh, printed for A. Kincaid 1747) (“A Society
of any Extent cannot be without Government. The Members must have Laws to determine
their Differences, and they must have Rulers to put their Laws in Execution.”); Samuel von
Pufendorf, De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem bk. II, ch. XI, at 122
(James Brown Scott ed., Frank Gardner Moore trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1927) (1682)
[hereinafter Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen] (“[I]t is in vain that laws are
passed, if the rulers allow them to be violated with impunity, it is accordingly their duty to
have charge of the execution of the same . . . .”); Samuel Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature
and of Nations in Eight Books bk. VII, ch. 4, reprinted in The Political Writings of Samuel
Pufendorf 93, 223 (Craig L. Carr ed., Michael J. Seidler trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1994)
[hereinafter Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations] (“[P]assing laws which you are
unable to put into effect is a hollow exercise . . . .”).
118. Daniel Defoe, The Poor Man’s Plea 23 (London, printed for A. Baldwin 2d ed.
1698). Defoe further argued that without the “[c]oncurrence” of the English gentry,
which had an important role in the execution of law, all “the Laws, Proclamations, and
Declarations in the World [would] have no Effect.” Id.
119. See Hobbes, supra note 117, at 2 ﬁg.2.
120. Id. at 169. For more examples of prominent treatise writers using corporeal metaphors for both law and government, see Jean Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonweale 7
(London, Richard Knolles trans., printed for G. Bishop 1606) (“[A] commonweale cannot
long stand if it be . . . destitute of those . . . things necessary for the life of man; no more
than can a man long live whose mind is so strongly ravished with the contemplation of
high things, that he forgetteth to eate or drinke . . . .”); John Davies, A Report of Cases and
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musical analogies, observing that “lawes without execucion, be no more
proﬁtable, than belles without clappers,”121 or that “the Law . . . is indeed
an excellent Instrument to make harmony and concord in the
Commonwealth: but the best Lute that ever was made could never make
musick of it self alone, without the learned hand of the Lute-player.”122
The point was visceral: The laws must “follow every subject, as the shadow
follows the body”123—for “what a livelesse fond thing would Law be,
without any judge to determine it, or power to enforce it . . . ?”124
The legal and political writings inherited by the Founders were fairly
obsessed with execution. The treatise known as Bracton returned metronomically to the pairing of judgment and execution—in both practical125
and jurisdictional126 terms. Later authors likewise framed their inquiries
Matters in Law, Resolved and Adjudged in the King’s Courts in Ireland 23–24 (Dublin,
printed for Sarah Cotter 1762) [hereinafter Davies, Report of Cases in Ireland] (“Again,
the Law is nothing else but a Rule which is made to measure the actions of men. But a
Rule is dead, and measures nothing, unless the hand of the Architect do apply it.”); JeanJacques Rousseau, The Social Contract bk. III, ch. 11, at 135 (Maurice Cranston trans.,
Penguin Books 1968) (1762) (“The legislative power is the heart of the state, the executive
power is the brain, which sets all the parts in motion. The brain may become paralysed
and the individual still live[] . . . but as soon as his heart stops functioning, the creature is
dead.”).
121. John Ponet, A Shorte Treatise of Politike Power 6 (n.p., n. pub. 1556); see also
Johannes Althusius, Politica 177 (Frederick S. Carney ed. & trans., Liberty Fund 1995)
(1617) (“Law should be accurately and precisely executed. For law without execution is
like a bell without a clapper. It would be as if the magistrate were mute or dead.”).
122. Davies, Report of Cases in Ireland, supra note 120, at 23–24.
123. Beccaria, supra note 117, at 147.
124. Parker, supra note 110, at 13–14. Theologian John Bramhall also described the
operation of laws in a Hobbesian state of nature when he wrote that Hobbes:
maketh the laws of nature to be laws and no laws: Just as a man and no
man, hit a bird and no bird, with a stone and no stone, on a tree and no tree:
not laws but theorems, laws which required not performance but endeavours,
laws which were silent, and could not be put in execution in the state of
nature.
John Bramhall, The Catching of Leviathan, or the Great Whale, in Castigations of Mr.
Hobbes: His Last Animadversions in the Case Concerning Liberty and Universal Necessity
449, 569 (London, E.T. 1658).
125. See 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 308 (“[Justice’s] jurisdiction is extended to all
matters necessary to determine the suit, so far as judgment and the execution of judgment
are concerned . . . .”); 4 Bracton, supra note 98, at 278 (“In civil causes . . . it seems that
clerks may not save themselves from answering in the secular forum in pleas which belong
to the crown and dignity of the king, because the king can order execution of the judgment without prejudice to the ecclesiastical dignity . . . .”).
126. See 3 Bracton, supra note 98, at 46 (“The plaint ought to be made to him who
has jurisdiction, as the prince, and not to everyone who has jurisdiction unless he also has
coertion, so that he may order execution of his judgment.”). However, “ecclesiastics,”
according to Bracton, “though they have jurisdiction in some matters . . . have neither cognisance nor coertion with respect to lay fee.” Id. If ecclesiastics “demanded execution [by
the sheriff], the sheriff would disobey them with imputiny . . . .” Id. (alteration in original); see also 4 Bracton, supra note 98, at 249 (“Of spiritual and temporal things and their
accessories . . . which must be determined in the ecclesiastical forum . . . and in the same
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as an exploration of administrative mechanisms for putting parchment
law into effect. The introduction to the jurist and politician John Davies’s
seminal work on Irish common law celebrated the king, not so much for
his majesty’s gracious gift of English law to the lucky nation of Ireland as
for creating an administrative apparatus to implement it.127 Coke prefaced the ﬁrst volume of his Reports by explaining that its publication was
prompted “when [he] considered how by her Majesties princely care and
choice, her Seates of Justice have beene ever for the due execution of her
Lawes.” 128 And Francis Bacon’s Elements of Common Law was framed
around an appeal to a set of royal reforms—compared by the author to
those of the Byzantine emperor Justinian129—aimed at facilitating the
execution of law. 130 This idea recurs persistently in legal treatises, 131

way if a plea is sued in the secular forum . . . cognisance of the principal matter will not . . .
belong to the ecclesiastical judge.”); 4 Richard Burn, The Justice of the Peace and Parish
Officer 42 (London, W. Strahan & W. Woodfall 15th ed. 1785) [hereinafter Burn, Justice
of the Peace and Parish Officer] (offering a similar observation on the pairing of judgment and execution).
127. See Davies, Report of Cases in Ireland, supra note 120, at 1 (“King John made the
ﬁrst division of Counties in Ireland, published the Laws of England, . . . commanded the
due execution thereof[,] . . . [and] erected the courts of justice . . . .”). To that end, and to
“put English Laws in execution [in Ireland],” the King “brought with him many learned
persons in the law, and other Officers and Ministers of all sorts . . . .” Id.
128. Edward Coke, Preface to Part One of the Reports (1660), reprinted in 1 Selected
Writings of Coke, supra note 94, at 5; see also Edward Coke, Preface to Part Nine of the
Reports (1613) [hereinafter Coke, Preface to Part Nine of the Reports], reprinted in 1
Selected Writings of Coke, supra note 94, at 291 (describing the constitutional law of
England as structured around the goal “[t]hat the Subject might be kept from offending,
that is, that Offences might be prevented both by good and provident Laws and by the due
Execution thereof”).
129. See Francis Bacon, The Elements of the Common Laws of England (1630)
[hereinafter Bacon, The Common Law], reprinted in Lord Bacon’s Law Tracts 24–25
(London, printed for D. Browne 2d ed. 1741) (“The same desire long after did spring in
the Emperor Justinian . . . who[,] having peace in the heart of his Empire . . . chose it for a
monument and honour of his government[] to revisit the Roman lawes from inﬁnite volumes . . . into one competent and uniform corps of laws.”).
130. See id. at 26 (“Your Majesty’s reign having been blessed from the highest with
inward peace, and falling into an age, wherein if science be increased, conscience is rather
decayed, and if mens wits be great, their wills be greater, and wherein also laws are
multiplied in number, and slackened in vigour and execution . . . .”). Bacon’s constitutional survey of English government focuses on the various actors’ power “to execute” law
and justice. See id. at 109–63 (explaining the powers and duties of the sheriffs, hundreds,
justices of the peace, and judges of the assizes); see also Francis Bacon, New Atlantis
(1627) [hereinafter Bacon, New Atlantis], reprinted in Francis Bacon: A Selection of His
Works 417, 439 (Sidney Warhaft ed., Macmillan Publ’g Co. 1985) (“The governor assisteth,
to the end to put in execution by his public authority the decrees and orders . . . .”).
131. See, e.g., John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae 80 (Cambridge, A. Amos
ed., Cambridge University 1825) (1775) (“[T]he King’s Sheriff . . . executes within his
county all mandates and judgments of the King’s Court of Justice . . . .”); cf. 3 Burn, Justice
of the Peace and Parish Officer, supra note 126, at 1–35 (“Justices of the peace are
judges of record, appointed by the king . . . for the conservation of the peace, and for the
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reported case law,132 and theoretical writings,133 and eighteenth-century
statute books were dotted with provisions aimed at “the more effectual
execution of . . . Laws.”134
C.

Execution: The King’s Deﬁning Role

The practical need for a constitutional cudgel was obvious. Luckily
for the English, they had one ready at hand: the king.135 The standard
formulation emphasized that “[t]o rule well a king requires two things,
arms and laws, that by them both times of war and of peace may be rightly ordered. For each stands in need of the other.”136 The English treatise
writers tended understandably to focus on the second:
For this is true freedome in a Prince, to be loved at home, and
feared abroad, to be able to defend his own people at home
from oppression and violence by his Laws, without the help of
an Army; to keep and conserve all his Subjects in happy peace,
by a sword made of Parchment and Paper in his Laws, and not
by a Sword made up of Iron and Steel in his Armies.137
execution of divers things comprehended within their commission, and within divers
statutes committed to their charge.”).
132. See, e.g., Calvin’s Case, or the Case of the Postnati (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 391;
7 Co. Rep. 1 a, 12 a (KB) (“So in our usual commission of assise, of gaol delivery, of oyer
and terminer, of the peace, &c. power is given to execute justice . . . .”); The Chamberlain
of London’s Case (1590) 77 Eng. Rep. 150, 151; 5 Co. Rep. 62 b, 63 a (KB)
(“[O]rdinances, constitutions, or by-laws are allowed by the law, which are made for the
true and due execution of the laws or statutes of the realm, or for the well government
and order of the body incorporate.”).
133. See, e.g., Helvetius, Essays on the Mind and its Several Faculties 139 (London, n.
pub. 1759) (“[L]aws made for the happiness of all would be observed by none, if the
magistrates were not armed with the power necessary to put them in execution.”).
134. E.g., 1773, 13 Geo. 3 c. 31, § 4 (Gr. Brit.) (expanding personal jurisdiction in
larceny cases); see also 1786, 26 Geo. 3 c. 82, § 6 (Gr. Brit.) (revising standards of proof in
tax-evasion cases).
135. Or Queen, faute de mieux.
136. 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 19 (“If arms fail against hostile and unsubdued enemies, then will the realm be without defense; if laws fail, justice will be extirpated; nor will
there be any man to render just judgment.”); see also Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince 51
(Daniel Donno ed. & trans., Bantam Books 1966) (1513) [hereinafter Machiavelli, The
Prince] (“The two most essential foundations for any state, whether it be old or new, or
both old and new, are sound laws and sound military forces.”). Thanks to John Hudson for
pointing out that this formulation appears to date at least to Justinian’s Institutes, still well
known in the eighteenth century. See D. Justiniani, Institutionum bk. IV, at 1 (George
Harris trans., London, printed for C. Bathurst & E. Withers 1756) (“The imperial dignity
should be supported by arms, and guarded by laws, that the people, in time of peace as
well as war, may be secured from dangers and rightly governed.”).
137. Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 104; see also Fortescue, supra note 131, at 2–3 (“[A]s
you divert and employ yourself so much in feats of arms, so I could wish to see you zealously affected towards the study of the laws; because, as wars are decided by the sword, so
the determination of justice is effected by the laws . . . .”) (footnote omitted); Ranulf de
Glanville, A Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Kingdom of England, at xxxvi
(London, J. Beames trans., A.J. Valpy 1812) (“The Regal Power should not merely be
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The king’s role in creating and interpreting law was one of seventeenthcentury England’s most hotly disputed constitutional controversies.138 But
when it came to its execution, everyone agreed that the king—or someone like him—was indispensable:139
[Y]our Majesty is in a double respect the life of our Laws; once,
because without your authority they are but litera mortua; and
again because you are the life of our peace, without which laws
are put to silence, and as the vital spirits do not only maintain
and move the body, but also contend to perfect and renew it; so
your sacred Majesty, who is anima legis, doth not only give unto
your laws force and vigour but also hath bin careful of their
amendment and reforming . . . .140
As Chief Justice of the King’s Bench Thomas Billing explained in the
ﬁfteenth century, “[I]t pertains to every king by reason of his office to do
justice and grace, justice in executing the laws, &c, and grace in granting
pardon to felons . . . .”141 To suggest otherwise was to misunderstand the
office: “[W]hat is the King himself, but the clear Fountain of Justice?
[A]nd what are the Professors of the Law but the Conduit-pipes deriving
and conveying the streams of his Justice to all the subjects of his several
Kingdoms?”142
decorated with Arms to restrain Rebels and Nations making head against it and its realm,
but ought likewise to be adorned with Laws for the peaceful governing of its Subjects and
its People.”). Of course, the reality didn’t always live up to the aspiration. See, e.g., Jupp,
supra note 89, at 6 (noting the spotty nature of law enforcement as actually exercised at the
local level).
138. See, e.g., Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 76 (“[N]ever any Bill passed in Parliament
for a Law (the King being within the Realme) by the Lords and Commons alone, without
the Kings personall assent in Parliament to the Bill, as he that gave life and being to the
Law . . . .”).
139. See, e.g., Althusius, supra note 121, at 177 (“[C]ommonwealths thrive only so
long as good laws, which are the soul of a commonwealth, are respected in them. The
magistrate has been constituted for the sake of executing law, and in this sense he is a living law . . . .”); John Milton, A Defence of the People of England (1692) [hereinafter
Milton, Defence of the English People], reprinted in 2 The Prose Works of John Milton 5,
106 (Philadelphia, John W. Moore 1847) (“[T]he parliament is the supreme council of the
nation, constituted and appointed by a most free people, and armed with ample power
and authority . . . to consult together upon the most weighty affairs of the kingdom; the
king was created to put their laws in execution.”); William Camden, Discourse Concerning
the Prerogative of the Crown (1617), in Frank Smith Fussner, William Camden’s “Discourse
Concerning the Prerogative of the Crown,” 101 Proc. Am. Phil. Soc’y 204, 213 (1957)
(“Next to the making of laws the execution of them is the most material, which wholly
dependeth upon the king, no man having any authority to put any thing into execution
but as his deputy . . . .”).
140. Bacon, The Common Law, supra note 129, at 23–24.
141. 1 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, supra note 101, at 102 (quoting Chief
Justice Thomas Billing in In re Bagot’s Case, YB 9 Edw. 4, fol. 1b (1469) (Eng.)).
142. Davies, Report of Cases in Ireland, supra note 120, at 21; see also Bagshaw,
supra note 90, at 56 (noting that “the regard the Law hath to the person of the Supreame
Governour, esteeming him the Head of the Law, and the Fountain of Justice”); 2 Bracton,
supra note 98, at 167 (“For to do justice, [give] judgment and preserve the peace is the
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The king’s centrality to the execution of law was practical, to be sure.
But it had signiﬁcant theoretical consequences too—reﬂected in a number of legal doctrines that turned on the Crown’s institutional role in
“giving life to law.” For one thing, to be out of the king’s protection was
to be legally defenseless:
[F]or the law and the king’s writs be the things[] by which a
man is protected and holpen; and so, during the time that a
man in such case is out of the king’s protection, he is out of
helpe and protection by the king’s Law, or by the king’s writ.143
This was true not only for those who physically departed the realm but also
for anyone expelled from the body politic in a metaphorical sense, as by
a praemunire facias.144 Even ritual formulations (“The King is dead; long
live the King!”) recognized that interregnum meant the death of law: “[I]t
is a general uncontested Rule, That upon the Death of a King in actual
Possession of the Crown, his Heir is a King . . . before his Coronation[,]
for without a King to execute the Laws, Justice must fail[,] and therefore
it is a Maxim[,] that the King never dies.”145

crown[,] without which it can neither subsist nor endure.” (ﬁrst alteration in original));
Coke, Speech and Charge at the Norwich Assizes, supra note 116, at 530–31 (“To Kings,
Rulers, Judges, and Magistrates, this sentence is proper: Vos Dii estis; you are Gods on
earth: when by your execution of Justice and Judgement, the God of heaven is by your
actions represented . . . .”). For a colonial example distinguishing “the executive power”
from other branches of prerogative and noting of the king that “possessing the executive
power of the laws, it is his peculiar duty to see such act carried into execution,” see, for
example, Godwin v. Lunan, Jeff. 96 (Gen. Ct. Va. 1771) (recording counsel’s argument in
a case brought by churchwardens and vestrymen against a licentious minister).
143. 1 Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England; or, a
Commentary upon Littleton bk. 2, ch. 11, § 199, at 129b (Francis Hargrave & Charles
Butler eds., London, Luke Hansard & Sons 16th ed. 1809) (1628) [hereinafter Coke on
Littleton]. Hobbes gave this formulation a nasty twist, at least from the king’s perspective:
“The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and no longer,
than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.” Hobbes, supra note 117, at
153. For an even more daring version, see the doctrinally-sound-but-common-sensedeﬁcient treason convict quoted in Hale’s The History of the Pleas of the Crown: “[T]he king
being convicted by the pope may be lawfully slaughtered by any whatsoever, for this is the
execution of the supreme sentence of the pope, as the other is the execution of the law.” 1
Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, supra note 101, at 117 (emphasis omitted).
144. See 1 Coke on Littleton, supra note 143, bk. 2, ch. 11, § 199, at 130a (“The judgement in a praemunire is[] that the defendant shall be . . . out of the king’s protection, and
his lands and tenements, goods and chattels forfeited to the king, and that his body shall
remaine in prison at the king’s pleasure.”). The praemunire facias offense was “[s]o
odious” that “[an attained man] might have bin slaine . . . without danger of law.” Id.
145. 1 William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown: Or a System of the
Principal Matters Relating to That Subject, Digested Under Their Proper Heads ch. 17,
§ 19, at 36 (London, Eliz. Nutt 1716) [hereinafter Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown]; see also
Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England: Concerning High
Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown, and Criminal Causes (1644), reprinted in 2
Selected Writings of Coke, supra note 94, at 944, 963–64 (“[T]he Crown descend to the
rightfull heire, he is Rex before Coronation: for by the Law of England there is no
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The king’s role as the executor of law was so conceptually central to
his identity that it was literally criminal to disrespect it. Thus, to refuse a
royal request for assistance with the execution of law was to commit a
misprision contempt against the king’s prerogative.146 It was also a crime,
not only to accuse the king of failing to execute the law but even simply
to suggest that he might not be doing so with sufficient vigor.147 It was no
accident that the ﬁrst item in Parliament’s Grand Remonstrance complained about King Charles I’s failure to provide for “the due execution
of those good laws which have been made for securing the liberty of your
subjects.”148
D. Toward a Separation of Powers
Whatever the virtues of kingship as a solution to the execution problem, it didn’t take a spitefully anti-Catholic legislature to notice that the
Crown came with some serious problems as well. One was the possibility
that the king might be too hasty. Energy was good, but it had to be
bridled, and its enthusiasms tamed—or at least carefully directed. In a
carefully abstract vein, the politically conservative Bacon cautioned:
[B]oldness is ever blind; for it seeth not dangers and
inconveniences. Therefore it is ill in counsel, good in execution; so that the right use of bold persons is that they never
command in chief, but be seconds and under the direction of
others. For in counsel it is good to see dangers, and in execution not to see them, except they be very great.149
interregnum: . . . for by the law there is alwayes a King, in whose name the lawes are to be
maintained, and executed, otherwise Justice should faile.”).
146. See Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 268–70 (“[T]he king
hath . . . [a] power of commanding the person of any man . . . [i]n reference to the public
service of the kingdom, . . . [either] (1) In point of advice, (2) In point of office or service,
[or] (3) In point of defence or safety.”); 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, supra note 145,
ch. 22, § 1, at 59 (explaining that misprisions not amounting to “misprision of treason”
include “[r]efusing to assist the King for the Good of the Public[]” and “[d]isobeying the
King’s lawful Commands”).
147. See 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, supra note 145, ch. 23, §§ 1–2, at 60 (explaining
that it was a “contempt[] against the King’s Person or Government” to “charg[e] the
Government with . . . weak Administration”).
148. See The Grand Remonstrance, with the Petition Accompanying It (Dec. 1, 1641),
reprinted in The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625–1660, at 202,
205 (Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1906). The Grand Remonstrance
offered the King some two hundred bits of constructive criticism. See id. at 202–32.
149. Francis Bacon, Of Boldness (1625), reprinted in Francis Bacon: A Selection of
His Works, supra note 130, at 74, 74–75; see also John Locke, An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding bk. II, ch. 30, § 4, at 373–74 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon
Press 1979) (1690) [hereinafter Locke, On Human Understanding] (“For a Man to be
undisturbed in Danger, sedately to consider what is ﬁttest to be done, and to execute it
steadily, is a mixed Mode, or a complex Idea of an Action which may exist.”); id. ch. 31, § 3,
at 376 (offering a similar view). This distinction between counsel and execution carried
through to The Federalist Papers. See The Federalist No. 70, supra note 30, at 357
(Alexander Hamilton) (“In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than
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Bracton—at least as inherited by eighteenth-century readers—often returned to an equestrian metaphor for the same point: “[S]ince the heart
of a king ought to be in the hand of God, let him, that he be not unbridled, put on the bridle of temperance and the reins of moderation, lest
being unbridled, he be drawn toward injustice.”150
Commentators also worried about other human frailties to which even
God’s lieutenant might be subject. The most candid urged realism: “[N]o
advantage in moral policy can be lasting, which is not founded on the
indelible sentiments of the heart of man. Whatever law deviates from this
principle will always meet with a resistance, which will destroy it in the
end . . . .”151 Sometimes they acknowledged that the king himself could
be wicked; popular tropes about Bad King John and humpbacked
Richard were often tolerated or even cultivated by subsequent dynastic
coalitions.152 More often, though, these worries were framed in terms of
bad advice from “Evil Counsellors, and Corrupt and Arbitrary Ministers
of State”153 who were themselves malicious or just ignorant. Other writers
a beneﬁt. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department . . .
often promote deliberation and circumspection . . . .”). Hamilton elaborated that the
legislature “constantly counteract[s] those qualities in the Executive, which are the most
necessary ingredients in its composition—vigour and expedition, and this without any
counterbalancing good.” Id.
150. 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 305. In a similar vein was Cesare Beccaria’s anxiety—
in work that generally celebrated vigorous execution—about “the unbounded licentiousness of ill-directed power, which has continually produced so many authorized examples of
the most unfeeling barbarity.” Beccaria, supra note 117, at 3–4.
151. Beccaria, supra note 117, at 8. Discussing the sovereign’s right to punish, Beccaria
observed that “[n]o man ever gave up his liberty[] merely for the good of the public. Such
a chimera exists only in romances.” Id. Machiavelli, as usual, was more blunt: “I deem it
best to stick to the practical truth of things rather than to fancies. . . . [I]t is necessary that
a prince who is interested in his survival learn to be other than good . . . .” Machiavelli,
The Prince, supra note 136, at 61–62; see also id. at 69 (“[I]t is often necessary to act
against mercy, against faith, against humanity, against frankness, against religion in order
to preserve the state.”).
152. See, e.g., William Shakespeare, Richard III act 3, sc. 1, ll. 130–31 (Gary Taylor et
al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (“Because that I am little, like an ape, He thinks that you
should bear me on your shoulders.”); An Excellent Ballad of King John and the Abbott of
Canterbury, English Broadside Ballad Archive, http://ebba.english.ucsb.edu/ballad/
32487/xml [https://perma.cc/VUK9-GH95] (last visited Feb. 1, 2019) (“I Will tell you a
Story, a Story anon, Of a noble Prince and his Name was King John; For he was a Prince,
and a Prince of great Might, He held up great Wrongs and he put down great Rights.”).
153. See William Penn, England’s Great Interest in the Choice of This New
Parliament: Dedicated to All her Free-Holders and Electors (1679), reprinted in The
Political Writings of William Penn 384, 384 (Andrew R. Murphy ed., Liberty Fund 2002)
(emphasis omitted). Penn argued that it was the work of Parliament to remove counselors
who had “giv[en] the King Wrong Measures” and “[a]lienat[ed] his Affections from his
People.” Id. The Grand Remonstrance likewise ritually forswore “the least intention to lay
any blemish upon [the King’s] royal person, but only to represent how [his] royal
authority and trust have been abused.” The Grand Remonstrance, supra note 148, at 203.
Parliament went on to describe “those evils under which we have now many years suffered,
are fomented and cherished by a corrupt and ill-affected party” made up of “[t]he
Jesuited Papists,” “[t]he Bishops,” and various “Councillors and Courtiers [who] for
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focused on society at large and the factions to which it gave rise, whether
religious, regional, socioeconomic, or otherwise.154
But this left them on the horns of a dilemma, since even the most
ardent parliamentarians recognized the need for a magistracy to execute
the law vigorously and predictably. The parliamentarian Henry Parker,
summarized the problem:
[After the origin of civil society,] it was soon therefore provided
that lawes agreeable to the dictates of reason should be ratiﬁed
by common consent, and that the execution and interpretation
of those Lawes should be intrusted to some magistrate, for the
preventing of common injuries betwixt Subject and Subject[.]
[B]ut when it after appeared that man was yet subject to
unnaturall destruction, by the Tyranny of intrusted magistrates,
a mischiefe almost as fatall as to be without all magistracie, how
to provide a wholsome remedy therefore, was not so easie to be
prevented. . . . [Even] if it be agreed upon, that limits should be
preﬁxed to Princes, and judges appointed to decree according
to those limits, yet an other great inconvenience will presently
affront us; for we cannot restraine Princes too far, but we shall
disable them from some good, as well as inhibit them from
some evill, and to be disabled from doing good in some things,
may be as mischievous, as to be inabled for all evils at meere
discretion. Long it was ere the world could . . . ﬁnde out an
orderly meanes whereby to avoid the danger of unbounded
prerogative on this hand, and too excessive liberty on the other:
and scarce has long experience yet fully satisﬁed the mindes of
all men in it.155
private ends have engaged themselves to further the interests of some foreign princes.” Id.
at 206–07.
154. See, e.g., Niccoló Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy 211–12 (Harvey C. Mansﬁeld &
Nathan Tarcov trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1996) (1517) [hereinafter Machiavelli, Discourses
on Livy] (“But as to sects, these renewals are also seen to be necessary by the example of
our religion, which would be altogether eliminated if it had not been drawn back toward
its beginning . . . brought back into the minds of men what had already been eliminated
there.”); Parker, supra note 110, at 23 (“The composition of Parliaments . . . takes away all
jealousies, for it is so equally, and geometrically proportionable, and all the States . . . contribute their due parts therein, that [none] can be of any extreame predominance, the
multitude loves Monarchy better then Aristocracy, and the Nobility . . . prefer it as much
beyond Democracy . . . .”); Mons. de Voltaire, A Commentary on the Book of Crimes and
Punishments, in An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, supra note 117, at 182 [hereinafter
Voltaire, Commentary] (“Would you prevent a sect from overturning the state . . . . The
only methods . . . to be taken with a new sect, are, to put to death the chief and all his
adherents . . . or to tolerate them . . . . The ﬁrst method is that of a monster; the second of
a wise man.”).
155. Parker, supra note 110, at 13–14. Hamilton picked up this thread in the New York
Convention debates:
There are two objects in forming systems of government—Safety for
the people, and energy in the administration. When these objects are
united, the certain tendency of the system will be to the public welfare.
If the latter object be neglected, the people’s security will be as certainly
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How indeed to “restraine Princes” from tyranny without “disabl[ing]
them” from the vigorous execution of law—which was the whole point of
having them in the ﬁrst place?
The start of an answer came as more of a (hotly disputed) assertion
than a solution as such: The king was said to be subject to law. This point
goes back to Bracton:156
[While the] king has no equal within his realm . . . [he] must not
be under man but under God and under the law, because law
makes the king, . . . for there is no rex where will rules rather
than lex. . . . And that he ought to be under the law appears
clearly in the analogy of Jesus Christ, whose vicegerent on earth
he is, . . . [and who] willed himself to be under the law that he
might redeem those who live under it.157
Both the manuscript lineage and the best reading of this portion of
Bracton are disputed; it is at least debatable whether it was an exhortation158

sacriﬁced, as by disregarding the former. Good constitutions are formed
upon a comparison of the liberty of the individual with the strength of
government: If the tone of either be too high, the other will be weakened too much.
Alexander Hamilton, Remarks at the New York Convention Debates (June 25, 1788),
reprinted in 22 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 1877, 1890.
156. Reading Bracton this way probably involved some degree of wishful thinking about
Merrie England—not to mention genuine ignorance about what we now know about the
text’s authorship and repeated revisions. Compare J.L. Barton, The Mystery of Bracton, 14
J. Legal Hist. 1 (1993) (defending the “traditional” view crediting royal judge Henry de
Bracton with authorship of the core elements of the treatise), with Paul Brand, ‘The Age
of Bracton,’ 89 Proc. of the Brit. Acad. 65 (1996) (arguing that Bracton was more likely a
reviser rather than the author of the treatise).
157. 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 33 (footnotes omitted). Bracton was an authoritative
citation even in the early United States:
Did the people of the United States intend to bind the several States by
the Executive power of the national Government? The affirmative answer
to the former question directs, unavoidably, an affirmative answer to this.
Ever since the time of Bracton, his maxim, I believe, has been deemed a
good one “Supervacuum esset leges condere, nisi esset qui leges tueretur.” “It
would be superﬂuous to make laws, unless those laws, when made, were
to be enforced.”
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 464–65 (1793) (Wilson, J.) (quoting Bracton);
see also A Farmer I, Balt. Md. Gazette, Feb. 15, 1788 [hereinafter A Farmer I], reprinted in
11 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 306, 311 (“Henry Bracton a cotemporary
lawyer and judge, who has left us a compleat and able treatise on the laws of England, is
thus clear and express—Omnes quidem sub rege, ipse autem sub lege, all are subject to the
King, but the King is subject to the law . . . .”). For more on the republication and early
modern inﬂuence of Bracton, see, for example, Ian Williams, A Medieval Book and EarlyModern Law: Bracton’s Authority and Application in the Common Law c. 1550–1640, at 79
Legal Hist. Rev. 47 (2011).
158. See 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 305 (“[H]e is a king as long as he rules well but a
tyrant when he oppresses by violent domination . . . . Let him . . . temper his power by law . . .
that he may live according to the laws, for the law of mankind has decreed that his own
laws bind the lawgiver . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 306 (“Nothing is more ﬁtting for a
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or a doctrinal statement of present legal obligation.159 Either way, the
notion of a king subject to law persisted. Quoting Bracton without
citation, Richard Hooker—one of England’s ﬁrst systematic constitutional theorists and in general an enthusiastic monarchist 160 —put it
simply: “[S]o is the power of the [English] king over all and in all limited, that unto all his proceedings the law itself is a rule.”161 On Hooker’s
account, this was England’s great boon:
Happier that people whose law is their king in the greatest
things, than that whose king is himself their law. Where the king
doth guide the state, and the law the king, that commonwealth
is like an harp or melodious instrument, the strings whereof are
tuned and handled all by one, following as laws the rules and
canons of musical science.162
Certainly counternarratives existed; the relationship between municipal
law and the king was a central point of disagreement between Crown and
Parliament during the seventeenth century. 163 By the Founding Era,
sovereign than to live by the laws, nor is there any greater sovereignty than to govern
according to law, . . . for the law makes him king.” (footnotes omitted)).
159. See 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 110 (“The king has a superior, namely, God. Also
the law by which he is made king. Also his curia, namely, the earls and barons, because if
he is without bridle, that is without law, they ought to put the bridle on him.” (footnotes
omitted)); id. at 305–06 (“[S]ince he is the minister and vicar of God on earth, [the king]
can do nothing save what he can do de jure . . . .”). Bracton further noted that the king
could not do “anything rashly put forward of his own will” but only what had been “rightly
decided with the counsel of his magnates, deliberation and consultation having been had
thereon, the king giving it auctoritas.” Id.
160. For a typical sentiment, see, for example, Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of
Ecclesiastical Polity bk. VII, ch. ii (1593), reprinted in 3 The Works of Richard Hooker
140, 345–46 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 7th ed. 1874) (“Unto kings by human right,
honour by very divine right, is due; man’s ordinances are many times presupposed as
grounds in the statutes of God . . . . So God doth ratify the works of that sovereign authority which kings have received by men.”).
161. Id. bk. VIII, ch. ii, at 353.
162. Id. at 352. Hooker emphasized that this meant “not only the law of nature and of
God, but [the] very national or municipal law consonant thereunto.” Id.; see also, e.g.,
Fortescue, supra note 131, at 26 (“A King of England cannot, at his pleasure, make any
alterations in the laws of the land, for the nature of his goverment is not only regal, but
political.”). Machiavelli’s commentary on republics did not focus on England, of course,
but it nicely crystalized this celebration of legally limited magistracy. See Machiavelli,
Discourses on Livy, supra note 154, at 118 (“[T]he states of princes have lasted very long,
the states of republics have lasted very long, and both have had need of being regulated by
the laws. For a prince who can do what he wishes is crazy; a people that can do what it
wishes is not wise.”). Note that Machiavelli’s defense of the Roman dictatorship relied
largely on its legalized nature: “[A] republic will never be perfect unless it has provided
for everything with its laws and has established a remedy for every accident and given the
mode to govern it.” Id. at 74–75; see also id. at 75 (“[T]hose republics that in urgent
dangers do not take refuge either in the dictator or in similar authorities will always come
to ruin in grave accidents.”).
163. Compare, e.g., Robert Filmer, Patriarcha (1680), reprinted in Patriarcha and
Other Writings, supra note 12, at 1, 43–44 (asserting that “in effect the king doth swear to
keep no laws but such as in his judgment are upright” and that “the prerogative of a king
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however, there was no question: The Crown was subject to law—or at least,
to its directive force.164
But that only displaced the question. We can tell the king he is subject to law. But what if he doesn’t listen? As Parker observed: “‘Twas not
difficult to invent Lawes, for the limitting of supreme governors, but to
invent how those Lawes should be executed or by whom interpreted, was
almost impossible, nam quis custodiat ipsos custodes . . . ?”165 For that, the
writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century began to explore the
idea of separate government powers in the well-ordered commonwealth.
There were two steps to this thought.
The ﬁrst step was recognizing a matter of empirical fact: Debates
about political legitimacy aside, governance in any moderately sophisticated state requires institutional specialization. In the chain of events
that bring law from a thought to an enacted rule to a lived reality, different institutions typically play different roles. The philosopher John Locke’s
taxonomy of legislative, executive, and federative (in other words, foreign affairs and national security) powers of the government was the
Founders’ most important referent.166 But the descriptive point long predated Locke. Already in the thirteenth century, Bracton was groping
toward the distinction between a legislative power167 and an implementing power in its executive and judicial guises.168 By the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, the commentary had long since found greater

is to be above all laws, for the good only of them that are under the laws”), and The Grand
Remonstrance, supra note 148, at 215 (contending that “[t]he most public and solemn
sermons before His Majesty were . . . to advance prerogative above law” and to urge that
“[t]he government must be set free from all restraint of laws concerning our persons and
estates”), with, e.g., John Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649), reprinted
in The Major Works 273, 278 (Stephen Orgel & Jonathan Goldberg eds., 1991) (“[A]ll
kings and magistrates at their ﬁrst instalment to do impartial justice by law: who, upon
those terms and no other, received allegiance from the people, that is to say, bond or
covenant to obey them in execution of those laws which they . . . had themselves made or
assented to.”).
164. See Finch, supra note 88, bk. I, ch. III, at 32 (“Statutes to suppress Wrong, or to
take away Fraud, bind the King [although] he is not named.”); Hale, Prerogatives of the
King, supra note 101,at 14 (“[A]s to the directive power of the law, the king is bound by
it . . . (1) [b]y his office . . . [and] (2) [b]y his oath at his coronation.”); see also supra
section II.A (discussing the emergence of parliamentary sovereignty). For one example of
Founding citations to Bracton on this exact point, see A Farmer I, supra note 157, at 311.
165. Parker, supra note 110, at 13–14.
166. See Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, §§ 143–148, at 164–65.
167. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing Bracton’s commentary on
the king as subject to the laws).
168. See 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 26 (“The public interest also requires that there be
magistrates appointed in the state, for through such persons, men pre-eminent in the doing
of justice, the law is given effect. For it is of little value that law exists in the state if there
are none to administer it.”); see also id. at 22 (“We must see what law is. Law is a general
command, the decision of judicious men, the restraint of offences knowingly or unwittingly committed, the general agreement of the res publica.”).
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precision. Davies, for example, explained in the preface to his treatise
that:
[I]n every Commonwealth, when it once begins to ﬂourish, and
to grow rich and mighty, the people grow proud withall, and
their pride makes them contentious and litigious, so as there is
need of many Laws to bridle them, and many Officers to execute those Laws, and many Lawyers to interpret those Laws, and
all little enough: as when a body grows full and gross, it needs
more physick then when it was lean.169
Coke’s classic commentary on Littleton used a similarly corporeal metaphor in distinguishing between law’s three phases—-announcement, interpretation, and enforcement: “The law is the rule, but it is mute. The king
judgeth by his judges, and they are the speaking law, lex loquens. The
processe and the execution, which is the life of the law consisteth in the
king’s writs.”170 Hale likewise distinguished between “jurisdictio or potestas
legem ferendi, or jurisdictio nomothetica” and “jurisdictio legem dicendi or
distribuendi,”171 and Hobbes noted that “the two arms of a Commonwealth,
are Force, and Justice; the ﬁrst whereof is in the King; the other deposited in the
hands of the Parlament.”172 Many others were to the same effect.173
169. Davies, Report of Cases in Ireland, supra note 120, at 16.
170. 1 Coke on Littleton, supra note 143, bk. 2, ch. 11, § 199, at 130a.
171. Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 169. The crucial distinction was
between the nomothetical creation of a new forward-looking rule and the executory
application of existing rules to past action: “The supreme jurisdiction of parliament acts
either deliberative where it makes laws or judicative when it gives judgment. The ﬁrst
respects the future . . . . The second respects the past and is not properly qua tale a law but
a supreme judgment unexaminable.” Id. at 181. Hale further divided jurisdictio legem
dicendi or distribuendi into the judicial power (“[a] power to give judgment”) and the executive power (“[a] power to compel the parties to come to judgment and to execute the
judgment given”). Id. at 179.
172. Hobbes, supra note 117, at 186. The reference to “Justice” here is to creating laws
pursuant to the social compact, not merely to their adjudication, for which Hobbes tended
to use the more speciﬁc word “judicature” and which he tended to divide from
“execution” of rulings. See, e.g., id. at 125 (deﬁning “the Right of Judicature” as the right
“of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise concerning Law, either Civill,
or Naturall, or concerning Fact”).
173. For other examples of this distinction between prescription and execution, see
Geoffrey Gilbert, The Law of Evidence 254 (London, printed for J.F. & C. Rivington et al.,
4th ed. 1777) (distinguishing between officers with power to render judgment and officers
with power to execute warrants issued thereunder); Helvetius, supra note 133, at 162
(“[M]ankind . . . will enter into conventions with each other, and these conventions will be
their ﬁrst laws; when they have formed laws, they will entrust some persons with the care of
seeing them put in execution, and those will be the ﬁrst magistrates.”); Hunton, A Treatise
of Monarchy, supra note 96, pt. I, ch. I, § 3, at 5–6 (“In respect of its degrees [government] is Nomothetical or Architectonical, and Gubernative or Executive. And in respect of the
subject of its residence, there is an ancient and usual distinction of it into Monarchical,
Aristocratical and Demeocratical.”); Parker, supra note 110, at 13 (using the standard tripartite formula to discuss society’s need for at least three institutions: “some magistracy to
provide new orders, and to judge of old, and to execute according to justice,” without
which “no society could be upheld”); Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, supra
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The second step was prescriptive, and it was at least initially far more
controversial. On this account, not only were the powers of government
in fact distributed among various institutions; they actually should be so
separated, with each institution at least somewhat independent from the
other. The Enlightenment philosopher Cesare Beccaria captured the
basic idea:
The sovereign, who represents the society itself, can only
make general laws, to bind the members; but it belongs not to
him to judge whether any individual has violated the social
compact, or incurred the punishment in consequence. For in
this case, there are two parties, one represented by the
sovereign, who insists upon the violation of the contract, and
the other is the person accused, who denies it. It is necessary
then that there should be a third person to decide this contest;
that is to say, a judge, or magistrate, from whose determination
there should be no appeal; and this determination should
consist of a simple affirmation, or negation of fact.174
This prescriptive assertion had been fiercely contested both in
theory175 and in practice.176 But by the late eighteenth century, it was
received wisdom—certainly among the commentators and legal
theorists on whom the Founders most relied, with Blackstone, 177

note 117, bk. I, ch. II, at 14 (“[T]he power to oblige, that is, to impose an inward necessity,
and the power to force or compel by penalties to observe the law, resides exclusively in the
lawgiver, and in him to whom has been committed the maintenance and execution of the
laws.”).
174. Beccaria, supra note 117, at 11–12. The Founders were much impressed by
Cicero as a classical antecedent in this respect. See, e.g., An Impartial Citizen VI,
Petersburg Va. Gazette, Mar. 13, 1788, reprinted in 8 Documentary History, supra note 70,
at 492, 493, 502, 503 n.14 (“Cicero, the most learned, and perhaps the wisest of the
ancient Romans . . . expresses his detestation of [special bills affecting individuals only] in
the most nervous and energetic language.”).
175. See, e.g., Hobbes, supra note 117, at 225 (“There is a Sixth doctrine, plainly, and
directly against the essence of a Common-wealth; and ‘tis this, That the Soveraign Power may
be divided. For what is it to divide the Power of a Common-wealth, but to Dissolve it; for
Powers divided mutually destroy each other.”); see also, e.g., Bodin, supra note 120, at
159–60 (“[T]he ﬁrst and chiefe marke of a soveraigne prince . . . [is] to give lawes to all his
subjects . . . without consent of any other . . . . For if a prince be bound not to make any
law without consent of [any other] . . . hee is then no soueraigne.”).
176. See, e.g., Darnel’s Case (or the Case of the Five Knights) (KB 1627), in 3 Cobbett’s
Complete Collection of State Trials 1, 51–59 (London, T. C. Hansard 1809) (“[I]f a man
be committed by the commandment of the king, he is not to be delivered by a Habeas
Corpus in this court . . . .”).
177. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *154 (“It is . . . necessary for preserving the
ballance of the constitution, that the executive power should be a branch, . . . not the whole,
of the legislature. The total union of them . . . would be productive of tyranny . . . .”); id. at
*155 (“[E]very branch of our civil polity supports and is supported, regulates and is regulated, by the rest; for . . . they mutually keep each other from exceeding their proper
limits.”); id. at *269 (“In this . . . separate existence of the judicial power, in a peculiar
body of men, nominated . . . but not removable at pleasure, by the crown, consists one
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Locke,178 and Montesquieu179 being the standard referents.180 The AngloIrish essayist Jonathan Swift was typical in criticizing Hobbes for “confound[ing] the [e]xecutive with the [l]egislative power”: “[A]ll wellinstituted [s]tates,” Swift argued, “have ever placed them in different
hands.”181 Even treatises on rather banal topics of private law would signal
their intellectual bona ﬁdes by reciting the standard point. 182 And
main preservative of . . . liberty; which cannot subsist long . . . unless the administration of
common justice be . . . separated both from the legislative and . . . the executive power.”).
178. See Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, § 143, at 164 (“[I]t may be too great a
temptation . . . for the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have . . .
power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to [those]
laws . . . and suit the law, both in its making, and execution, to their own private
advantage.”).
179. See 1 M. de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws bk. XI, ch. VI, at
222 (Thomas Nugent trans., London, printed for J. Nourse & P. Vaillant 5th ed. 1773)
[hereinafter Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws] (“When the legislative and executive powers
are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no
liberty . . . lest the same monarch enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical
manner.”); id. (“[T]here is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the
legislative and executive.”). For the original French, see 1 M. de Secondat, Baron de
Montesquieu, De l’esprit des Lois bk. XI, ch. vi, at 312 (London, n. pub., new ed. 1768)
[hereinafter Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois] (“Lorsque dans la même personne ou
dans le même corps de magistrature, la puissance législative est réunie à la puissance
exécutrice, il n’y a point de liberté; parce qu’on peut craindre que le même monarque ou
le même sénat ne fasse des lois tyranniques, pour les exécuter tyranniquement.”); id. (“Il
n’y a point encore de liberté si la puissance de juger n’est pas séparée de la puissance
législative et de l’exécutrice.”).
180. Genevan legal and political theorist Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, for example,
argued that one way to secure “the most perfect liberty” was to “invest the person, who
enjoys the honours and title of sovereignty, with only a part of the supreme authority” and
to “lodge the other in different hands, [such as in] in a council or parliament.” 2
Burlamaqui, supra note 117, pt. II, ch. II, at 346. He contended that, “with regard to
[m]onarchies,” the “military and legislative powers, together with that of raising taxes,”
should be “lodged in different hands, to the end that they may not be abused.” Id.
Similarly, de Lolme observed that:
[T]he English Constitution has not only excluded from any share in the
Execution of the laws, those in whom the People trust for the enacting
of them, but it has also taken from them what would have had the same
pernicious inﬂuence on their deliberations—the hope of ever invading
that executive authority, and transfering it to themselves.
De Lolme, The Constitution of England, supra note 105, bk. II, ch. X, at 281; see also 2 de
Lolme, Constitution de l’Angleterre, supra note 105, at 28 (“Et il ne suffisoit pas d’ôter
aux législateurs l’exécution des loix, par conséquent l’exemption, qui en est la suite
immédiate; il falloit encore leur ôter ce qui eût produit les mêmes effets, l’espoir de jamais
s’attribuer cette autorité exécutive.”).
181. 4 Jonathan Swift, The Sentiments of a Church-of-England Man, in The Works of
Dr. Jonathan Swift 63, 87 (London, printed for C. Bathurst 1751).
182. See, e.g., William Jones, An Essay on the Law of Bailments 18 (Boston, Samuel
Etheridge 1796) (“The constitution of Rome was originally excellent; but . . . C. Octavius
[imposed a] new form of government [that] was in itself absurd and unnatural; and the lex
regia, which concentrated in the prince all the powers of the state both executive and
legislative, was a tyrannous ordinance . . . .”).
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commentators—both British 183 and Continental 184 —focused frequently
on this separation as a principal cause for England’s celebrated liberty
and prosperity.185 In Blackstone’s famous paraphrase of Montesquieu,
England was “the only nation in the world where political or civil liberty
is the direct end of it’s constitution.”186

183. See Davies, Report of Cases in Ireland, supra note 120, at 5–6 (“[English law]
doth excell all other Laws in upholding a free Monarchie, which is the most excellent form
of Government, exalting the Prerogative Royall, and being very tender and watchfull to
preserve it, and yet maintaining withall the ingenious Liberty of the Subject.”); Finch,
supra note 88, at i (“If the Laws of England do deservedly surpass the Laws of all other
Countries in the Perfection of their Nature, the Excellency of their Constitution, and
especially in that Spirit of Freedom and Liberty which they breathe upon the Subject; . . .
an unpleasing Peculiarity of Fate [still] attend[s] them . . . .”). In one example of the many
North American celebrations of this point, “Curtius” wrote:
[S]hould [the President] remind of a Government, once justly dear to
us—then let us enquire, where, among foreign nations, are the people
who may boast like Britons? In what country is justice more impartially
administered, or the rights of the citizen more securely guarded? . . .
[H]ad we been justly represented in the Parliament of Great-Britain; to
this day we should have gloried in the peculiar, the distinguished
blessings of our political Constitution.
Curtius I, N.Y. Daily Advertiser, Sept. 29, 1787, reprinted in 19 Documentary History, supra
note 70, at 63, 64.
184. See Francois Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Letter VIII on the Parliament, in Letters
Concerning the English Nation 40, 42–43 (Lenox Hill reprt. 1974) (1926) (“The English
are the only people upon earth who have been able to prescribe limits to the power of
Kings by resisting them.”); see also 2 Burlamaqui, supra note 117, pt. II, ch. II, at 347
(“[I]s not England at present a proof of the excellency of mixed governments? Is there a
nation, every thing considered, that enjoys a higher degree of prosperity or reputation?”
(footnote omitted)). Like many early modern commentators (and perhaps along with the
British constitution itself), Burlamaqui sometimes conﬂated mixed government in the
sense of social estates with separation of powers in the sense of a tripartite Lockean
division. But in context, he is here clearly referencing the separation of powers.
185. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *143–145 (celebrating the “liberties of
Englishmen,” the protections they enjoy against “every species of compulsive tyranny and
oppression”).
186. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *145; see also 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws,
supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 237 (“Harrington, in his Oceana, . . . enquired into the utmost degree of liberty, to which [a] [state] constitution . . . may be carried. . . . [F]or want
of knowing the nature of real liberty, he [pursued] an imaginary one; and that he built a
Chalcedon, though he had a Byzantium before his eyes.”); 1 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des
Lois, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 334 (“Arrington, [dans] Oceana, a aussi examiné quel
étoit le plus haut point de liberté où la constitution d’un état peut être portée. Mais on
peut dire de lui, qu’il n’a cherché cette liberté qu’après l’avoir méconnue; & qu’il a bâti
Chalcédoine, ayant le rivage de Bisance devant les yeux.”).
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III. LEGAL DOCTRINE
A.

The Umbrella Term for the Crown’s Nonstatutory Powers Was “The Royal
Prerogative”

That brings us to the late eighteenth-century English constitution
and the semantic conventions used by legal treatises and political theorists alike to describe the powers of the Crown. Blackstone’s Commentaries
make a useful expositional scaffold, both because they are so well written
and because they were so important to the mainstream American understanding of English law. Published over four years beginning in 1765,
Blackstone’s multivolume treatise was as inﬂuential in the United States
as it was in England187—on constitutional questions, perhaps even more
so. That’s not to say that it was inﬂuential in shifting the law; if anything,
Blackstone was behind the times in his presumably willful silence about
the Commons’s political dominance of the Crown.188 But for Americans
like James Madison, Blackstone’s treatise was the “book which is in every
man’s hand”—central to pedagogy, drafting, and litigation alike as the
standard restatement of the formal constitutional law of England.189
187. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
188. Some have suggested that the Founders’ reverence for Blackstone left them
“unfamiliar[] with the English developments.” See Berger, supra note 55, at 9 n.45. This
may have been true for the less sophisticated. But plenty knew the real state of affairs. For
a mere sampling, see, for example, Notes of James Madison on the Convention (July 24,
1787), reprinted in 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 99, 104 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention] (recording
Gouverneur Morris’s contention that “the real King, [is] the Minister”); Marcus II,
Norfolk and Portsmouth J., Feb. 27, 1788, reprinted in 16 Documentary History, supra
note 70, at 242, 246 (“[E]very body knows that the whole movements of their government,
where a Council is consulted at all, are directed by their Cabinet Council, composed entirely
of the principal officers of the great departments . . . .”). Marcus II also distinguished “the
constitutional ideas” of England from “what the present practice really is.” Id. at 244. For
additional examples, see The Federalist No. 76, supra note 30, at 385–86 (Alexander
Hamilton) (discussing the actual political relationship between Commons and the Crown);
George Nicholas, Remarks at the Virginia Convention Debates (June 4, 1788), reprinted in 9
Documentary History, supra note 70, at 915, 925 (“[T]he House of Commons . . . entirely
controul the operation of government, even in those cases where the King’s prerogative
gave him nominally the sole direction.”); A Farmer V (Part II), Balt. Md. Gazette, Mar. 28,
1788, reprinted in 12 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 448, 449 (“I must insist that
[the British government] was hardly a government at all, until it became simpliﬁed by the
introduction and regular formation of the effective administration of responsible ministers, on its present system . . . .”); Civis Rusticus, To Mr. Davis, Va. Indep. Chron., Jan. 30,
1787, reprinted in 8 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 331, 337 (“The King of
England can make peace or declare war; can make treaties, but, whenever the Commons
disapprove of the measures by which these have been brought about, we know the consequences . . . .”). For more on the robust transatlantic legal culture, see, for example, Mary
Sarah Bilder, Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire 1–11 (2008); Daniel Hulsebosch,
Constituting Empire 203–06 (2005).
189. See James Madison, Remarks at the Virginia Convention Debates (June 18,
1788), reprinted in 10 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 1371, 1382. Even
Blackstone’s sharpest critics acknowledged—indeed, were motivated by—the pervasiveness
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The key to Blackstone’s conceptual structure is his careful division of
two distinct issues. First, the timeless powers of government in the abstract.
Second, the contingent and particular entities among which those powers
happened to be divided in mid-eighteenth-century England.
Blackstone thus begins by dividing the law-related powers of governance into two interlocking categories, each of which depends on the
presence of the other to form a meaningful whole:
1. The “legislative” authority, defined as the “right” of “making . . . the laws”; and
2. The “executive” authority, deﬁned as the “right” of “enforcing the laws.”190
Paraphrasing Montesquieu, Blackstone then explains that the genius of
the English constitution was to vest these conceptual powers in two separate institutions:
In all tyrannical governments the supreme magistracy, or
the right both of making and of enforcing the laws, is vested in
one and the same man, or one and the same body of men; and
wherever these two powers are united together, there can be no
public liberty. The magistrate may enact tyrannical laws, and
execute them in a tyrannical manner, since he is possessed, in
quality of dispenser of justice, with all the power which he as
legislator thinks proper to give himself. But, where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct hands, the former
will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a power, as
may tend to the subversion of it’s own independence, and therewith of the liberty of the subject. With us therefore in England
this supreme power is divided into two branches; the one
legislative, to wit, the parliament, consisting of king, lords, and
commons; the other executive, consisting of the king alone.191
With this roadmap in place, Blackstone proceeds to a consideration of
the two politically distinct entities to which these two conceptually distinct
powers were separately entrusted.

of his inﬂuence. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 17, 1826), in
Thomas Jefferson: Political Writings 57, 58 (Joyce Appleby & Terrance Ball eds., 2004)
(“[T]he honied Mansﬁeldism of Blackstone became the Student’s Hornbook, [and] from
that moment, that profession (the nursery of our Congress) began to slide into toryism,
and nearly all the young brood of lawyers now are of that hue.”).
190. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *146. This classiﬁcation of two discrete conceptual
powers of government persists as an organizing principle throughout the book. See, e.g.,
id. at *338 (“In a former chapter of these Commentaries we distinguished magistrates into
two kinds; supreme, or those in whom the sovereign power of the state resides; and subordinate, or those who act in an inferior secondary sphere.”). Blackstone continues, “We
have hitherto considered the former kind only; namely the supreme legislative power or
parliament, and the supreme executive power, which is the king: and are now to proceed
to inquire into the rights and duties of the principal subordinate magistrates.” Id.
191. Id. at *146–147.
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He starts with Parliament—the political entity vested with the
legislative power. The treatise’s second chapter surveys the basic elements
of that entity’s identity, structure, and powers.192 The structural discussion
describes the entity’s constituent parts: King, Lords, and Commons.193
Blackstone describes the varying process by which particular human
beings were selected to fulﬁll the role of each part.194 He also explores
the basic operations of the entity as a real-world decisionmaker: how
Parliament was convened,195 the process by which it passed laws,196 and
the process by which those laws were handed off for execution.197 In
addition to surveying Parliament’s constitutional structure, Blackstone
conducts a close review of its substantive authorities, entitlements, and
privileges.198 First among these was, of course, the legislative power itself:
the authority to enact forward-looking rules of legal compulsion.199 But
the suite of powers and authorities held by Parliament also included the
legislators’ right to speak freely on the ﬂoor of Parliament200 and a more
general immunity from arrest while actively engaged in parliamentary
service.201
With Parliament sorted, Blackstone then turns in his third chapter to
the political entity vested with the executive power: “The Person of the
King.” 202 Over the next two hundred pages, Blackstone conducts a
methodical analysis of the structural and institutional characteristics of
the Crown. First, he describes the process by which “the English
nation . . . mark[s] out with precision, who is that single person”—i.e., the
rules of “the royal succession.”203 Then he describes the constitution,
legal rights, and juridical relations of the individuals and institutions
appurtenant to the Crown: in particular “The King’s Royal Family”204 and
“The Councils Belonging to the King,” from “the high court of
parliament” and “the peers of the realm” to “the judges of the courts of
law” and the “privy council.”205 The treatise then turns to “The King’s
Duties,” especially “the duty . . . to govern his people according to law,”
with close attention to the historical evolution of the coronation oath.206
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See id. at *146–189.
See id. at *153–160.
See id. at *170–180.
See id. at *150–153.
See id. at *181–185.
See id. at *185–186.
See id. at *160–170.
See id. at *160–162.
Id. at *164.
Id. at *164–165.
See id. at *190–347.
See id. at *190–217.
Id. at *219–226.
Id. at *227–232.
Id. at *233–236.
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Only after this lengthy discussion of the Crown’s institutional characteristics does Blackstone ﬁnally arrive at the question of most interest for
modern purposes: a discussion of the substantive “rights and capacities
which the king enjoys alone.”207
This suite of substantive authorities had a name: “The King’s
Prerogative.”208 As discussed above, by Blackstone’s time, the prerogative
had long since been consigned in its entirety to what American
constitutional lawyers would call Youngstown Zone Two.209 That is to say, it
represented a residual and defeasible authority for Crown action in areas
that Parliament—or more precisely the “King-in-Parliament”—had not
(yet) chosen to occupy. Like the common law more generally, the
prerogative as described by Blackstone thus provided the default rule of
decision for questions of Crown authority—until Parliament chose, by
contrary or supplementary legislation, to displace it.210
The ﬁrst royal authority was—as we have already seen—the
“supreme executive power,” speciﬁcally deﬁned as “the right of enforcing
the laws.”211 The full list of Crown prerogatives, however, goes on (and
207. Id. at *237–337.
208. Id. at *237; see also id. at *190 (“[I]t matters not to which sex the crown descends; but the person entitled to it, whether male or female, is immediately invested with
all the ensigns, rights, and prerogatives of sovereign power; as is declared by statute.”).
Blackstone further classiﬁes the direct royal prerogative into three principal subcategories:
those that pertain to “the king’s royal character”; those that pertain to “his royal authority”;
and those that pertain to “the royal income.” Id. at *240. The middle category in turn
includes two aspects: those that “respect . . . this nation’s intercourse with foreign nations”
and also those that “respect . . . this nation’s . . . own domestic government and civil polity.”
Id. at *252; see also id. at *260. The last category includes the king’s “ordinary revenue.”
Id. at *281–306. Blackstone also includes his discussion of the king’s “extraordinary
revenue” in the same chapter but makes clear that the latter references nonprerogative
powers of taxation that are granted by statute. Id. at *306–337.
Other writers similarly distinguished between different categories of prerogative. See,
e.g., Coke, Speech in the Committee of Grievances, supra note 98, at 1199–200
(distinguishing “prerogative indisputable” and “prerogative disputable”); Thomas
Egerton, Chancellor Ellesmere, A Coppie of a Wrytten Discourse Concerning the Royall
Prerogative (c. 1604), in Louis A. Knaﬂa, Law and Politics in Jacobean England: The Tracts
of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere 197, 197–201 (1977) (treating the judicial power as an
“absolute prerogative” that could be delegated, unlike discretionary royal powers); Hale,
Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 145 (drawing a distinction between the king’s
“powers” and “prerogatives,” with the latter deﬁned as those which conduce to his “support and dignity”).
209. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing Youngstown Zone Two in
relation to the Royal Residuum Thesis).
210. For more on parliamentary supremacy, see supra section II.A.
211. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *146–147. Blackstone’s chapter-opening formulation for this particular authority was strikingly similar to the Executive Power Clause:
“The supreme executive power of these kingdoms is vested by our laws in a single person,
the king or queen . . . .” Id. at *190. Blackstone was not the only prominent writer who
preﬁgured the Founders’ various formulations in Article II. See, e.g., Obadiah Hulme, An
Historical Essay on the English Constitution 29 (London, printed for Edward & Charles
Dilly 1771) (“There were three things essentially necessary, to form a Saxon

1224

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119:1169

on). It’s worth setting out the full inventory. As the footnotes to the list
will attest, Blackstone was not innovating. He was just the latest consolidator of Anglo-American constitutional commonplaces:
• the sovereign and sacred nature of the royal person;212
• a personal immunity from suit;213
• a personal exemption from the rules of laches and negligence;214
• the “sole power of sending [a]mbassadors to foreign states,
and receiving [a]mbassadors at home”;215
• the power “to make treaties, leagues, and alliances with foreign states and princes”;216
• “the sole prerogative of making war and peace”;217
• “the prerogative of granting safe-conducts”;218
• the right to be “a constituent part of the supreme legislative
power” with “the prerogative of rejecting such provisions in
parliament, as he judges improper”;219
government[:] . . . a court of council, a court of law, and a chief magistrate . . . [who] . . .
was vested with the executive authority to administer the constitution . . . and . . . to take
care that every man, within his jurisdiction paid . . . obedience to law.”). Some writers
suggested that the power to execute the law was a separate branch of authority from those
powers denoted as royal prerogative. See e.g., Bolingbroke, Remarks on the History of
England, supra note 71, at 82 (“A King of Great Britain is that supreme Magistrate, who has
a negative Voice in the Legislature. He is entrusted with the executive Power; and several other
Powers and Privileges, which we call Prerogatives, are annex’d to this Trust.”). That
distinction makes no analytical difference for present purposes; either way, “executive
power” meant the execution of laws rather than a shorthand for the full suite of royal
authorities.
212. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *242; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the King,
supra note 101, at 15 (“[T]he king in case of such acts done contrary to the directive
power of the law is not subject to the coercive power of the law in respect of the sacredness
and sublimity of his person . . . .”).
213. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *242; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the King,
supra note 101, at 15 (“This is one of the principal reasons of the maxim in law that the
king can do no wrong . . . .”); A Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants, and the Seizure of
Papers 6 (London, printed for J. Almon 2d ed. 1764) (“The King can do no wrong . . . .”
(emphasis omitted)).
214. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *247; see also John Surrebutter, The Pleader’s
Guide: A Didactic Poem bk. I, at 12 (London, printed for T. Cadell 1796) (“How long
soe’er a Cause is stay’d / By Orders, Rules, and Motions Made / On Points by learned
Counsel mooted / The KING can never be nonsuited.”).
215. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *253.
216. Id. at *257.
217. Id.; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 169 (“power of
peace and war”); A Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants, and Seizures, supra note 213, at 6
(“treaties of peace and war”).
218. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *259.
219. Id. at *261; see also Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 76 (“[N]ever any Bill passed in
Parliament for a Law (the King being within the Realme) by the Lords and Commons
alone, without the Kings personall assent in Parliament to the Bill, as he that gave life and
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• the role of “the generalissimo, or the ﬁrst in military command”;220
• the “sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies”;221
• “the prerogative of appointing ports and havens”;222
• “the erection of beacons, light-houses, and sea-marks”;223
• “the power . . . of prohibiting the exportation of arms or
ammunition out of this kingdom, under severe penalties”;224
• “the right of erecting courts of judicature”;225
• the ultimate role of prosecutor;226
• the power of “pardoning offenses”;227
• the “prerogative of issuing proclamations” that “enforce the
execution of such laws as are already in being, in such manner as the king shall judge necessary”;228
• “the sole power of conferring dignities and honors”;229
being to the Law . . . .”). Hale ﬂipped the formulation, though to the same practical effect.
See Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 171 (concluding that “the power
legislative resides in the king alone, though so qualiﬁed that he cannot enact a new law
without the advice and assent of the three estates assembled in parliament”); cf. Parker,
supra note 110, at 7 (“[T]he Law had trusted the King with a Prerogative to discontinue
Parliaments . . . .”).
220. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *262; see also Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 113–14
(noting the king’s “chief command of the Militia”); Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra
note 101, at 117–32 (discussing the king’s powers under martial law and jus belli).
221. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *262.
222. Id. at *263–264; see also Coke, Preface to Part Nine of the Reports, supra note
128, at 290 (“chief Ports of the Sea”); Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286
(“[C]oncerning the customs of the king, for maintaining . . . ports and havens, and the
power of appointing, opening and shutting of them.”).
223. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *264.
224. Id. at *265.
225. Id. at *267; see also 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 166 (“Also justice and judgment
[and everything] connected with jurisdiction, that, as a minister and vicar of God, he may
render to each his due.” (footnote omitted)).
226. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *268; see also A Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants,
and Seizures, supra note 213, at 6 (explaining “the direction of crown-prosecutions”).
227. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *269; see also Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 113–14
(describing “the pardoning of Offences”).
228. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *270; see also Case of Proclamations (1610) 77
Eng. Rep. 1352, 1353; 12 Co. Rep. 74, 75 (KB) (“[A] thing which is punishable by the
Law, . . . if the King prohibit it by his proclamation, before that he will punish it, and so
warn his subjects . . . there if he commit it after, this as a circumstance aggravates the
offence; but he by proclamation cannot make a thing unlawful . . . .”); Hale, Prerogatives
of the King, supra note 101, at 172 (“[I]t is the [king’s] prerogative . . . and those only who
derive it from him, either as his ministers or by custom, to make open proclamation. The
king nevertheless cannot by these make or introduce a new law or add a new penalty to an
old law or abrogate any law.” (citation omitted)).
229. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *271; see also Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 114 (“the
giving of Honour”); Coke, Preface to Part Nine of the Reports, supra note 128, at 290
(“[h]onors”).
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• “the prerogative of erecting and disposing of offices”;230
• “the prerogative of conferring privileges upon private persons”;231 such as converting aliens into citizens, or “erecting
corporations”;232
• “the establishment of public marts, or places of buying and
selling, . . . with the tolls thereto belonging”;233
• “the regulation of weights and measures”;234
• the power to coin money and “give it authority or make it
current”;235
• the role of “supreme governor of the national church”;236

230. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *272; see also, e.g., Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 114
(“the making of Judges and Officers”); 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 306–07 (“[S]ince he
cannot unaided determine all causes [and] jurisdictions, that his labour may be lessened,
the burden being divided among many, he must select from his realm wise and Godfearing men . . . who will judge the people of God equitably . . . .” (second alteration in
original)); cf. Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 105 (“[T]he weight,
multiplicity and variety of the occasions and emergencies of a kingdom doth necessarily
require assistances adhiberi saltem in regiae sollicitudinis adminiculum, [dum] licet non in
imperii participationem.”(second alteration in original)); id at 268–70 (noting that the king
has the “power of commanding the person of any man . . . [i]n reference to the public
service of the kingdom, and that in these three particulars: (1) In point of advice, (2) In
point of office or service, [and] (3) In point of deference or safety”); A Letter Concerning
Libels, Warrants, and Seizures, supra note 213, at 6 (“appointments to offices in the
state”).
This prerogative was the focus of Charles I’s answer to the Nineteen Propositions of
Parliament:
It is demanded, That Our Councellors, all chief Officers both of Law
and State, Commanders of Forts and Castles, and all Peers hereafter
made . . . be approved of (that is, chosen) by [Parliament] . . . .
....
These being past, we may be waited on bare-headed; we may have
Our hand kissed . . . . [B]ut as to true and reall Power We should remain
but the outside, but the Picture, but the signe of a King.
Charles I, His Majesties Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses of Parliament
(June 18, 1642), reprinted in Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Struggle for Sovereignty 145, 161–
62 (Liberty Fund 1999) (emphases omitted).
231. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *272; see also Cowell, Institutes, supra note 117, at
5 (noting that the king “may grant privileges at pleasure, as to single persons, as to
Corporations and Colleges, provided they become not injurious to a third person”).
232. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *272.
233. Id. at *274; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286
(“places of public trade, fairs and markets”).
234. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *274; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the King,
supra note 101, at 173 (“weights and measures”).
235. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *276; see also Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 114 (“the
coyning of Money”); Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 299–305 (“money
and coin”).
236. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *279–280; cf. Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra
note 101, at 11 (“[T]he king hath that supreme ecclesiastical power in him.”); 1 Hawkins,
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• the right to “all the lay revenues, lands, and tenements . . .
which belong to an archbishop’s or bishop’s fee”;237
• the right to “send one of his chaplains to be maintained by
[each] bishop”;238
• the right to “all the tithes arising in extraparochial places”;239
• the right to a share of the proﬁts of the lower clergymen;240
• the right to all of “the rents and proﬁts” of various types of
Crown lands;241
• all “profits arising from the king’s ordinary courts of justice”;242
• the right to all whale and sturgeon caught near the English
shore;243
• the right to certain goods washed up on the land from shipwrecks;244
• the right to silver or gold mines245 and various other categories of “treasure-trove” that are discovered;246
• the right to “goods stolen, and waived or thrown away by the
thief in his ﬂight”;247
• the right to “valuable animals as are found wandering” without an apparent owner;248
Pleas of the Crown, supra note 145, ch. 19, at 49 (recognizing “appealing to Rome from
any of the King’s Courts” as a praemunire felony “against the Prerogative of the Crown”).
237. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *282.
238. Id. at *283.
239. Id. at *284.
240. See id. at *284–285.
241. Id. at *286.
242. Id. at *289.
243. See id. at *290; see also The Case of Swans (1592) 77 Eng. Rep. 435, 435–36; 7
Co. Rep. 15 b, 15 b–16 a (KB) (“All white Swans not marked, having gained their natural
liberty . . . may be seised to the King’s use by his prerogative . . . as a Swan is a Royal fowl; . . .
and so [] whales and sturgeons are Royal Fish, and belong to the King by his
prerogative.”); 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 167 (“great ﬁsh, sturgeon, waif, things said to
belong to no one”); Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286 (“[animals]
ferae naturae” (alteration in original)).
244. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *290; see also 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 167
(“wreck”); Coke, Preface to Part Nine of the Reports, supra note 128, at 290 (“[w]reck”);
Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286 (“[b]ona vacantia, wreck”).
245. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *276–277; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the
King, supra note 101, at 286 (describing the king’s right to “mines and minerals, and
therein his seignory in case of royal mines, tin and lead”).
246. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *295; see also 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 167
(“treasure trove”); Coke, Preface to Part Nine of the Reports, supra note 128, at 290
(“[t]reasure found”) Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286 (“[b]ona
vacantia, . . . treasure trove”).
247. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *296–297.
248. Id. at *297–298; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286
(“[animals] ferae naturae” (alteration in original)).
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• the right to any other “goods in which no one else can claim
a property”;249
• the right to lands and goods forfeited in punishment for various offenses;250
• the right to lands escheated for a defect in either the testament or the heirs;251 and
• “the custody of idiots” and their estates.252
The royal prerogative, as it was understood in the Founding Era,
thus comprised a long list of separate and highly particularized legal
authorities within a well-understood framework of English constitutional
law. There was no overarching theoretical coherence to it; it was just “stuff
the king can do,” so long as Parliament didn’t tell him otherwise.
Nor did the authorities on this list originate with Blackstone. He was
just describing, in the fashion of a modern nutshell, his own generally
unremarkable take on what amounted to black letter administrative law.
The particular authorities varied somewhat from summary to summary,
but the gist was remarkably consistent, as was the use of the legal term
“prerogative” to name this grab bag of powers that originated in the
Crown itself rather than from some parliamentary grant of authority.253
To be sure, eighteenth-century writers regularly used “prerogative” in the
same loose sense we use it today—as a generic power, privilege,

249. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *298–299; see also 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at
167 (“Also . . . [things] . . . by occupation and apprehension, [as] of another’s property, as
where a thing is cast away and taken to be abandoned.” (alterations in original)); Hale,
Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286.
250. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *299–300; see also Coke, Preface to Part Nine of
the Reports, supra note 128, at 290 (“[c]hattels of Felons and Fugitives”); Hale, Prerogatives
of the King, supra note 101, at 286 (“Bona conﬁscata et forisfacta, (i) per exigent, (ii) per
utlary, (iii) per fugam, (iv) per false appeal, ou omission in appeal, (v) per premunire, (vi)
per felony de se vel de alio.”).
251. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *303.
252. Id. at *303–306; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286
(“Custodiae, (i) infantium, (ii) fatuorum, (iii) temporalium.”).
253. See, e.g., Francis Bacon, Cases of Treason (1641), reprinted in Lord Bacon’s Law
Tracts, supra note 129, at 178–81 (cataloguing a list of prerogative powers); 2 Bracton,
supra note 98, at 166–67 (“It is clear that the lord king [has all] dignities, [it is the lord
king] himself who has ordinary jurisdiction and power over all who are within his realm.”
(alterations in original) (citation omitted)); Camden, supra note 139, at 205–15 (cataloguing a list of prerogative powers); Coke, Preface to Part Nine of the Reports, supra note
128, at 288, 290–91 (listing the royal prerogatives as part of a constitutional law discussion of “the whole frame of the ancient Common Laws of this Realm”); de Lolme, The
Constitution of England, supra note 105, bk. I, chs. IV–VI, at 71–84 (describing the
prerogative powers of the king); James Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and the
Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament 33 (Philadelphia, William &
Thomas Bradford 1774) (outlining the powers of the king, who was “entrusted with the
direction and management of the great machine of government”).
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entitlement, or even just a general id-like willfulness.254 But as a term of
art in the context of constitutional law, “prerogative” had a very speciﬁc
meaning: “all powers, preheminences, and priviledges, which the law
giveth to the crowne.”255 The writers are both precise and explicit about
what was for them a schoolboy distinction between “the prerogative” as
the basket category for royal power and “the executive power” as one
specific authority among a great many in that basket.256 They even used
254. Compare Bobby Brown, My Prerogative, on Don’t Be Cruel (MCA 1988) (“They
say I’m crazy / I really don’t care / That’s my prerogative / . . . Why don’t they just let me
live (Tell me why) / I don’t need permission / Make my own decisions (Oh) / That’s my
prerogative / It’s my prerogative”), with, e.g., William Staunford, An Exposition of the
King’s Prerogative fol. 5 (London, Rychard Tottel 1567) (“[P]rerogative is as much to saye
as a privilege or preeminence that any person hath before another whiche as it is tollerable
in some, so it is most to be permitted and allowed in a prince or, soveraine governor of a
realme.”). For an inﬁnitely more serious survey of the various ways the word was used in its
more abstract and colloquial senses, including during the ratiﬁcation debates, see generally Matthew Steilen, How to Think Constitutionally About Prerogative: A Study of Early
American Usage, 66 Buff. L. Rev. 557 (2018) (canvassing Revolutionary- and Founding-Era
uses of “prerogative” to discuss entitlements to, inter alia, personal authority, political
sovereignty, self-determination, property protection, and “order, peace, and the preservation of existing . . . hierarchies,” as well as the power not just to break but even to make
the laws). Steilen effectively “challenges the view of ‘prerogative’ as a discretionary
authority to act outide the law,” rightly concluding, regarding the less technical uses, that
“[i]t is enough to make one’s head spin.” Id. at 557, 547. His ﬁndings match mine: The
term most assuredly was used in many ways other than as a legal term of art. But its
technical meaning was the same for transatlantic lawyers in that era as it is for U.K. lawyers
now: “the residue of powers which remain vested in the crown.” R (Miller) v. Sec’y of State
for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [44].
255. 1 Coke on Littleton, supra note 143, bk. 2, ch. 5, § 125, at 90b; see also, e.g.,
Francis Bacon, An Essay of a King 5 (London, printed for Richard Best 1642) [hereinafter
Bacon, Essay of a King] (describing the prerogatives of the king); Bagshaw, supra note 90,
at 83–84 (using “prerogative” in a way that suggests Coke’s deﬁnition); Cowell, Institutes,
supra note 117, at 238–39 (“But there are some [actions] which . . . are inherent in the
Crown by reason of the Kings Priviledg and Prerogative.”); Staunford, supra note 254, at
fol. 5 (offering a similar perspective on prerogative). For case law on this point, see, for
example, Case of Convocations (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 1350, 1350; 12 Co. Rep. 71, 72 (KB)
(describing four sources of legally binding authority: “prerogative of the king,” “the
common law,” “statute law,” and “custome of the realm”).
256. See, e.g., Bolingbroke, Remarks on the History of England, supra note 71, at 82
(“He is entrusted with the executive Power[] and several other Powers and Privileges, which
we call Prerogatives, are annex’d to this Trust.”); Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Present
Discontents (1770), reprinted in 2 The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke 242, 258,
277 (Paul Langford & William B. Todd eds., 1982) (canvassing “the discretionary powers
which are necessarily vested in the Monarch” after noting that “[t]he power of the crown,
almost dead and rotten as Prerogative, has grown up anew, with much more strength, and
far less odium, under the name of Inﬂuence”); 5 Hume, History of England, supra note
71, at 349 (stating that Parliament had “gradually encroach[ed] on the executive power of
the crown, which forms its principal and most natural branch of authority”); Aequus,
From the Craftsman, Mass. Gazette & Bos. Newsl., Mar. 6, 1766, reprinted in 1 American
Political Writing During the Founding Era, 1760–1805, at 62, 65–66 (Charles S. Hyneman
& Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983) [hereinafter American Political Writing] (cataloguing powers
wielded by the Crown and Parliament over the colonies, including “the executive power of
government” as one item in a long list of authorities including many of the typical
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the same terminology when describing the chief magistrates of other
nations.257
Before we transition to a closer focus on the executive power as a single
element of the royal prerogative, it’s worth stepping back to recall the bigpicture structure of Blackstone’s analysis. First he discussed the entity
that possessed the legislative power: Parliament.258 His discussion covered
both the structural law of that entity’s formation and constitution259 and
also the entity’s substantive authorities and entitlements—including but
not limited to the legislative power.260 Next, he walked through the exact
same steps in analyzing the entity that possessed the executive power: the
Crown.261 Once again, he began with a detailed discussion of the structural constitutional law of that entity.262 And once again he then turned
to a detailed discussion of the substantive authorities and entitlements of
that entity—including but not limited to the executive power.263
B.

“The Executive Power” Was the Power to Execute the Laws

So “the executive power” was a discrete subset of the Crown prerogative, which was itself a long list of substantive authorities ranging from
the consequential (the right to participate in lawmaking and the power
of war and peace) to the mundane (the power to erect lighthouses and
the right to claim whale carcasses). Within this suite of powers, though,
what exactly did the executive power entail?

prerogatives); see also William Guthrie, A New Geographical, Historical, and Commercial
Grammar 162 (London, printed for Charles Dilly & George Robinson 7th ed. 1782) (“The
king of Scotland had no negative voice in parliament; nor could he declare war, . . . or conclude any other public business . . . without the advice and approbation of parliament. The
prerogative of the king was so bounded, that he was not even entrusted with the executive
part of the government.”); id. at 477 (noting that the Spanish privy-council has “the direction of all the executive part of government,” while the Spanish council of war “takes
cognizance of military affairs only”).
257. See, e.g., Joel Barlow, A Letter to the National Convention of France on the
Defects in the Constitution of 1791 and the Extent of the Amendments Which Ought to
Be Applied 7 (London, printed for J. Johnson 1792) (cataloguing the French King’s
constitutional powers with a similar distinction between “the executive . . . power” and a
number of other distinct authorities including “much of the legislative power,” the ability
to require various revenues, and the war powers); Walter Moyle, Democracy Vindicated:
An Essay on the Constitution and Government of the Roman State 5 (Norwich, J. March
1796) (“[Romulus] founded his dominion[] . . . [upon] his standing body of guards; his
great revenue in lands; the sole power of the executive, and part of the legislative; and last
of all, the administration of justice, and the command of the armies, which were the great
branches of the royal prerogative.”).
258. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 193–197 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 203–206 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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We already know Blackstone’s answer: It was simply “the right . . . of
enforcing the laws.”264 In keeping with the nutshell quality of his constitutional discussion more generally, this was just the rote recitation of a
terminological commonplace. Locke was but one in a long line of commentators who contrasted the “legislative power” as “a right to direct how
the force of the commonwealth shall be employed” with the “executive
power,” which “see[s] to the execution of the laws that are made, and
remain in force.”265 According to Whig politician Algernon Sidney’s martial formulation, “[t]he Sword of Justice comprehends the legislative and
the executive Power: the one is exercised in making Laws, the other in
judging Controversies according to such as are made.”266 And using “executive power” as the word for law-implementation was no Anglo-American
idiosyncrasy. As the seminal international law theorist Emmerich Vattel
explained:
The executive power naturally belongs to the sovereign[]—
to every conductor of a people: he is supposed to be invested
with it, in its fullest extent, when the fundamental laws do not
restrict it. When the laws are established, it is the prince’s province to have them put in execution. To support them with
vigour, and to make a just application of them to all cases that
present themselves, is what we call rendering justice.267
264. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *146; see also supra note 190 and accompanying
text.
265. Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, §§ 143–144, at 164. Remember that this is
precisely how Blackstone deﬁned “executive power” as well—as the rule-implementing
counterpart to legislative power’s capacity to create rules in the ﬁrst place. See supra note
190 and accompanying text.
266. Sidney, supra note 96, ch. III, § 10, at 295; see also James Harrington, The
Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), reprinted in The Political Works of James Harrington
155, 174 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1977) [hereinafter Political Works of
Harrington] (“[T]he hand of the magistrate is the executive power of the law, so the head
of the magistrate is answerable unto the people that his execution be according unto the
law; by which Leviathan may see that the hand or sword that executes the law is . . . not
above it.”).
267. Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied
to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns bk. I, ch. XIII, § 162 at 187 (Knud
Haakonssen et al., eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1797). Other Continental commentators
were to the same effect. De Lolme began his chapter titled “Of the Executive Power” by
deﬁning it as “[t]he ﬁrst prerogative of the King, in his capacity of Supreme Magistrate,
[which] has for its object the administration of Justice.” de Lolme, The Constitution of
England, supra note 105, bk. I, ch. IV, at 72. De Lolme characterized the executive power
in terms of its role in implementing legislative enactments. See id. at 71 (“When the
Parliament is prorogued or dissolved, it ceases to exist; but its laws still continue to be in
force: the King remains charged with the execution of them, and is supplied with the
necessary power for that purpose.”). In the original French, in his chapter titled “Du
pouvoir executif,” de Lolme wrote: “Lorsque le parlement est prorogé ou dissous, il cesse
d’exister; mais les loix subsistent: le roi est chargé de l’exécution, est muni du pouvoir
nécessaire pour la procurer.” 1 de Lolme, Constitution de l’Angleterre, supra note 105, at
65. Indeed, de Lolme relied on this understanding of executive power to explain why the
monarch could not himself be subject to coercive judicial process. See de Lolme, The
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Nor was the terminology ideologically inﬂected or otherwise conceptually contested. To the contrary, even arch-royalists like the man known
to Founding-Era Americans as “the prostituted, rotten Sir Robert
Filmer”268 knew that the “executive power” was limited to law execution.
That’s why Filmer and other critics of parliament resisted a description of
the king’s power that was limited to those terms:
By these words of legislative, nomothetical and architectonical
power, in plain English, [is understood] a power of making laws.
And by gubernative and executive, a power of putting those laws
in execution by judging and punishing offenders.269
It’s hard to overstate the uniformity of this point. As Jean-Jacques
Rousseau explained almost a hundred years later, it just wasn’t that
complicated a concept: “[T]he executive power . . . is only the instrument for applying the law.”270
Constitution of England, supra note 105, bk. I, ch. VIII, at 93 (“It is true, the King himself
cannot be arraigned before Judges; because, if there were any that could pass sentence
upon him, it would be they, and not he, who must ﬁnally possess the executive
power . . . .”); 1 de Lolme, Constitution de l’Angleterre, supra note 105, at 86. (“Le roi luimême est, il est vrai, hors de l’atteinte des tribunaux, parce que, s’il en étoit un qui put le
juger, ce seroit ce tribunal & non pas lui, qui auroit ﬁnalement le pouvoir exécutif . . . .”).
Rousseau likewise conceptualized the executive and legislative powers as interlocking and
complementary functions. See Rousseau, supra note 120, bk. II, ch. 2, at 70 (“[A]
declaration of [the general] will is an act of sovereignty and constitutes law . . . . [O]ur
political theorists, unable to divide the principle of sovereignty, divide it in its purpose;
they divide it into power and will, divide it, that is, into executive and legislative . . . .”).
268. A Farmer I, supra note 157, at 309; see also, e.g., John Adams, The Letters of
Novanglus, to the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay (Jan. 23, 1775), reprinted in 2 The Adams Papers 226, 231 (Sarah Martin ed., 2008–2019) (excoriating an
opposing pamphleteer as a “foul mouthed scold, deserv[ing] [only] silent contempt” for
“mak[ing] no scruples to advance the principles of Hobbs and Filmer, boldly”). Despite
his role as designated boogeyman, Filmer was fourth on James Madison’s shopping list of
political writers for the library of the Continental Congress. See Report on Books for
Congress (Jan. 23, 1783), reprinted in 6 The Papers of James Madison 62, 84–85 (J.C.A.
Stagg ed., 2010).
269. Filmer, The Anarchy, supra note 12, at 136. Not once does the greatest
theoretician of royal power describe the full suite of royal powers as “the executive power.”
Along with all well-socialized Englishmen, his word for the king’s full suite of authorities
was “the royal prerogative.” Id. Hunton relied on the same conceptual categorization in
noting that “[i]n respect of its degrees [government is] Nomothetical or Architectonical, and
Gubernative or Executive. And in respect of the subject of its residence, there is an ancient
and usual distinction of it into Monarchical, Aristocratical, and Democratical.” Hunton, A
Treatise of Monarchy, supra note 96, pt. I, ch. I, § 3, at 5–6. Hunton distinguished between
the conceptual executive power of government and the entity called a monarchy, and
criticized both parliamentarian resistance theory and divine-right absolutism. Id.; see also
Philip Hunton, A Vindication of the Treatise of Monarchie, ch. V, § 2, at 39 (London, G.
M. 1644) (noting that “[the King] is the sole Principle and fountaine from whence the
execution of all Law and Justice ﬂowes to his people by inferiour Officers and Courts, all
whose Authoritie is derivatively from him as its head,” but asking rhetorically, “is not the
Legislative Power the supreame?”).
270. Rousseau, supra note 120, bk. III, ch. 15, at 142. For other examples, see William
Mollyneux, The Case of Ireland Being Bound by Acts of Parliament in England 43–44
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In the most signiﬁcant sense, Rousseau’s “only” was completely accurate: “[T]he executive power” didn’t encompass other authorities. In
another way, though, it might mislead modern ears—because, let’s be
clear, this was a hugely important authority. As discussed at length above,
the execution problem may have been the single greatest concern of
political and legal thinkers over the course of English history. In recognizing this power as perhaps the king’s deﬁning authority, Blackstone was
thus once again following an illustrious list of predecessors. From
Bracton271 to Hume272—with a chorus of thinkers as diverse as Bacon,273
James I, 274 Milton, 275 and Filmer 276 in between—English law had for
centuries recognized the king’s coercive power to “punish and compel
wrongdoers”277 as his “principal and most natural branch of authority.”278
(London, printed for J. Almon & M. Hingeston 1770) (explaining “the judiciary and
executive Parts of the Law, and the Ministers and Process thereof”); Samuel Rutherford,
Lex Rex: The Law and the Prince question xxi, at 178–79 (London, printed for John Field
1644) (discussing “[a] Power executive of Laws more in the King, a Power legislative more
in the Parliament”).
271. See 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 166–67.
272. See 5 Hume, History of England, supra note 71, at 349 (stating that Parliament
had “been gradually encroaching on the executive power of the crown, which forms its
principal and most natural branch of authority”).
273. See Bacon, Essay of a King, supra note 255, at 3 (explaining the prerogative to
“animate[] the dead letter [of the law], making it active toward all his Subjects praemio &
poena [such as by reward and by punishment]”).
274. James I publicly admonished his son, “[T]hat as yee are a good Christian, so yee
may be a good King . . . in establishing and executing, (which is the life of the Law) good
Lawes among your people . . . .” James I, Basilikon Doron bk. 2 (1616), reprinted in The
Political Works of James I, at 3, 18 (Charles Howard McIlwain ed., 1918). Over the course
of the brief pamphlet, James returned to his exhortations about “executing . . . Lawes”
sixteen times. See id. at 18–42. The record does not reﬂect whether he also advised his son
neither to borrow nor to lend.
275. See Milton, Defence of the English People, supra note 139, at 106 (“[T]he king
was created to put . . . laws in execution.”).
276. See Filmer, The Free-holders Grand Inquest, supra note 96, at 114 (“[T]here be a
power in kings both to judge when the laws are duly executed, and when not; as also to
compel the judges if they do not their duty.”).
277. See 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 166.
278. See 5 Hume, History of England, supra note 71, at 349. For a mere sample of this
kind of celebration of the king’s law enforcement power—in both its judicial and
executive guises—see, for example, 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 166–67; Cowell, Institutes,
supra note 117, at 2; Ellesmere, supra note 208, at 197 (discussing the king’s absolute but
delegable prerogative to “punish the guiltie”); Hobbes, supra note 117, at 126 (“[T]o the
Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding . . . and of Punishing with corporall, or
pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Law he hath formerly made . . . .”); John Nalson, The King’s Prerogative and the Subject’s Privileges
Asserted According to the Laws of England 108 (London, printed for J. Walthoe 1684)
(relying on a close analysis of Magna Carta to infer the Crown’s power and obligation to
deliver “[e]xecution of [j]ustice”); James Otis, The Rights of the Colonies Asserted and
Proved 71 (London, reprinted for J. Almon 1764) (“The supreme legislative, and the
supreme executive, are a perpetual check and balance to each other. . . . Here, the King
appears, as represented by his judges, . . . as supreme executor of the commonwealth; and
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This “power to compel the parties to come to judgment and to execute
the judgment given”279 was celebrated especially in judicial opinions,
which saw “a King’s Crown [as] an hieroglyphic of the laws, where justice,
&c. is administered,”280 and public law treatises, which “take it for granted, [t]hat the King, being the supreme Magistrate of the Kingdom, [is]
intrusted with the whole executive Power of the Law.”281
It was precisely because the Crown’s deﬁning authority was “the sole
exercise of the executive power” that the king was “therefore by our
English lawyers called ‘the universal judge of property’—‘the fountain of
justice’—‘the supreme magistrate of the kingdom, intrusted with the
whole executive power of the law.’”282 And it was for that same reason that
the Crown’s implementation of this particular prerogative was the principal measure of its performance: If a legislature is “denominated good,
from the goodness of its laws,” then “[t]he goodness of executive government” for its part “consists in [the] due administration of the laws
already made.”283
C.

This Power to Execute Was an Empty Vessel, both Subsequent and
Subordinate to the Power to Legislate

The singular feature of this constitutionally indispensable authority
was its derivative and subsequent character—and therefore its conceptual
subordination ab initio. Certainly as a matter of the speciﬁc constitutional
law of England, the executive power was subject to plenary control and
instruction by parliamentary legislation. 284 But conceptually speaking,
this wasn’t a merely contingent feature of Parliament’s political and
he never shines brighter, but on his throne, at the head of the supreme legislative.”); see
also Edmund Plowden, The Commentaries or Reports of Edmund Plowden 237 (London,
Catharine Lintot & Samuel Richardson 1761) (reporting Willion v. Berkley, 3 Eliz.)
(“[T]he King has in him three Things, viz. Power, Justice, and Mercy; Power to do, Justice
to enforce him to do, and Mercy to restrain him from doing . . . so that every Subject may
claim from him Justice, and the King is forced by Justice to do that which he ought.”).
279. Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 179; see also id. at 191 (discussing the power of “coercion” as “that whereby the judicative power is acted” and the king
“may enforce the person complained of to come to judgment and to execute it”).
280. Calvin’s Case, or the Case of the Postnati (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 390; 7 Co.
Rep. 1 a, 1 b (KB).
281. 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, supra note 145, ch. 1, § 1, at 2 (London, Eliz.
Nutt & R. Gosling 1721) (pivoting from Book I’s discussion of the substantive “nature of
criminal offenses” to Book II’s procedural–structural discussion of “in what manner the
offenders are to be brought to punishment”).
282. Letter by J., Bos. Evening Post (May 23, 1763), reprinted in 1 American Political
Writing, supra note 256, at 25–26; see also, e.g., Noah Webster, The Revolution in France
15–16 (New York, George Bunce & Co. 1794) (“[P]roperty must be placed under the
protection of law; and the laws must receive an energy from a well-constituted executive
power, that shall ensure a due execution.”).
283. Nathaniel Niles, Two Discourses on Liberty (June 5, 1774), reprinted in 1
American Political Writing, supra note 256, at 270.
284. See supra section II.A (discussing the emergence of parliamentary sovereignty).
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military supremacy. Rather, the subordinacy of “executive power” was
one of its constitutive features: Without some preexisting intention or
instruction, that power is an empty vessel that has nothing to execute.285
This conceptual point was nowise a tendentious claim of Whigs, republicans, or commonwealthmen. It was simply intrinsic to the concept in
eighteenth-century vocabulary—both in the governance context and in
the world at large.
1. The “Empty Vessel” Nature of Executive Power in General. — To begin
with, the conceptual subservience of executive power to legislative power
was just a special case of executive power in general. While law was
certainly the default object of execution in political theory, “executive
power” in its most generic sense referenced the ability and authority to
take a plan, intention, or instruction, and bring that mentally formulated
state of affairs into actual being.286
This distinction was central to eighteenth-century theories of human
perception and cognition.287 Rousseau’s account, for all its naiveté by the
standards of modern neuroscience, beautifully captures the standard
eighteenth-century framework:
Every free action has two causes which concur to produce
it, one moral—the will which determines the act; the other
physical—the strength which executes it. When I walk towards
an object, it is necessary ﬁrst that I should resolve to go that way
and secondly that my feet should carry me. When a paralytic
resolves to run and when a ﬁt man resolves not to move, both
stay where they are. The body politic has the same two motive
powers—and we can make the same distinction between will
and strength—the former is legislative power and the latter
executive power.288
285. As Hunton wrote:
[P]ower being either the Legislative or the Gubernative. In a mixed
Monarchy, sometimes the mixture is the seat of the Legislative power,
which is the chief of the two. . . . For if the Legislative be in one [body],
then the Monarchy is not mixed but simple, for that [that is, the legislative power] is the superior, if that be in one, all else must needs be so
too: By Legislative, I mean the power of making new Laws . . . .
Hunton, A Treatise of Monarchy, supra note 96, pt. I, ch. IV, § 2, at 26.
286. As more than one dictionary explained, “To Execute” meant “to put a law, or any
thing planned, in practice.” See Francis Allen, A Complete English Dictionary (London,
printed for J. Wilson & J. Fell 1765) [hereinafter Allen, Complete English Dictionary]; see
infra Part V for more dictionary deﬁnitions than you can shake a stick at.
287. See, e.g., Locke, On Human Understanding, supra note 149, bk. II, ch. 21, § 47,
at 263 (“For the mind [has] in most cases . . . power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires . . . .”); see also David Hume, A Dissertation on the Passions § 1, in
2 Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects 178 (London, printed for T. Cadell 1777) (“The
Will exerts itself, when either the presence of the good or absence of the evil may be
attained by any action of the mind or body.”).
288. Rousseau, supra note 120, bk. III, ch. 1, at 101; see also id. ch. 4, at 112 (“He who
makes the law knows better than anyone how it should be executed and interpreted. So it
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The notion of an “executive power” as the enacting force which
transforms intentions into reality was as pervasive among theologians as it
was among philosophers of the mind: “It is the distinguishing Character
of a rational Creature, to propose to himself an End, and then to pursue
that End in proper Methods; hence Logicians tell us, the End is ﬁrst in
the Intention, and last in the Execution . . . .”289 And so it was, according
to Saint Thomas Aquinas, that “operation belongs to the executive power;
and the act of the will does not follow the act of the executive power, on
the contrary execution comes last.”290
The act of execution thus often had a rote or even marionette quality, with the inﬂuential treatise writer William Hawkins describing
“[c]onjurers, who by force of certain Magick Words endeavor to raise the
Devil, and compel him to execute their Commands”291 and Francis Bacon
describing officers who “execute the experiments so directed” by another
officer.292 Not for nothing did the phrases “executors and administrators”293
might seem that there could be no better constitution than one which united the executive power with the legislative; in fact, this very union makes that form of government
deﬁcient . . . .”).
289. Gilbert Tennent, Sermon on Corinthians 10:31 (1743), in Twenty Three Sermons
upon the Chief End of Man 40 (Philadelphia, William Bradford 1744) [hereinafter
Tennent Sermons]. In a separate sermon, Tennent made this comparison to the two great
powers of government explicit: “The Law must be enacted by competent Power and Authority;
because Legislation, as well as the Execution thereof, are Acts of Government.” Gilbert
Tennent, Sermon on Deuteronomy 32:4 (1743), in Tennent Sermons, supra, at 278; see
also Samuel Davies, The Good Soldier: Extracted from a Sermon Preached to a Company
of Voluntiers, Raised at Virginia, August 17, 1755, at 3 (London, n. pub. 2d ed. 1755)
(“[T]rue Courage . . . will render Men vigilant and cautious against Surprizes, prudent
and deliberate in concerting their Measures, and steady and resolute in executing them.”).
290. Aquinas, supra note 111, at pt. I–II, question 16, art. 1 Objection 2, at 1475; see
also id. pt. III supp., question 32, art. 6, at 6027 (“Now there are in us three principles of
action; the ﬁrst is the directing principle, namely, the cognitive power; the second is the
commanding principle, namely, the appetitive power; the third is the executive principle,
namely, the motive power.”). Aquinas also observed:
Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And
the last act that belongs to the ﬁrst relation of the will to the means, is
choice . . . . Use, on the other hand, belongs to the second relation of
the will, in respect of which it tends to the realization of the thing willed.
Wherefore it is evident that use follows choice; provided that by use we
mean the will’s use of the executive power in moving it.
Id. pt. I–II, question 4, art. 4, at 1479.
291. 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, supra note 145, ch. 3, § 1, at 5.
292. Bacon, New Atlantis, supra note 130, at 456.
293. See, e.g., Slade’s Case (1602) 76 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1077; 4 Co. Rep. 91 a, 94 b (KB)
(“executors or administrators”); Bacon, The Common Law, supra note 129, at 142
(“executors or administrators” of a principal); John Cowell, A Law Dictionary: Or, the
Interpreter of Words and Terms (London, printed for D. Browne et al. 1708) (using
“executor or administrator” in the deﬁnitions of “Administration” and “Inventory”);
Stewart Kyd, A Treatise on the Law of Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes 24
(London, printed for J. Johnson et al. 3d ed. 1795) (noting the “executors, administrators,
and assigns” of a principal). The formulation recurred in statutes as well. E.g., 1605–1606,
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and “execution and administration” 294 become formulaic. Indeed,
Justinian’s Institutes taught that if you went beyond your instructions, you
were no longer engaged in execution: You could no longer intelligibly
speak of your actions as a manifestation of executive power.295 Execution
also had a signiﬁcant association with success: not merely an attempt to
perform the plan but the actual consummation thereof.296 In this vein,
three standard objects of “execution” were a judicial writ, 297 a legal
judgment,298 and a creative work.299
1. The “Empty Vessel” Nature of Executive Power in a Constitutional
Context. — Applying “executive power” to the special case of state action
was thus pretty straightforward. It was the implementing power: the
authority to deploy the massed force of the state to bring legislated intentions into effect, especially the laws and their intended consequences.
Notably, this concept of bringing-into-being extended to all decisions
3 Jac. 1 c. 5, § 14 (Eng.) (“[S]uch Recusants . . . shall be disabled to be Executor[s] or
Administrator[s] . . . .”); 1697–1698, 9 Will. 3 c. 35, § 1 (Eng.) (noting that the second
conviction for “deny[ing] the Christian Religion” resulted in being “disabled . . . to be [a]
Guardian[,] . . . Executor, or Administrator).
294. Finch, supra note 88, bk. I, ch. III, at 32 (discussing the “constituting [of] a new
Sheriff, viz. for the Execution and Administration of Justice”).
295. See Justinian, supra note 136, bk. III, ch. XXVII, § 8, at 89–90 (“He, who executes
a mandate ought not to exceed the bounds of it . . . .”); see also Finch, supra note 88, bk.
II, ch. IX, at 77 (discussing “[o]fficers negligent or corrupt, who do not execute their
office as of right they ought”).
296. Writers sometimes played on an obvious double meaning: “If, upon judgment to
be hanged by the neck till he be dead, the criminal be not thereby killed, but revives, the
sheriff must hang him again: for the former hanging was no execution of the
sentence . . . .” Richard Burn, New Law Dictionary 287 (Dublin, Brett Smith 1792)
[hereinafter Burn, New Law Dictionary]; see also Beccaria, supra note 117, at 153 (“The
importance of preventing even attempts to commit a crime sufficiently authorises a
punishment; but, as there may be an interval of time between the attempt and the
execution . . . .”); Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, Letters on the Study and Use of
History 182 (n.p., JJ. Tourneisen 1791) (“The emperor . . . attempted little against France,
and the little he did attempt was ill ordered, and worse executed.”); 2 Edward Hyde East,
A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 509 (Philadelphia, printed for P. Byrne 1806) (“The
breaking and entry of the mansion in the night must be with intent to commit some felony
therein . . . whether the felonious intent be executed or not.”); The Grand Remonstrance,
supra note 148, para. 81, at 218 (“[S]uch violent intentions were not brought into
execution.”); id. para. 176, at 228 (“[I]f by God’s wonderful providence their main
enterprise upon the city and castle of Dublin had not been detected and prevented upon
the very eve before it should have been executed.”).
297. See generally Anthony Fitz-Herbert, The New Natura Brevium (London, A.
Strahan & W. Woodfall 9th ed. 1794) (1534) (describing various types of judicial writs).
298. Examples are ubiquitous. For a speciﬁc dictionary deﬁnition, see Burn, New Law
Dictionary, supra note 296, at 280 (“EXECUTION (in civil cases), signiﬁes the obtaining
of actual possession of any thing acquired by judgment of law.”); see also, e.g., Matthew
Hale, The History of the Common Law of England 23–24 (Charles M. Gray ed., 1971)
(1713) (discussing the “Coertion or Excution” of an ecclesiastical court judgment).
299. See, e.g., Hobbes, supra note 117, at 275 (discussing “the execution of some
supernaturall work”); Plowden, Preface, supra note 278, at v (“And in order that I might
execute this Work with the utmost Sincerity and Truth . . . .”).
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about state action of any sort—which for their part could only be
designated by an exercise of legislative power. That’s why Locke begins
with the broadest possible deﬁnition of legislation: “The legislative power
is that, which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth
shall be employed . . . .”300 The implementation of authoritatively formulated intent was intrinsic to the very concept of the executive function,
both grammatically and in principle.
By the Founding, the implementatory essence of executive power
was most often expressed in terms of Locke’s vision of law as an interlocking tripartite phenomenon: First the law must be legislated, then in at
least some cases it must be adjudicated, and then its requirements must be
executed. While this trinitarian scheme still dominates our modern understanding of the law-related functions of government, it’s worth noting
that many joined Blackstone in describing the essential powers of government as two interlocked halves of a whole: the “legislative . . . authority”
as “the right . . . of making . . . the laws,” and the “executive authority” as
“the right . . . of enforcing” them.301 This uncertainty about whether to
classify judicial power as a distinct authority or as a subset of executive
power ran deep,302 but for present purposes it doesn’t matter in the
slightest. That’s because all formulations were identical on the crucial
point: Exercising “the executive power” meant bringing the legislated
intentions of society into being. As Obadiah Hulme put it in his muchpraised Historical Essay on the English Constitution: “The king, who is in the
constant exercise, of the executive power, in the state, always did the
business of the state; and therefore, it immediately falls within his province, to see any plan, of national utility, put into execution . . . .”303
In its famous 1774 Appeal to the Inhabitants of Quebec, the Continental
Congress described the standard framework in similar terms:
300. Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, § 144, at 164.
301. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *146; see also supra note 190 and accompanying
text.
302. As a colonial pamphlet explained:
Government is generally distinguished into three parts, Executive,
Legislative and Judicial; . . . [but] however we may reﬁne and deﬁne,
there is no more than two powers in any government, viz. the power to
make laws, and the power to execute them; for the judicial power is only
a branch of the executive, the CHIEF of every country being the ﬁrst
magistrate.
Letter IV, supra note 88, at 21; see also, e.g., A Farmer of New Jersey, Observations on
Government, New York, Nov. 3, 1787, reprinted in 19 Documentary History, supra note 70,
at 181, 183 (proposing “[t]hat the [draft Constitution’s] executive be divided into THREE
GRAND DEPARTMENTS,” headed by “The President . . . The Chief Justice . . . [and]
[t]he Superintendent of Finance”); Speech of Nathaniel Fiennes (Feb. 9, 1640), in 4
Historical Collections, supra note 99, at 174, 178 (London, printed for Richard Chiswell &
Thomas Cockerill 1692) (“And here, Mr. Speaker, give me leave to lament the Condition of
this our Church of England . . . . As to the Executive part, which consisteth in the exercise of
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, therein I note also two Disorders, Confusion and Corruption . . . .”).
303. Hulme, supra note 211, at 182.
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You have a Governor, it may be urged, vested with the executive
powers or the powers of administration. In him and in your
Council is lodged the power of making laws. You have Judges who
are to decide every cause affecting your lives, liberty or property.
Here is, indeed, an appearance of the several powers being
separated and distributed into different hands for checks one upon
another . . . .304
To put it mildly, such constitutional formulations about the “execution” of
“law” were pervasive, including both those that used the speciﬁc phrase
“executive power” and those that did not.305
This deﬁnition of executive power necessarily entailed both its
subsequence and its subordination to the legislative power. As pastor Gad
Hitchcock explained in his famous 1774 Election Day sermon—before an
audience that included the British military governor for Massachusetts—
“the executive power is strictly no other than the legislative carried forward,
and of course, controlable by it.”306 Scottish philosopher David Hume summarized the matter as an uncontroversial and fully generalizable point of political theory: “[T]he executive power in every government is altogether subordinate to the legislative . . . .”307 A long and diverse list of commentators—

304. Cont’l Cong., Appeal to the Inhabitants of Quebec (Oct. 26, 1774), reprinted in 1
American Political Writing, supra note 256, at 231, 236. The Americans continued by
helpfully explaining to their northern neighbors that this was just an illusion, a
“tinsel’d . . . ‘sepulchre’ for burying your lives, liberty and property.” Id.
305. For a tiny inlet in the vast sea of such usages, see, for example, Beccaria, supra
note 117, at 117 (“a magistrate, the executor of the laws”); id. at 176 (“Clemency is a
virtue which belongs to the legislator, and not to the executor of the laws . . . . Let, then,
the executors of the laws be inexorable, but let the legislator be tender, indulgent, and
humane.”); Cowell, Institutes, supra note 117, at 2 (“[I]t is requisite likewise, [t]hat there
be Magistrates ordained, . . . [so that] the Lawes may be put in execution . . . .”); 2 Hugo
Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace 1031 (Richard Tuck ed., Liberty Fund 2005) (1625)
(“[I]n a Civil State [religion’s function] is partly supplied by the Laws, and the easy
Execution of the Laws; whereas . . . in the universal Society of Mankind, the Execution of
Right is very difficult . . . and the Laws are very few, . . . [deriving] their Force chieﬂy from
the Fear of a Deity . . . .”); Hobbes, supra note 117, at 231 (“[T]he procuration of the safety
of the people . . . should be done . . . by a generall Providence, contained in publique
Instruction, both of Doctrine, and Example; and in the making, and executing of good
Lawes . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Voltaire, Commentary, supra note 154, at xvii (“[T]his
law, like many others, remained unexecuted . . . .”); The Grand Remonstrance, supra note
148, at 205 (pleading for the “due execution of those good laws which have been made for
securing the liberty of [the King’s] subjects”).
306. Gad Hitchcock, An Election Sermon (Boston 1774), reprinted in 1 American
Political Writing, supra note 256, at 281, 295 (“Legislators . . . should know how to give
force, and operation to their laws . . . . This, indeed, is to be done by means of the executive part . . . .”). For more on the context of this annual sermon series, see generally Lindsay
Swift, The Massachusetts Election Sermons: An Essay in Descriptive Bibliography (Cambridge,
John Wilson & Son Univ. Press 1897).
307. Hume, Independency of Parliament, supra note 95, at 44 (emphasis added).
Hume clariﬁed that this was a global point, distinct from the English Crown’s practical
need for money. See id.; see also David Hume, Essay XVI: Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth
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including but not limited to parliamentary partisans like William Prynne,308
Philip Hunton,309 and John Locke310—were in accord.311 That’s why the
great eighteenth-century historian Catherine Macaulay could call it
(1777), reprinted in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, supra note 95, at 512, 526
(stating that “the legislative power [is] always superior to the executive”).
308. Prynne explored the point at some length:
Military Affaires of the kingdome heretofore, have usually, even of right,
(for their originall determining, counselling, and disposing part) beene
Ordered by the Parliament; the executive, or ministeriall part onely, by the
King . . . . To instance in particulars.
First, the denouncing of warre against forraine enemies, hath been
usually concluded and resolved on by the Parliament, before it was proclaimed by the King . . . .
....
Secondly, All preparations belonging to warre by Land and or Sea,
have in the grosse and generall, beene usually ordered, limited and
setled by the Parliaments . . . .
William Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes (1643), reprinted
in 1 David M. Hart, Tracts on Liberty by the Levellers and Their Critics (1638–1659) 315,
323, 328 (David M. Hart & Ross Kenyon eds., 2015) (emphasis added).
309. See Hunton, A Treatise of Monarchy, supra note 96, pt. I, ch. IV, § 2, at 26
(“[S]upreme power [is] either the Legislative, or the Gubernative . . . [and] the Legislative
power . . . is the chief of the two.”).
310. See Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, §§ 149–150, at 166 (“[T]here can be
but one supreme power, which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be
subordinate . . . . In all cases, whilst the government subsists, the legislative is the supreme
power: for what can give laws to another, must needs be superior to him . . . .”).
311. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“If . . . a government[] . . . were established, by a Constitution, which
imposed no limits on the legislative power, the consequence would inevitably be, that
whatever the legislative power chose to enact, would be lawfully enacted, and the judicial
power could never interpose to pronounce it void.”); 2 Burlamaqui, supra note 117, at
394, pt. III, ch. I, at 403–04 (“Among the essential parts of sovereignty, we have given the
ﬁrst rank to the legislative power . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Charles Chauncy, Civil
Magistrates Must Be Just, Ruling in the Fear of God (1747), reprinted in 1 Political
Sermons of the American Founding Era, 1730–1805, at 148 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1998)
[hereinafter Political Sermons] (“[T]he laws are the rule for the executive powers in the
government.”). Consider also pastor Samuel Sherwood’s entreaty in his famous Revolutionary
War sermon:
[R]ulers considered either in their legislative or executive capacity . . .
must be just. Particularly,
1. There is justice to be observed in making laws. The legislative
authority is usually stiled supreme. The power of making laws is undoubtedly the highest in every society. The executive officers are obliged
to observe the rule prescribed them by the legislators . . . .
....
2. Rulers considered in their executive capacity as putting laws in
executive, must be just. Executive officers are obliged to proceed according to the received and established laws of their country.
Samuel Sherwood, A Sermon, Containing Scriptural Instructions to Civil Rulers, and All
Free-born Subjects (Aug. 31, 1774), reprinted in 1 Political Sermons, supra, at 375, 387,
389.
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“absurd”—strictly as a matter of logic—for Charles I to claim sovereignty
over the estates, “since no power can be superior to the legislative; and if
the King is not part of the legislative, he can be only the executive, which
is a power subordinate to the legislative.” 312 And that’s likewise why
writers seeking to limit magistrates to the executive power could describe
the “executive branch of government” as being charged “only to
perform, (without a will of their own), what the constitution and
representation enacts.”313
Far from disagreeing, even the most royalist writers emphasized—
often with some disdain—that “the executive power” by deﬁnition “derived from” the legislative power. The divine right theorist Filmer was
especially contemptuous: “When the law must rule and govern the
monarch, and not the monarch the law, he hath at the most but a
gubernative or executive power.” 314 It was precisely because of the
subsequent and subordinate nature of this power that Filmer rejected it as
the basis for the English king’s powers: “[A] limited monarch must
govern according to law only. Thus is he brought from the legislative to
the gubernative or executive power only.”315 Other writers sympathetic to
the monarchy were similarly dismissive of “executive power” as a
factotum’s charge. The German jurist Samuel Pufendorf observed that it
“is characteristic of a minister or a bare executor” to “have the strength
by which you may compel others, but only if another decides that it
should be brought to bear.”316 Old Whig parliamentarian Edmund Burke
scolded “many on the continent” who “altogether mistake the condition
of a King of Great Britain” as “an executive officer.”317 To the contrary,
Burke explained, “[h]e is a real King,” certainly “if he will not trouble
himself with contemptible details, nor wish to degrade himself by
becoming a party from little squabbles.”318 The less-categorizable Adam
Smith captured a similarly dismissive ﬂavor: “The leading men of

312. See 3 Macaulay, supra note 71, at 6 n*.
313. See Of the Distribution of Authority, in Rudiments of Law and Government Deduced
from the Law of Nature (1783), reprinted in 1 American Political Writing, supra note 256,
at 565, 585, 587.
314. Filmer, The Anarchy, supra note 12, at 136. For the same point in a more neutral
register, see Bolingbroke’s observation that “the executive power [is] trusted to the prince,
to be exercised according to such rules and by the ministry of such officers as are prescribed by the laws and customs of this kingdom.” Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke,
A Dissertation upon Parties: Letter XIII (1734), reprinted in Bolingbroke: Political
Writings 1, 124 (David Armitage ed., 1997).
315. Filmer, The Anarchy, supra note 12, at 136 (“When the law must rule and govern
the monarch, and not the monarch the law, he hath at the most but a gubernative or executive power.”).
316. Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, supra note 117, bk. VII, ch. 4, at 223.
317. Letter from Edmund Burke to a Member of the [French] National Assembly
(1791), reprinted in 8 The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, supra note 256, at
294, 331 (L.G. Mitchell & William B. Todd eds., 1989).
318. Id. at 332.
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America . . . feel, or imagine, that if their assemblies . . . should be so far
degraded as to become the humble ministers and executive officers of
[the British] parliament, the greater part of their own importance would
be at an end.”319
At times, Burke was even more explicit about the narrow scope of
executive power, not only recognizing its “mere” implementatory nature
but going out of his way to emphasize that it did not include the authority
to make decisions about foreign and military affairs. Listen to his mockery of the revolutionary French government: “[I]n their hurry to do every
thing at once,” he jibed, “[they] have forgot one thing that seems essential, and which, I believe, never has been before, in the theory or the
practice, omitted by any projector of a republic.”320 What was it? “[A]
Senate, or something of that nature and character.”321 And why did the
omission matter? Burke thought a government with only legislative and
executive officers might forget to designate anyone to conduct foreign
affairs:
Never, before this time, was heard of a body politic composed of
one legislative and active assembly, and its executive officers,
without such a council; without something to which foreign
states might connect themselves; something to which, in the
ordinary detail of government, the people could look up;
something which might give a bias and steadiness, and preserve
something like consistency in the proceedings of state. Such a
body kings generally have as a council. A monarchy may exist
without it; but it seems to be in the very essence of a republican
government. It holds a sort of middle place between the supreme
power exercised by the people, or immediately delegated from
them, and the mere executive.322
Note that Burke had no problem believing in precisely the “constitutional gap” that modern Residuum theorists ﬁnd unthinkable. He knew
what practicing lawyers and statesmen have never forgotten: Drafting is
hard.
All of this is to say that Blackstone was neither confused nor idiosyncratic when he described the executive power as the power to enforce the
319. 2 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
bk. IV, ch. VII, at 231 (London, printed for W. Strahan and T. Cadell 1776). For a similar
rhetorical ﬂavor from an American Revolutionary, see Letter from James Mitchell Varnum
to William Greene (Apr. 1781), in 17 Letters of Delegates to Congress: March 1–August
31, 1781, at 115, 117 (Smith et al. eds., 1990) (“Our Time is consumed in triﬂing executive
Business, while Objects of the greatest Magnitude are postponed, or rejected as subversive
in their Nature, of democratical Liberty.”).
320. Edmund Burke, Reﬂections on the Revolution in France (1790) [hereinafter
Burke, Reﬂections on the Revolution in France], reprinted in 8 Writings and Speeches of
Edmund Burke, supra note 256, at 53, 245.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 245–46, 273 (summarizing Burke’s “few remarks on the constitution of the
supreme [that is, legislative] power, the executive, the judicature, the military, and on the
reciprocal relation of all these establishments”).
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law. Here as in most other respects, the eighteenth century’s greatest law
treatise was just reciting a relatively bland restatement of conventional
wisdom.323 Even at the most royalist stage of the political story traced in
section II.A, and even according to the most royalist writers, this conceptual understanding of “the executive power” was common currency—
simply a special case of the same phrase when applied to human affairs in
general. It was the power to execute a law or project that had been separately authorized by some other source of government authority: perhaps
a statute; perhaps the common law; perhaps a royal decree issued
pursuant to a different branch of prerogative. The key conceptual point
was that “executive power” referred to the downstream implementing
authority, not to its upstream authorization. Without a source, you can’t
have a fountain;324 without a planet, the idea of a satellite makes no
sense.325
IV. WHY HAVE RESIDUUM PROPONENTS MISUNDERSTOOD THIS EVIDENCE?
We are left with a puzzle. In the face of such overwhelming evidence,
how did the Royal Residuum Thesis come to conﬂate the overarching
category of royal prerogative with a single sub-item on the incredibly
long list of authorities that it included? How could a Supreme Court

323. See, e.g., 4 Goldsmith, supra note 71, at 338–39 (explaining that the Commons
was “armed with no legal executive powers to compel obedience”); Letter from Abbé de
Mably to John Adams, in Remarks Concerning the Government and Laws of the United
States of America 41, 65 (Dublin, printed for Moncrieffe et al. 1785) (“Let us now come to
the executive power, without which it were a[] useless task to frame a law.”). Daniel Shute,
a Congregationalist minister and delegate to the Massachusetts convention, espoused a
similar view in an election sermon to the Massachusetts governor and house of
representatives:
The wellfare of the province . . . [is the] purpose [for which] the
legislative and executive powers are to be exercised. But laws are useless
in a state, unless they are obeyed; nor will putting the executive power
into the best hands avail to the designed purpose, if there is not proper
application made to it . . . for in proportion to the want of this application the most excellent code of laws will be a dead letter. It is necessary . . . to give life and energy to the laws in producing the designed
happy effects.
We [thus] have good laws; and magistrates appointed to put those
laws into execution . . . .
Daniel Shute, An Election Sermon (Boston 1768), reprinted in 1 American Political
Writing, supra note 256, at 109, 132.
324. See Davies, Report of Cases in Ireland, supra note 120, at 21 (“[W]hat is the King
himself, but the clear Fountain of Justice? [A]nd what are the Professors of the Law but
the Conduit-pipes deriving and conveying the streams of his Justice to all the subjects of
his several Kingdoms?”).
325. See Peres [Perez] Fobes, An Election Sermon (Boston 1795), reprinted in 2
American Political Writing, supra note 256, at 990, 1003 (developing a metaphor of
government as a solar system to note that “a number of secondaries perform their judicial
circuits in periodical times” and “are attended with satellites of executive power”).
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Justice wind up writing the following, catastrophically incorrect summary
of the evidence:
Founding-era evidence reveals that the “executive Power”
included the foreign affairs powers of a sovereign State. . . .
. . . William Blackstone, for example, described the executive power in England as including foreign affairs powers . . . .
....
This view of executive power was widespread at the time of
the framing of the Constitution. . . . Given this pervasive view of
executive power, it is unsurprising that those who ratiﬁed the
Constitution understood the “executive Power” vested by Article
II to include those foreign affairs powers not otherwise allocated in the Constitution.326
Not one sentence in that excerpt is right. For the moment, though, focus
only on Justice Thomas’s claim about the Founding Generation’s “pervasive
view of executive power.”327 How could he have gotten it so wrong?
This Part will focus on three reasons, starting with mistakes in the
scholarship on which Justice Thomas relies.328 First and most important,
while looking for evidence in the historical materials, Royal Residuum
theorists have systematically confused two different things: (1) the use of
the phrase “executive power” to reference a conceptual power capable of
being “vested,” and (2) the use of the phrase “the executive” as a metonym for the political entity in which that conceptual power was vested.
Second, Royal Residuum theorists have misread an idiosyncratic taxonomy adopted by the eighteenth-century authors Thomas Rutherforth
and Montesquieu, who didn’t actually contradict the fundamental
conceptual structure described above at all. The third reason is a little
different. It has to do not with errors made by the theory’s champions
but with the ready audience they ﬁnd in many lawyers and academics.
Some listeners’ receptivity may of course result from what they want
326. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2098–99 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). I did try to warn him. See Julian Davis Mortenson,
The Supreme Court Should Stay Far Away from the Vesting Clause in Zivitofsky [sic],
Lawfare (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-should-stay-faraway-vesting-clause-zivitofsky [https://perma.cc/B2AL-94AB] (“My only point here is to
urge any Justice who considers the Vesting Clause argument to take a couple of hours and
read Blackstone—or at least assign the ﬁrst nine chapters of Book I of the Commentaries to a
clerk.”).
327. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2099.
328. Royal Residuum theorists are surely influenced, it must be said, by an ambiguous
passage from Alexander Hamilton’s multi-essay defense of the Washington Administration’s
right to state out loud its interpretation of various treaty obligations. See supra note 7
(citing Hamilton’s ﬁrst Paciﬁcus pamphlet). I don’t think Hamilton erred so much as he
sought to wring a meaning from Article II that he was famously unable to win at the
Convention itself. Not for nothing was he known as “one of the best legal minds in the
country.” Martin S. Flaherty, Restoring the Global Judiciary: Why the Supreme Court
Should Rule in U.S. Foreign Affairs (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 120) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review).
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presidential power to be—a bias to which none of us is immune. The
more signiﬁcant reason, however, seems to be a common misunderstanding of what the Founders meant by a “separation” of powers in the ﬁrst
place.
A.

The First Scholarly Error: Attributing the Whole to the Part

By far the most important mistake of the Royal Residuum Thesis is
its systematic conﬂation of two different things: (1) the Constitution’s use
of “executive” to describe a particular power of government with (2) the
historical sources’ use of “executive” as metonymy for the political entity
that possesses both that particular power and also many others. It’s hard to
overstate the pervasiveness of this error.329 So far as I can tell, every single
piece of evidence from pre-Framing commentary cited in support of the
Thesis—other than the misunderstanding of Rutherforth and Montesquieu
discussed below—is a trivially demonstrable conﬂation of these two
meanings.
At bottom, the point is simple. The eighteenth-century practice of
referring to presidents, governors, prime ministers, stadtholders, and
emperors as “the executive” was an everyday metonymy:330 the use of
something associated with the referent as a name for the referent itself,
like talking about “head” of cattle or “boots” on the ground. This was
neither semantically confused nor substantively controversial: Today, we
likewise use “the executive” as shorthand for our governors, presidents,
and prime ministers because they all count the executive power as one of
329. It is worth noting that, while unmistakable, the error is perhaps understandable.
It is akin to the linguistic phenomenon of semantic drift, which describes the process by
which a word or phrase evolves to mean something very different from its original
meaning over time. Consider, for example, the path of words like “terrible” and “awful,”
where widespread error by prescriptive lights eventually changed the meaning of both
terms. Cf. J.D. Sadler, Semantics: The Ups and Downs, 68 Classical J. 262 (1973). Certainly,
scholars on both sides of the Executive Power Clause debate have been tempted by this
error. In addition to the examples below, see, for example, Flaherty, Most Dangerous
Branch, supra note 59, at 1774 (“[T]he [Northwest] Ordinance . . . accord[ed] the governor an absolute veto over legislation [and] the ‘power to convene, prorogue, and dissolve
the general assembly when, in his opinion, it shall be expedient.’ This was arguably
‘executive’ authority; British monarchs and royal colonial governors possessed these
powers into the eighteenth century.” (quoting The Northwest Territorial Government, 1
Stat. 50, at § 11 (1789)). Without wading into the debates over corpus linguistics—which
doubtless has its uses—the metonymy error’s persistence even among those who have
looked closely at the texts leaves me skeptical that database corpus techniques could shed
much light on the Executive Power Clause.
330. I sometimes think that this use of “executive” is better characterized as synecdoche than metonymy, the former being a more speciﬁc example of the latter. If we think
of “the executive power” as being a constituent element of the political entity, then calling
the President the executive is synecdoche in the same way as “all hands on deck.” If we
think of “the executive power” as something related but not physically integral to the
political entity, then it is a metonymy in the same way as “the pen is mightier than the
sword.” Nothing substantive rides on this difference. Replace every reference to “metonymy” in this Article with “synecdoche” and the analysis works precisely as written.
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their authorities. But not even the most aggressive Residuum theorist
would claim that all authorities held by “an executive” in this metonymic
sense are part of “the executive power” in the relevant conceptual sense.
Partly that’s because the claim is obviously wrong: Everyone agrees, for
example, that the President’s veto is a quintessentially legislative act.331
More profoundly, however, the problem is that this would turn the linguistic logic of metonymy upside down. Rather than using the part as
shorthand for the whole, this move crams all the features of the whole
into the part. And that’s exactly backward.
Think, for example, of referring to a seventeen-year-old boy as “a
youth.” We do that because one attribute of the boy is his youth—his
young age. So far, so uncontroversial. But in addition to his young age, the
boy surely has other abilities and characteristics as well. Probably he can
read and run. Probably he has ears and elbows. But even if in these
respects this particular boy is pretty representative of boys in general, it
would be incorrect to reason as follows:
1. This boy is called a youth.
2. This boy has ears.
3. Therefore, it is an intrinsic feature of youth to have ears.332
For an example closer to the political context, consider the practice
of referring to an army as “a force.” The semantic logic of this metonymy
is that the army has the capacity to be forceful—to compel, especially in a
violent or kinetic fashion. And yet it would be nonsensical to include
other characteristics of this army (even if shared by many other armies)
in the dictionary deﬁnition of the word “force.” Probably this army is
wearing uniforms. Probably its members carry riﬂes rather than halberds.
Surely some of its members are qualiﬁed to deliver skilled medical care.
But that would hardly lead us to conclude that it is a constituent element
of “force” to be wearing a uniform, carrying any particular weapon, or
wielding an EMT certiﬁcation.
And yet that is exactly what virtually all of the evidence for the Royal
Residuum Thesis involves. There are far too many examples to list. But
the error comes in two different versions. The ﬁrst involves (1) accurately
ﬂagging an author’s metonymic reference to the king as “the executive”
or “the executive authority,” and then (2) mistakenly concluding that all
of the royal powers later described by the author are therefore
331. See supra note 26 (outlining the President’s powers).
332. I have used the metonymic noun as the principal example. But the point applies
with equal force to the use of metonymy in its adjective form. That is to say, it would be
equally incorrect to reason as follows:
1. This boy is the young person in our group.
2. This boy has ears.
3. Therefore, it is an intrinsic feature of being “young” to have ears.
I am grateful to Henry Monaghan for pointing out that this is a version of the fallacy of the
undistributed middle.
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conceptually “executive.” The leading scholarly argument for the Royal
Residuum Thesis, for example, states:
According to Blackstone, the executive power ‘is the delegate or representative of his people’ who transacts with ‘another
community’ because it is impossible for individuals of one
community to transact directly ‘the affairs of that state’ with
another.333
What Blackstone actually says in the cited text, however, is: “[T]he king is
the delegate or representative of his people,” and “the king therefore, as
in a center” must “transact the affairs of that state.”334 It’s only (much)
earlier that Blackstone uses the shorthand “executive power”—in its
metonymic sense—to refer to the king.335
A second version of the error involves (1) accurately ﬂagging an
author’s observation that the king has the “executive power” of government, but then (2) mistakenly suggesting that the all the other prerogatives later described by the author are therefore part of that “executive
power” as well. So, for example, the leading modern Royal Residuum
theorists assert: “Emmerich de Vattel, a leading European writer on the
law of nations, said that the ‘conductor’ or ‘sovereign’ of a nation had
the ‘executive power’ and consequently could enter into treaties, send
emissaries, engage in war, and control the nation’s ambassadors.”336 But
what Vattel actually wrote in the quoted passages was that:
The executive power naturally belongs to the sovereign—to
every conductor of a people: he is supposed to be invested with
it, in its fullest extent, when the fundamental laws do not
restrict it. When the laws are established, it is the prince’s province to have them put in execution. To support them with
333. Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 44, at 269
(quoting 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *252).
334. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *252. The relevant excerpt reads in its entirety as
follows:
With regard to foreign concerns, the king is the delegate or representative of his people. It is impossible that the individuals of a state, in
their collective capacity, can transact the affairs of that state with another
community equally numerous as themselves. Unanimity must be wanting
to their measures, and strength to the execution of their counsels. In the
king therefore, as in a center, all the rays of his people are united, and
form by that union a consistency, splendor, and power, that make him
feared and respected by foreign potentates . . . .
Id.
335. See, e.g., id. at *136, *141, *154, *164. Of course, the king did have these powers.
But that doesn’t mean that they were part of “the executive power.” Indeed, Blackstone later
refers to the king’s absolute negative as “a constituent part of the supreme legislative power.”
Id. at *261. And no one, least of all Blackstone, sees the veto as “executive” in the conceptual sense.
336. Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 44, at 270
(emphasis added) (quoting E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural
Law 69, 100, 160–61, 235–36, 393 (photo. reprint 1993) (Charles G. Fenwick trans.,
Carnegie Inst. 1916) (1758)).
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vigour, and to make a just application of them to all cases that
present themselves, is what we call rendering justice. And this is
the duty of the sovereign, who is naturally the judge of his
people.337
This is, of course, the textbook deﬁnition of executive power explained at length above; indeed, Vattel turned immediately from this
point to an extended discussion of the judicial function, which had historically been associated with the executive power in its law enforcement
sense.338 It was only much later in Vattel’s discussion that he turned to the
chief magistrate’s authority to enter treaties and send ambassadors.339
And in those contexts, Vattel doesn’t use any variant of “executive” to
describe the magistrate; rather, he refers to “the sovereign.”340 Far from
suggesting that the latter powers are “consequent[]” to the “executive
power,” Vattel makes clear that they have nothing to do with it—they are
simply different branches of what the English called prerogative.341
Make no mistake: Blackstone (and many others) did say that—in
addition to the executive power—the king claimed a range of foreign
affairs powers as part of his prerogative.342 And Blackstone (and many
others) did variously refer to the Crown as “the executive,” “the executive
magistrate,” “the executive part of government,” and sometimes even “the

337. Vattel, supra note 267, bk. I, ch. XIII, § 162, at 187. Vattel used the phrase
“executive power” only one other time in the work. See id. bk. II, ch. XVII, § 282, at 418.
That use, too, was in the proper, conceptual sense. And that use, too, was obviously in
reference to the execution of law: “[W]ise and free people have too often seen, by the
experience of other nations, that the laws are no longer a ﬁrm barrier and secure defence,
when once the executive power is allowed to interpret them at pleasure.” Id. Prakash and
Ramsey cite to the 1916 Classics of International Law translation of Vattel’s text, but the
substance of the two translations is identical in this respect.
338. See id. §§ 163–168, at 187–91.
339. See id. bk. II, ch. XII, §§ 154–156, at 338–40.
340. See id.
341. For a similar example, consider the leading Royal Residuum advocates’ claim that
“Jean De Lolme . . . described the King’s executive power as including the ability to serve
as ‘the representative and depository of all the power and collective majesty of the nation;
he sends and receives ambassadors; he contracts alliances; and has the prerogative of
declaring war and making peace.’” Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, supra note 44, at 270 (quoting J.L. De Lolme, The Constitution of England 50
(photo. reprint 1999) (London, A. Hancock 1821)). But de Lolme didn’t say that at all.
His chapter “Of the Executive Power” (“Du pouvoir exécutif”) follows his chapter “Of the
Legislative Power” (“Puissance legislative”). In the ﬁrst paragraph, it notes that “[w]hen
the Parliament is prorogued or dissolved, . . . its laws still continue to be in force: the King
remains charged with the execution of them, and is supplied with the necessary power for that
purpose.” De Lolme, Constitution of England, supra note 105, bk. I, ch. IV, at 71 (emphasis
added). De Lolme then goes on to catalogue the king’s other prerogatives, starting with the
unequivocally legislative right to veto proposed enactments: “the share allotted to him in
the legislative authority” by way of “giv[ing] or refus[ing] his assent to the bills presented
to him.” Id. De Lolme’s reference to foreign affairs powers comes about eighth in a list of
additional authorities that he discusses after the king’s executive power. Id. at 73.
342. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *252–261.
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executive power.”343 But neither of those facts, nor both in combination,
supports the erroneous claim that “William Blackstone . . . described the
executive power [in its conceptual sense] . . . as including foreign affairs
powers.”344 Instead, Blackstone described the Crown as having various foreign affairs powers, in addition to the distinct power to execute the laws.
And he used “the executive” as a shorthand for the political entity, rather
than as an umbrella category for the activity or function. So long as you
bear this simple grammatical distinction in mind, the bookshelf evidence
offered for the Royal Residuum Thesis simply evaporates as you read it.

343. See id. at *336 (“We have therefore now chalked out all the principal outlines of
this vast title of the law, the supreme executive magistrate, or the king’s majesty . . . [and]
the power of the executive magistrate, or prerogative of the crown . . . .”); id. at *336–337
(“[The post-Restoration reforms] put together give the executive power so persuasive an
energy with respect to the persons themselves . . . as will amply make amends for the loss
of external prerogative . . . . The stern commands of prerogative have yielded to the
milder voice of inﬂuence.”). De Lolme deployed the same usage:
But all these general precautions to secure the rights of the
Parliament, that is, those of the Nation itself, against the efforts of the
executive Power, would be vain, if the Members themselves remained
personally exposed to them. Being unable openly to attack, with any
safety to itself, the two legislative bodies, and by a forcible exertion of its
prerogatives, to make, as it were, a general assault, the executive power
might, by subdividing the same prerogatives, gain an entrance, and
sometimes by interest, and at others by fear, guide the general will, by
inﬂuencing that of individuals.
De Lolme, Constitution of England, supra note 105, bk. I, ch. VIII, at 96–97. For an
American example, consider Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, prohibiting states
from “enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power” without the
permission of Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
There is one sentence in which Blackstone could be read to refer casually to the king’s
powers as “constitu[ing] the executive power of the government.” See 1 Blackstone, supra
note 78, at *281 (“[H]aving . . . considered at large those branches of the king’s prerogative, which contribute to his royal dignity, and constitute the executive power of the government . . . .”). In context—not least since the subset of powers referenced include the
Crown veto, id. at *250, *261, which everyone including Blackstone agreed was legislative
under his classiﬁcation—this seems best read as a metonymic reference to the constitution
of the entity of the Crown. To read it as a considered conceptual reference to a function of
government would require rejecting the entire organization of Blackstone’s constitutional
framework, see supra notes 192–207 and accompanying text, ignoring Blackstone’s own
repeated deﬁnitions of “executive power,” see supra note 190 and accompanying text,
ignoring his unvarying use of “prerogative” rather than “executive power” to describe the
conceptual authorities throughout the referenced section, see 1 Blackstone, supra note 78,
at *236–279, and contradicting every other contemporary treatment of the question, see
supra notes 253–257 and accompanying text. Even if it’s semantically possible to misread
the sentence in isolation, the Founders would have to be shown to have done so for the
error to be relevant to Article II. I can ﬁnd no reference to this sentence—let alone a misreading of it—anywhere in the Documentary History of the Ratiﬁcation of the Constitution.
344. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2099 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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The Second Scholarly Error: Misunderstanding “Internal Executive” and
“External Executive”

The second source of confusion is rooted in the idiosyncratic taxonomy of two eighteenth-century writers—the minor Rutherforth and the
major Montesquieu. Modern advocates of the Royal Residuum Thesis
have relied on snippets from Montesquieu345 and Rutherforth346 in a
way that is both inaccurate and also disproportionate to their taxonomy’s
contemporary signiﬁcance.347 In this section I will show that the Royal
345. E.g., Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 44, at
268 (“Montesquieu . . . helped usher in the late eighteenth-century view that the executive power had domestic and foreign affairs components.”); Prakash & Ramsey, The
Jeffersonian Executive, supra note 10, at 1632–35, 1637 (“Montesquieu categorized
foreign affairs powers as executive powers.”).
346. E.g., Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 44, at
269–70 (identifying Rutherforth as a “prominent eighteenth-century writer[] [who]
identiﬁed foreign affairs power as executive power”); Prakash & Ramsey, The Jeffersonian
Executive, supra note 10, at 1638–39 (“Rutherforth . . . conﬁrms the conventional description of powers, and the conventional deﬁnition of foreign affairs powers as executive.”).
347. Modern Royal Residuum authors have also relied on a set of resolutions passed by
a county assembly in Essex County, Massachusetts. See Theophilus Parsons, The Essex
Result (1778), reprinted in 1 American Political Writing, supra note 256, at 480; Prakash &
Ramsey, The Jeffersonian Executive, supra note 10, at 1643–44; John C. Yoo, The
Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84
Calif. L. Rev. 167, 231–32 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo, The Continuation of Politics]. That
reliance seems quite mistaken.
As a substantive matter, the Essex Result simply adopts the taxonomic distinction
introduced by Rutherforth and Montesquieu, with the same focus on actions taken—a
reading underscored by its author’s comments at the Massachusetts ratifying convention a
decade later. See Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, supra note 13, at 46 (describing
Theophilus Parsons’s discussion of “executive power” in the Massachusetts convention).
That said, I leave it in a footnote here because, so far as I can tell, the Essex Result seems
to have had no impact outside of Massachusetts. I have yet to see a single contemporaneous source supporting the proposition that it was any more inﬂuential on the national
debate than the hundreds of other pamphlets that appeared in the second half of the
eighteenth century. (The 1859 remembrance of the author’s son—almost eighty years
later—is neither contemporaneous nor exactly neutral.) So far as I can tell, it is not cited
even once—by author, by town of origin, or by paraphrase—in the documents collected
during almost ﬁve decades of work by the team responsible for The Documentary History of
the Ratiﬁcation of the Constitution. Besides the 1859 memoir of Parsons ﬁls, see Theophilus
Parsons, Memoir of Theophilus Parsons, Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts 454 (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 1859), the earliest citation appears to be in
Charles Thach’s 1922 description of the Result as a “document, from the pen of a future
State chief justice, [which] may be fairly considered as representative of conservative
Massachusetts opinion.” Thach, supra note 29, at 44 (providing no citation other than the
memoir of Theophilus Parsons’s son).
To be clear, the Essex Result is a terriﬁc piece of work, and well worth study. Substantively, though, it is even less relevant to the Royal Residuum Thesis than Montesquieu or
Rutherforth, because it expressly declares the external executive beyond its scope of
discussion. That said, it is indeed “a most remarkable document.” Vile, supra note 37, at
165; see also Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions 21 (Rita Kimber &
Robert Kimber trans., Rowman & Littleﬁeld Publishers, Inc. expanded ed. 2001) (1940)
[hereinafter Adams, The First American Constitutions]. I cannot ﬁnd the slightest indica-
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Residuum Thesis’s heavy reliance on these two writers is substantively
mistaken.348 Not only was the taxonomy of Montesquieu and Rutherforth
idiosyncratic, but even taken on its own terms, their framework does not
actually support a royal residuum at all. To the contrary, their discussion
necessarily rejects it, for exactly the same reasons that the rest of the
literature does too.
But ﬁrst, what did Montesquieu and Rutherforth say? For them, it
was taxonomically important to distinguish between the application of
“the executive power” to internal objects and its application to external
objects. In his Institutes, Rutherforth wrote:
[T]he executive power is either internal or external. We may
call it internal when it is exercised upon objects within the society; when it is employed in securing the rights[,] or enforcing
the duties of the several members, in respect either of one
another or of the society itself. And we may call it external executive power, when it is exercised upon objects out of the society;
when it is employed in protecting either the body or the several
members of it against external injuries . . . .349
Montesquieu said something similar: “In every government there are
three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive [la puissance exécutrice],
in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive,
in regard to things that depend on the civil law.”350 Note that his deﬁnition
was even narrower than Rutherforth’s, identifying both forms of executive power as involving the authority to implement strictly legalized entitlements and authorizations.
1. Montesquieu’s Taxonomy of “Executive Power” Was Just an Expositional
Tool to Organize His Otherwise Standard Use of the Concept. — First and most
important, the substance of Rutherforth and Montesquieu’s discussion
reﬂected an entirely standard understanding of “the executive power” as
a general concept. Their taxonomic wrinkle was no conceptual revolution. It served simply to highlight the rather mundane point that government force can be directed in one of two directions: inward or outward.
In both realms, “the executive power” is the power to execute—the power
to follow through on a plan, desire, or instruction. It is just that the

tion, however, that Parsons’s work registered in, let alone inﬂuenced, the national
discussion. I would be grateful to be alerted to any evidence I have missed.
348. Cf. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 37, at 563–64 (2004) (suggesting that
Montesquieu’s discussion is unclear and self-contradictory); see also Vile, supra note 37, at
93–101 (making similar points).
349. 2 Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law 59 (Philadelphia, printed for
William Young 3d ed. 1799) [hereinafter Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law].
350. 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 221. In the
original French, Montesquieu wrote, “Il y a, dans chaque état trois sortes de pouvoirs; la
puissance législative, la puissance exécutrice des choses qui dépendent du droit des gens,
& la puissance exécutrice de celles qui dépendent du droit civil.” 1 Montesquieu, De
l’Esprit des Lois, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 311.
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power is “internal” when performed internally; “external” when performed externally.
If you read Rutherforth’s entire discussion of government powers,
the point is not subtle:
The legislative is the joint understanding of the society,
directing what is proper to be done, and is therefore naturally
superior to the executive, which is the joint strength of the society exerting itself in taking care that what is so directed shall be
done.351
A leading review of his Institutes zeroed in on precisely this point: The
internal and external versions were conceptually indistinguishable aspects
of the same power to carry out an a priori instruction or plan. “It may be
called internal,” the reviewer wrote, “when exercised upon members of
the society; external, when exercised upon persons neither belonging to
the society, nor residing in it . . . .”352
Montesquieu likewise left no doubt that the “legislative power” was
the content-giving font of instructions to be carried out by the external
“executive [power].” He could scarcely have been more speciﬁc—the legislative power and the external executive power may each:
be given . . . to magistrates or permanent bodies, because they
are not exercised on any private subject; one being no more than
the general will of the state, and the other the execution of that general
will.353
It’s for that reason that his account so tightly associated the separation of
powers with the protection of liberty: “There would be an end of every
thing, were the same man, or the same body, . . . to exercise those three
powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions,

351. 2 Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, supra note 349, at 79. Rutherforth
argued that “legislative power is thus found to be superior to executive, when they are considered in the abstract.” Id. In other words, the legislative power controls the executive
power when both terms are used in the sense of functions of government rather than as
metonymic references to the political entities to which they are contingently vested.
352. Rutherforth’s Institutes of Natural Law, Monthly Rev., July 1756, at 217, 219
[hereinafter Review of Rutherforth’s Institutes]. For another political theorist’s reference
to executive power as the motive force or the power of action, see, for example, Nathaniel
Bacon, The Continuation of an Historical and Political Discourses of the Laws and
Government of England 18 (London, printed for John Starkey 1682) (noting that privy
councilors’ obligation to “do right in Judgment” concerns “immediately the King in his
politick capacity, but trencheth upon all Laws of the Kingdom, in the executive power; and
all the motions in the whole Kingdom, either of Peace or War”).
353. 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 225
(emphasis added). For the original French, see 1 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois, supra
note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 315–16 (“Les deux autres pouvoirs pourroient plutôt être
donnés à des magistrats ou à des corps permanens, parce qu’ils ne s’exercent sur aucun
particulier, n’étant, l’un, que la volonté générale de l’état; & l’autre, que l’exécution de
cette volonté Générale.”).
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and [that] of trying the [crimes] of individuals.”354 Every single example
in Montesquieu’s weirdly celebrated sentence about the “law of nations”
executive355 thus relates to the implementation of a plan—a plan that he
has just ﬁnished telling us is deﬁned in its entirety by an exercise of the
relevant legislative power, wherever that happens to be vested.356
Understanding the conceptual subordinacy of execution to legislative intention, however, doesn’t even require this close a reading of their
respective accounts. This is because both authors go out of their way to
insist that the executive power is conceptually every bit as subordinate to
354. 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 222. In the
original French: “Tout serait perdu, si le même homme, ou le même corps des principaux,
ou des nobles, ou du peuple, exerçaient ces trois pouvoirs: celui de faire des lois, celui
d’exécuter les resolutions publiques, & celui de juger les crimes ou les différents des particuliers.” 1 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 312–13.
Montesquieu further wrote:
In the republics of Italy, where these three powers are united, . . .
[t]he same body of magistrates are possessed, as executors of the laws, of
the whole power they have given themselves in quality of legislators . . . .
. . . [T]hey have likewise the judiciary power in their hands, every private citizen may be ruined by their particular decisions.
1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 223. In the original
French:
Dans les républiques d’Italie, où ces trois pouvoirs sont réunis , . . .
. . . [l]e même corps de magistrature a, comme exécuteur des lois,
toute la puissance qu’il s’est donnée comme législateur. Il peut ravager
l’etat par ses volontés générales; & comme il a encore la puissance de
juger, il peut détruire chaque citoyen par ses volontés particulieres.
1 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 313–14.
355. See infra section IV.B.2; see also 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note
179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 222 (“By the [executive power,] [the magistrate] makes peace or
war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against invasions.”); 1 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 311 (“Par la
seconde, il fait la paix ou la guerre, envoie ou reçoit des ambassades, établit la sureté,
prévient les invasions.”); cf. James Harrington, A Discourse Upon This Saying: The Spirit
of the Nation is Not Yet to be Trusted With Liberty; Lest It Introduce Monarchy, or Invade
the Liberty of Conscience (1659), reprinted in Political Works of Harrington, supra note
266, at 735, 740 (highlighting the use of “executive power . . . in the management . . . of a
war or treaty with foreign States” (emphasis added)).
356. Rousseau is almost identical in this respect:
The mistake comes from having no precise notion of what
sovereign authority is, and from taking mere manifestations of authority
for parts of the authority itself. For instance, the acts of declaring war
and making peace have been regarded as acts of sovereignty, which they
are not; for neither of these acts constitutes a law, but only an application of law, a particular act which determines how the law shall be interpreted—and all this will be obvious as soon as I have deﬁned the idea
which attaches to the word ‘law.’
Rousseau, supra note 120, bk. II, ch. 2, at 71. As he later explains, “The public force thus
needs its own agent to call it together and put it into action in accordance with the
instructions of the general will, . . . and in a sense to do for the public person what is done
for the individual by the union of soul and body.” Id. bk. III, ch. 1, at 102.
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the legislative power when acting on foreign objects as it is when acting
domestically. Again, Rutherforth couldn’t be more explicit:
[T]he external executive power, in its own nature, is no more
an independent power of acting without being controlled by
the legislative, than the internal executive power is. Even in
those civil societies, where the particular constitution has left
this power discretionary in some instances, it does not suffer it
to be so in all.357
This is exactly how Rutherforth’s eighteenth-century contemporaries
understood him: “The Doctor is of opinion, that the executive power is
derived from, and ought always to be held, as, in a very great measure,
dependent upon, and originally subordinate to, the legislative.”358 And
again Montesquieu is to the same effect: Not only was the external executive
power just “the execution of [the] general will” as deﬁned by the
legislative power, but the terms of that execution could be dictated totally
by the entity possessing the legislative power.359
Here Montesquieu and Rutherforth were on common ground with
every other commentator I have encountered. Everyone agreed that an
exercise of the conceptual function of legislative power would deﬁne the
scope of every other function of government, including the federative:
We act as a nation, when, through the organ of the legislative power, which speaks the will of the nation, and by means of
the executive power which does the will of the nation, we enact
laws, form alliances, make war or peace, dispose of the public
money, or do any of those things which belong to us in our collective capacity.360
Certainly that had been the constitutional law of England since at least
the 1701 Act of Settlement,361 and as expressed more saliently for the

357. 2 Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, supra note 349, at 66.
358. Review of Rutherford’s Institutes, supra note 352, at 219. Note that ﬁnal
formulation: “[O]riginally” here means not “at ﬁrst” but “as a matter of its origin.” The
subsequence and subordinacy of executive power were as true when applied to external
objects as they were to internal objects.
359. See Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 225.
Montesquieu twice emphasized that, unless the head magistrate had the right to
participation in lawmaking, his conduct of foreign affairs could be entirely stripped away
by legislative prescription. See id. at 231 (“Were the executive power not to have a right of
restraining the encroachments of the legislative body, the latter would become despotic;
for as it might arrogate to itself what authority it pleased, it would soon destroy all the
other powers.”); id. at 233 (“The executive power, pursuant to what has been already said,
ought to have a share in the legislature by the power of rejecting, otherwise it would soon
be stripped of its prerogative.”).
360. Anna Letitia Barbauld, Sins of Government, Sins of the Nation; or, a Discourse
for the Fast 3 (London, printed for J. Johnson 1793).
361. See An Act for the Further Limitation of the Crown and Better Securing the
Rights and Liberties of the Subject (Act of Settlement) 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2, § 3
(Eng.) (prohibiting monarchs not born in England from engaging “in any Warr for the
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Revolutionaries in cases like the 1774 decision in Campbell v. Hall, which
barely paused on the point in discussing the Crown’s foreign affairs prerogative as the basis for a peace treaty with France in the Caribbean.362
This was likewise true in the realm of theoretical commentary, where
writers observed without fear of contradiction that the various foreign
affairs powers were fully subject to direction by legislative power.363

Defence of any Dominions or Territories which do not belong to the Crown of England,
without the Consent of Parliament”).
362. See Campbell v. Hall (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1048; 1 Cowp. 204, 209 (KB).
The opinion observed that:
[I]f the King (and when I say the King, I always mean the King without
the concurrence of Parliament,) has a power to alter the old and to
introduce new laws in a conquered country, this legislation being subordinate, that is, to his own authority in Parliament, he cannot make any
new change contrary to fundamental principles: he cannot exempt an
inhabitant from that particular dominion . . . from the power of
Parliament . . . ; and so in many other instances which might be put.
Id. Note that Campbell, like all eighteenth-century questions of prerogative authority, is a
Youngstown Zone Two case. See id. at 1048; 209–10 (“It is left by the constitution to the
King’s authority to grant or refuse a capitulation . . . . [N]o man ever said the Crown could
not do it.”). On the contemporary salience of Campbell v. Hall, see 1 John Philip Reid,
Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Rights 158 (1986)
(noting “the discussion it generated during the months leading up to the American
Revolution”).
The colonists might also have been struck by reports of the parliamentary debate
about King George III’s introduction of Hessian mercenaries into Gibraltar and Minorca
without parliamentary approval in 1776. See 18 William Cobbett, Cobbett’s Parliamentary
History of England, from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, at 798–824 (London, T.C.
Hansard 1813). The opposition claimed that this violated the Bill of Rights’ prohibition on
keeping a standing army within the kingdom, the Mutiny Bill’s limitation on the size of
British army, and the Act of Settlement’s prohibition aganst placing foreigners in any
military “office, or place of trust.” Id. at 799–800, 825. Supporters of the government
responded by arguing that the statutes did not apply under the circumstances, and by
suggesting that an Act of Indemnity be passed to immunize any illegal behavior. But none
of them argued that the Crown was legally entitled to ignore the statute. Id. at 801–12.
363. See Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, § 149, at 166, § 153, at 168 (“[T]here
can be but one supreme power, which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must
be subordinate,” such that “the federative power [is] both ministerial and subordinate to
the legislative”). Compare in this respect the Antifederalist “Federal Farmer’s” logical
extension of Rutherforth’s geographical subdivision of executive power to the other two
powers of government:
In the second place it is necessary, therefore, to examine the extent,
and the probable operations of some of those extensive powers proposed to be vested in this [national] government. These powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, respect internal as well as external objects.
Those respecting external objects, as all foreign concerns, commerce,
imposts, all causes arising on the seas, peace and war, and Indian affairs,
can be lodged no where else, with any propriety, but in this [national]
government.
Federal Farmer, Letter III, Letters to the Republican, Oct. 10, 1787, reprinted in 19
Documentary History, supra note 70, at 203, 224.
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2. Montesquieu’s Taxonomy of Executive Power Was Odd and
Unrepresentative. — Notably, Montesquieu and Rutherforth’s presentational choice to divide the universe of executive power into these
taxonomic categories was highly unrepresentative. Certainly as a matter
of English law, “the executive power” was a completely distinct branch of
royal authority from the military and foreign affairs powers—a point by
itself decisive in a Constitution so thoroughly steeped in Anglo-American
legal concepts. But so far as I can tell, Rutherforth and Montesquieu
stood alone among political theorists in this taxonomy more generally.
Indeed, both thinkers acknowledged that “[t]hese two branches of the
executive power may, if we like these names better, be called civil and
military.”364 So they may. And so they typically were: The standard way to
incorporate foreign affairs into governance theory was as a subject
matter—a competence, to borrow a term from modern European Union
law—no different in principle from building lighthouses, or coining
money, or conferring honors.365
364. See 2 Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, supra note 349, at 59; see also 1
Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch.XIX, at 264–65 (comparing
how “in a commonwealth the same magistrate ought to be possessed of the executive
power, as well civil as military[,]” whereas in a monarchy “some [officers that have] the
civil executive, and others the military executive power, which does not necessarily imply a
despotic authority”). Besides the Essex Result, I have come across only one other
contemporary author who comes close to using their taxonomy. See John Brand, An
Historical Essay on the Principles of Political Associations in a State 126 (London, printed
for T.N. Longman & J. Owen 1796) (“The remaining heads of this comparison will relate
to the executive power of the Crown, judicial and military . . . .”).
365. See Althusius, supra note 121, at 53 (listing as distinct portfolios “the executive
functions and occupations necessary and useful to the provincial association [that is, legislature;]” “the distribution of punishments and rewards by which discipline is preserved
in the province;” “the provision for provincial security;” “the mutual defense . . . against
force and violence;” and many others); cf. Vile, supra note 37, at 16–17 (distinguishing
between the “‘tasks’ of government” and the “‘functions’ of government”). Althusius goes
on to distinguish at great length between what he repeatedly refers to as the administrator’s executive function as to general right and what he describes as the separate and distinctive function of “arms and war” among many other “special right[s].” Althusius, supra
note 121, at 182–83. Compare these special rights with id. at 175–76 (“General right, in
turn, involves . . . the enactment and execution of useful laws, and the administration of
justice . . . .”).
For other examples, see Beccaria, supra note 117, at 119 (distinguishing between “the
interior power, which defends the laws, and the exterior, which defends the throne and
kingdom”); Burke, Reﬂections on the Revolution in France, supra note 320, at 273
(describing “the supreme [that is, legislative] power, the executive, the judicature, [and]
the military” as separate branches of government authority); 2 Cornelius Van
Bynkershoek, Quaestionum Juris Publici bk. II, ch. XIII, at 211 (James Brown Scott ed.,
Tenney Frank trans., Clarendon Press 1930) (1737) (“[T]he counsellors of the StatesGeneral who have charge of the state treasury and the exaction of the contributions . . . do
not possess executive power in the several provinces, nor any jurisdiction, nor any military
authority without permission of the Estates.”); Hobbes, supra note 117, at 166–70
(discussing “publique ministers” whose portfolios involve “speciall Administration; that is
to say, charges of some speciall businesse, either at home, or abroad,” and describing
departments for the economy, the armed forces, the judiciary, the execution of judgments,
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To be sure, many thought that the various foreign affairs
competences ought usually to be vested in the same hands that held the
executive power.366 But that was all contingent political dickering—such
debates had nothing to do with essentialist claims about the “executive”
nature of such competences. To the contrary, the same people often asserted that similar practical considerations meant that the chief magistrate
should also hold powers that were on nobody’s account “executive”: the
veto or negative,367 the power to raise money,368 and in some cases the
power to enact law itself.369
and the wielding of diplomatic power); Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, §§ 146–148,
at 165 (describing the “distinct” and “natural” power called “federative,” which “contains
the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions, with all
persons and communities without the commonwealth”).
In a similar vein, see 2 Burlamaqui, supra note 117, pt. I, ch. VII, at 320 (“[T]he body
of the nation reserves to itself the legislative power . . . [and] it gives the king the military
and executive powers . . . .”). Burlamaqui’s chapter “Of the Parts of Sovereignty” left no
doubt that he was distinguishing here between a Lockean executive power and a Lockean
federative power. See id. ch. VIII, at 322–25. He there describes “the legislative power,”
“the coercive power,” “the judiciary power,” and an unnamed assortment of foreign affairs
powers to “guard the people against strangers, and to procure to them, by leagues with
foreign states, all the necessary aids and advantages.” Id. at 323–24. And de Lolme likewise
distinguished between the executive, federative, and legislative powers. See de Lolme, The
Constitution of England, supra note 105, bk. I, ch. V, at 74 (“The [English] King not only
unites in himself all the branches of the Executive power,—he not only disposes, without
controul, of the whole military power in the State,—but he is moreover . . . Master of the
Law itself, since he calls up, and dismisses, at his will, the Legislative Bodies.”).
366. See Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, § 148, at 165 (“Though . . . the
executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in themselves, yet
they are hardly . . . separated, and placed at the same time in the hands of distinct persons:
for both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost
impracticable . . . .”). Pufendorf likewise wrote:
[I]t follows that in a state there ought necessarily to be in the hands of
some one person the authority to unite and arm as many citizens in any
peril or occasion, as shall seem to be needed for the common defence,
in view of the enemy’s force, and again, to make peace with the enemy,
as often as it shall be proﬁtable to do so. This power will rest with the
same one also who has the authority to exact punishments, since no one
can of right force citizens to arms and to the expense of war, except the
one who can also punish the recalcitrant.
Samuel Pufendorf, Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence bk. II, at 384
(Thomas Behme & Knud Haakonssen eds., William Abbott Oldfather trans. 1931, Liberty
Fund 2009) (1672) [hereinafter Pufendorf, Elements of Universal Jurisprudence].
367. See 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 222
(“Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and
executive powers.”).
368. See Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, supra note 117, bk. VII, ch. 4, at 223–
24 (“[I]t is obvious that the right of war and peace, and the right to impose taxes, cannot be
separated from [punitive power]. . . . [N]o one can . . . compel citizens to take up arms, or to
assume the expenses of war and peace, unless he can . . . punish those who do not comply.”).
369. See id. at 223 (“For if the legislative authority belongs in the end to one part and
the punitive power to another, fundamentally and independently to each, either the former will necessarily be without substance or the latter will minister to it.”); see also Hobbes,
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The Founders rightly declined to confuse this distinction between
subject matter (competence) and conceptual function (power).370 There
is much more to say on this score, but for the moment, let some statistics
refute the claim that we should treat the Rutherforth–Montesquieu
presentational taxonomy as anything other than idiosyncratic. The most
comfort their writings offer to the Royal Residuum Thesis is a single sentence by Montesquieu that—shorn completely of context and squeezed
for every conceivable semantic ambiguity—reads as follows: “By the
[executive power][,] [the magistrate] makes peace or war, sends or
receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against
invasions.”371 This quote from Montesquieu is littered throughout the
modern commentary, invoked as a shibboleth by those who claim a presidential power to ignore the law in the realm of national security and
foreign affairs.372
supra note 117, at 117–21 (describing sovereign power); Pufendorf, Elements of Universal
Jurisprudence, supra note 366, bk. I, at 204 (“[A] pact gives the civil laws their origin,
because by it there is established a supreme sovereignty, in whose hands is the authority to
enact laws in a gathering subject to it.”).
370. We do not treat executive power as having subject matter subcategories: an environmental executive power, and a criminal executive power, and a postal executive power,
and an international armed conﬂict executive power, and so on. Certainly in each case, the
conceptual power (that of bringing a desire into being) is applied to a topic area, or
competence. But it’s all executive power, and the subdivisions are thoroughly unilluminating.
Montesquieu got a lot right. But—as some of the Founders pointed out—his conceptual structure wandered. See, e.g., Americanus V, N.Y. Daily Advertiser (Dec. 12, 1787),
reprinted in 19 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 397, 397–98 (“Tho’ the Spirit of
Laws contains a fund of useful and just observations on Government, . . . it is evidently
defective. His general divisions of Government into different species . . . do not convey to
the mind clear and distinct ideas of different qualities really existing in the nature of
things.”); A Farmer V (Part I), Balt. Md. Gazette, Mar. 25, 1788, reprinted in 12 Documentary
History, supra note 70, at 431, 431 (“[I]t is much to be questioned whether the full and
free political opinion of any one great luminary of science, has been fairly disclosed to the
world—Even when the great and amiable Montesquieu had hazarded a panegyric on the
English constitution, he shrinks back with terror . . . .”); cf. The Federalist No. 47, supra
note 30, at 246–50 (James Madison) (glossing Montesquieu’s views with reference to the
actual operation of English law, so that “we may be sure then not to mistake his meaning
in this case”).
371. 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 222. For the
original French:
Il y a dans chaque état trois sortes de pouvoirs, la puissance
législative, la puissance exécutrice des choses qui dépendent du droit
des gens, & la puissance exécutrice de celles qui dépendent du droit
civil. . . . Par la seconde, [le prince ou le magistrat] fait la paix ou la
guerre, envoie ou reçoit des ambassades, établit, la sûureté, prévient les
invasions.
1 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 311.
372. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting this sentence); Prakash & Ramsey,
Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 44, at 265–66, 268 (paraphrasing this
sentence); Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the
Constitution: A Review Essay of John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility, 34 Va. J. Int’l L.
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If the quote were as central to the founding generation’s conception
of the executive power as these commentators believe, surely the
Founding generation would have mentioned it. Yet they did not—not
once, not even in passing, and surely not to assert that an executive could
ignore duly enacted law.
The gargantuan-though-still-unfinished Documentary History of the
Ratiﬁcation of the Constitution of the United States has compiled all archival
records relating to the Constitution’s drafting and ratiﬁcation from every
state except North Carolina.373 None of these documents contain the
phrase “internal executive,” “external executive,” or their cognates. For his
part, Montesquieu is cited by name 166 times. But not one of these
citations quotes, paraphrases, or even mentions the quote on which
more or less the entire intellectual pedigree for the Royal Residuum
Thesis hangs. To the contrary: Every single citation to Montesquieu’s discussion of the separation of powers invokes the portion of his discussion
where “the executive power” unambiguously means the execution of domestic law.374 (I suspect this is because that passage is the one paraphrased by
903, 931 n.106 (1994) (quoting this sentence); Yoo, The Continuation of Politics, supra
note 347, at 174, 201 (quoting this sentence).
373. See generally Documentary History, supra note 70.
374. For one Royal Residuum theorist agreeing that Montesquieu’s separation of
powers nostrum must be read as using “executive power” in the law execution sense, see
Prakash, Essential Meaning, supra note 41, at 747 (“[O]ne can only make sense of
Montesquieu’s famous separation maxim if one regards him as subscribing [in that
passage] to a modern conception of executive power—as all powers to execute the law
except for the judicial power.”). Blackstone’s reference is likewise to one of Montesquieu’s
unambiguous uses of the phrase “executive power” in the standard sense of executing the
legislative will as to internal law. Even uncredited, this Blackstonian paraphrase surfaced
regularly. See, e.g., Cont’l Cong., supra note 304, at 236 (citing “the authority of a name
which all Europe reveres” for the proposition that “[t]here is no liberty, if the power of
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers”).
Montesquieu himself rarely deployed the taxonomy created in his chapter on the
government of England. I have found very few occasions in his work where he does so to
refer to the conceptual power rather than as metonymy for the entity which possesses that
power. Most are simply indeterminate. See, e.g., 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra
note 179, bk. XI, ch. XV, at 250 (noting that the decemvirate controlled all powers of
government, including “the whole legislative, the whole executive, and the whole
judicial”); id. ch. VI, at 227 (noting that both the people and the Senate had a “part of the
executive”); id. bk. II, ch. III, at 18 (stating that rulers in aristocracy “are invested both
with the legislative and executive authority”); id. bk. IX, ch. I, at 186 (observing that a
captured town is “deprived not only of the executive and legislative power, but moreover
of all human property”).
Those references that do not just gesture at a general anticentralization principle are,
frankly, confused even on Montesquieu’s own taxonomy. One such reference relates to the
scope of the Roman Senate’s powers. Montesquieu notes that “[s]o great was the share the
senate took in the executive power that . . . foreign nations imagined that Rome was an
aristocracy.” Id. ch. XVII, at 254. The next sentence then lists a series of what could be
read as examples that begin with acts that not even Montesquieu would understand as
executive: “dispos[ing] of the public money” and “farm[ing] out the revenue.” Id. Further
confusing things, Montesquieu seems later to deﬁne even the implementation of foreign
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Blackstone, who a great many Founders actually read in some depth.375)
As for Rutherforth, he’s cited one single time in the ratification discussions—for the proposition that adopting the Constitution would not
absolve debtors of their obligations to the United States.376 Publius didn’t
even spell the guy’s name right.377
C.

Fertile Ground Among Nonspecialists: Conﬂating the “Separation” and the
“Distribution” of Powers

Besides the misreadings described above, the Royal Residuum Thesis
offers no other support for its claims about Madison’s bookshelf or the
intellectual foundation on which the Revolutionary and Founding
debates took place.378 But there’s something else worth saying about the
success of the Thesis—a more speculative observation that has less to do
affairs intentions as “legislative”—which certainly cannot be the case either under his
taxonomy or anyone else’s. See id. at 254 (“In the earliest times, when the people had
some share in the affairs relating to war or peace, they exercised rather their legislative
than their executive power.”). In the same vein, Montesquieu seems to deﬁne the “granting . . . of permission [to] borrow[]” as conceptually executive in nature. See 2 id. bk.
XXII, ch. XXII, at 128–30. It is ambiguous as to whether this connection described the
motivation for the Senate’s permission (it had a government to run!) or the essence of the
Senate’s permission. If the latter it is confused on Montesquieu’s own account, since he
explains that the Senate did so by “enact[ing] decrees,” which is unequivocally legislative
on his earlier taxonomy. See id. at 129.
375. The better-educated Founders can be found commenting condescendingly on
their peers’ lack of genuine familiarity with Montesquieu. There are more literate examples, but one of my favorites is “The News-Mongers’ Song for the Winter of 1788,” which
ran in part: “Write something at randum, you need not be nice / Public spirit, Montesquieu,
and great Dr. Price.” The News-Mongers’ Song for the Winter of 1788, Alb. Gazette (Nov.
15, 1787), reprinted in 14 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 117.
Blackstone, by contrast, was to American lawyers what the Bible was to Prostestants. A
petty drama illustrating the point played out at the Pennsylvania Convention when
Representative William Findley produced the third volume of Blackstone’s Commentaries
to show “incontrovertibly” that “the learned Chief Justice [Thomas McKean] and
Counselor [James Wilson] from the city” had made errors the previous day for which “if
[Findley’s] son had been at the study of the law for six months . . , [Findley] should be
justiﬁed in whipping him.” William Findley, Remarks at the Pennsylvania Convention
(Dec. 10, 1787), reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 532; see also
Bailyn, supra note 61, at 24 (noting that most writers’ citations to nonlegal sources were
poorly understood “window dressing”).
376. See Federalist No. 84, supra note 30, at 487 n.4 (Alexander Hamilton) (citing
“Vide Rutherford’s Institutes, Vol. 2, Book II, Chapter X, Sections XIV and XV”).
377. See id. It’s unlikely that Publius’s spelling can be explained as a matter of variable
eighteenth-century orthography. Rather, it seems to be a slip of the pen for a completely
different person: Samuel Rutherford, a seventeenth-century parliamentarian who wrote a
well-known defense of limited monarchy called Lex Rex. For an unrelated citation to that
work, see supra note 270.
378. Royal Residuum theorists do have other arguments grounded on political
practice during the Revolution, the Founding, and the Early Republic. Those will be taken
up in subsequent work. For the moment, suffice it to say that I do not believe Residuum
theorists make any arguments about background political and legal theory that have been
left unaddressed in this Article.
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with the errors of Royal Residuum champions, and more to do with the
mistaken premises of some in their audience. Speciﬁcally, many nonspecialists—that is to say, lawyer-generalists who have no expertise in
either constitutional history or eighteenth-century political theory—have
confused intuitions about what the constitutional “separation” of powers
actually entails.
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison is a classic example. It begins:
It is the proud boast of our democracy that we have “a government of laws, and not of men.” Many Americans are familiar
with that phrase; not many know its derivation. It comes from
Part the First, Article XXX, of the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780, which reads in full as follows:
“In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial
powers, or either of them: The executive shall never exercise
the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or
either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws, and
not of men.”
The Framers of the Federal Constitution similarly viewed the
principle of separation of powers as the absolutely central guarantee of a just Government.379
Justice Scalia thus equates the Federal Constitution’s allocation of
powers with the Massachusetts Constitution’s statement that only the
chief magistrate may exercise any portion of the executive power. He then
bolsters the case—without noticing that he has shifted from conceptual
powers to institutional organization—by noting that “the Founders
conspicuously and very consciously declined to sap the Executive’s
strength . . . by dividing the executive power. Proposals to have multiple
executives . . . were rejected.”380 This shows, Scalia says, that Article II’s
vesting of “the executive power” in the President “does not mean some of
the executive power, but all of the executive power.”381
As a historical statement about the Founding, this is a howler. Opponents of the Constitution savaged the document—at length and with
great relish—precisely because of its failure to impose the kind of clean
separation between legislative, judicial, and executive powers that is
sketched in Scalia’s excerpt of the Massachusetts Constitution. Far from
379. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Mass.
Const. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XXX, reprinted in 3 Federal and State Constitutions, supra note
34, at 1888, 1893).
380. Id. at 698–99.
381. Id. at 705; see also id. at 709 (“It is not for us to determine . . . how much of the
purely executive powers of government must be within the full control of the President.
The Constitution prescribes that they all are.”); cf. Flaherty, Most Dangerous Branch,
supra note 59, at 1734 (“The Court’s formalist cases teach what ‘every schoolchild learns,’
at least those schoolchildren who are headed to the Office of Legal Counsel. Formalist
catechism posits three discrete branches, each exercising one of three distinct powers.”).
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being embarrassed by this feature of the Constitution, Federalists embraced it:
Is there any one branch, in which the whole legislative and
executive powers are lodged? No. The legislative authority is
lodged in three distinct branches properly balanced: The
executive authority is divided between two branches; and the judicial
is still reserved for an independent body, who hold their office
during good behaviour.382
As Hamilton explained, this distribution of powers “is so complex, so
skillfully contrived, that it is next to impossible that an impolitic or wicked
measure should pass the great scrutiny with success.”383 Madison agreed
that while “[i]t is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging
to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely
administered by either of the other departments,” it is likewise true that
“the degree of separation which the maxim requires . . . can never in
practice be duly maintained” “unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the
others.”384
382. Alexander Hamilton, Remarks at New York Convention Debates (June 27, 1788)
[hereinafter Hamilton, Remarks at New York Convention Debates (June 27, 1788)],
reprinted in 22 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 1921, 1953 (emphasis added)
(Childs’s notes). Madison’s discussion of the point in Federalist 47 is canonical, at least
among historians of the period:
The constitution of Massachusetts . . . declares “that the legislative
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or
either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and
judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers, or either of them.” This declaration
corresponds precisely with the doctrine of Montesquieu . . . . In the very
Constitution to which it is preﬁxed, a partial mixture of powers has been
admitted. The executive magistrate has a qualiﬁed negative on the
legislative body, and the Senate, which is a part of the legislature, is a
court of impeachment for members both of the executive and judiciary
departments. The members of the judiciary department, again, are
appointable by the executive department, and removable by the same
authority on the address of the two legislative branches. Lastly, a number
of the officers of government are annually appointed by the legislative
department. As the appointment to offices, particularly executive offices, is
in its nature an executive function, the compilers of the [Massachusetts]
Constitution have, in this last point at least, violated the rule established
by themselves.
The Federalist No. 47, supra note 30, at 248 (James Madison).
383. Hamilton, Remarks at New York Convention Debates (June 27, 1788), supra note
382, at 1953.
384. The Federalist No. 48, supra note 30, at 251 (James Madison). As Federalists
never tired of pointing out, this was perfectly consistent with Montesquieu. See Adams,
The First American Constitutions, supra note 347, at 40 (explaining that “[a] complete
tyranny is established by [] a combination of powers,” which “Montesquieu . . . had
warned against”); cf. Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership 33
(1960) (describing “separated institutions sharing power”).

2019]

ARTICLE II VESTS THE EXECUTIVE POWER

1263

For present purposes, however, Justice Scalia makes an even more
signiﬁcant mistake. And that’s the methodology he announced for deciding
what kinds of power count as “executive.” He asks:
In what other sense can one identify “the executive Power” that
is supposed to be vested in the President (unless it includes everything the Executive Branch is given to do) except by reference to
what has always and everywhere—if conducted by government
at all—been conducted never by the legislature, never by the
courts, and always by the executive?385
Scalia thus suggests an inductive analysis based on empirical observations
about institutional practice of actual political entities: If the thing called
“the executive branch” does X, then that means that X is an exercise of
“executive power.” As an evidentiary matter, this is a version of the grammatical error described above, conﬂating the metonym with its referent.
And at least by the lights of Madison’s bookshelf, it’s simply incorrect.
To Scalia’s credit, he was later persuaded to reject the Royal Residuum
Thesis as yielding “a presidency more reminiscent of George III than
George Washington.”386 But his confusion in Morrison exempliﬁes the
mistaken mental shorthand that makes some audiences such fertile
ground for claims about such a thesis. If you move from the (correct)
observation that each branch is associated primarily with one power to
the (incorrect) conclusion that all acts by that branch represent an
exercise of that power, then the Royal Residuum Thesis might seem quite
intuitive. But that doesn’t make it any less wrong, at least as a matter of
history.
V. DICTIONARIES
In light of the sources canvassed above, it should come as no
surprise that the literally uncontradicted dictionary deﬁnition of executive power in the Founding Era was “the power to execute.” For someone
immersed in the historical materials, this makes perfect sense. The words
“execute” and “execution” were commonly used in the eighteenth century for the act of bringing an intention into being, often in places where
it would now be more typical to say “do” or “ﬁnish” or “perform.” And
yet seeing the deﬁnitions below may startle people who have read only
Royal Residuum Thesis scholarship. That’s because it’s central to Royal
Residuum claims that eighteenth-century readers shared some special,
counterintuitive-by-modern-lights understanding of “executive” that
involved more than just the power to execute law. There was obviously
more to the word: It would disrespect the President to conﬁne him to his
385. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706.
386. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2126 (2015) (Scalia, J. dissenting). I certainly
do not mean to suggest that Justice Scalia’s conclusion here was affected by purposive
reasoning or legislative history. He may well have conducted in camera textual analysis not
reﬂected on the face of his opinion.
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enumerated powers, supplemented only by the role of executing legislative commands. Or so the instinct goes—and it’s quite misguided.
In 1808, the first edition of Noah Webster’s dictionary made a
typical distinction between “executive” as an adjective and “executive”
as a noun.387 As a noun, “executive” meant “the person or council
administering a government.”388 Other dictionaries agreed: When used
as a noun, “executive” meant “the person or body in the administration
of a country who puts the laws in force—thus distinguished from the
legislative and judicial bodies.”389 The Executive Power Clause obviously
uses executive in the adjectival sense, and it is that sense on which the
remainder of this Part focuses.390

387. Noah Webster, A Compendious Dictionary of the English Language 109 (Conn.,
Sidney’s Press 1806) [hereinafter Webster, Dictionary]. For other dictionaries that take the
same care with this distinction, see, for example, Caleb Alexander, The Columbian
Dictionary of the English Language (Boston, Isaiah Thomas & Ebenezer T. Andrews 1800)
(“Executive, eks-’ek’u-tiv, n. the chief magistrate; Executive, eks-e’u-tiv, a. having power to
act, or to carry laws into execution”); James Stormonth, A Dictionary of the English
Language 338 (New York, Frank F. Lovell & Co. 1800) (“n. egz-ek-u-tiv, the person or body
in the administration of a country who puts the laws in force . . . distinguished from the
legislative and judicial bodies; the governing person or body; adj. pert. to the governing
body: having the power to put the laws in force; not legislative or judicial . . .”).
388. Or the “executive power” for short. Webster also listed another synonym for this
entity: “Execútioner, n. a man who puts the law in force.” Webster, Dictionary, supra note
387, at 109.
A number of other dictionaries and encyclopedias deﬁned the entity referred to as the
executive power. They generally observed that the executive power-qua-entity possessed its
homonym power-qua-authority, without elaboration on what the latter actually was. For
example, the Encyclopedia Brittancia deﬁned “EXECUTIVE POWER” as:
The supreme executive power of these kingdoms is vested by our laws in
a single person, the king or queen, for the time being. . . .
The executive power, in this state, hath a right to a negative, in
parliament, i.e., to refuse assent to any acts offered [by parliament], or
otherwise the two branches of the legislative power would, or might,
become despotic.
4 Encyclopedia Brittanica (Edinburgh, J. Balfour & Co. et al. 2d ed. 1779) (citation
omitted); see also Giles Jacob, A New Law Dictionary (London, W. Strahan & W. Woodfall
10th ed. 1782) (almost verbatim). For shorter versions obviously cribbed from these longer
entries, see, for example, 2 Ephraim Chambers, Cyclopaedia, or a Universal Dictionary of
Arts and Sciences (London, printed for J. F. & C. Rivington et al. 1788) (“EXECUTIVE
power, supreme, is by the constitution of these kingdom’s lodged in a single person, the
king or queen, for the time being. See CROWN”); 2 William Henry Hall, The New Royal
Encyclopaedia (London, printed for C. Cooke 1788) (almost verbatim); 2 George Selby
Howard, The New Royal Cyclopaedia and Encyclopedia 853 (London, printed for Alex
Hogg 1788) (almost verbatim). The Encylopaedia Perthensis was almost verbatim, though
included a mention of the French Directorate. 9 Encyclopaedia Perthensis; or Universal
Dictionary of the Arts, Sciences, Literature 215–16 (Edinburgh, John Brown 2d ed. 1816).
389. Stormonth, supra note 387, at 338 (“the governing person or body”).
390. It is grammatically impossible to parse the Executive Power Clause in any other
way: Article II uses the word “executive” as an adjective, and in any event the President
obviously wasn’t being vested with a political entity.
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Here are the Founding-Era dictionary definitions I have found for the
adjective “executive” as an attribute or characteristic in the most general
sense. Each bullet represents a definition from a different dictionary.
• “having the quality of executing or performing”391
• “having power to act”392
• “having power to act”393
• “(adj from execute) having the quality of executing, having
the power of execution”394
• “that which may be done, or is able to do; . . . [exécutoire, F.]
serving to execute”395
• “[executoire, F.] that which may be done or is able to do, or
pertaining to executing”396
• “being invested with a Power to act”397
• “that which may be done, or which is able to do”398
• “that has the power of doing a thing, by virtue of a proper
authority”399
• “having power to act”400
• “having a power, or tending, to act”401
• “active, able to act”402
• “having power to execute”403
• “having power to act”404
391. Allen, Complete English Dictionary, supra note 286.
392. A Dictionary of the English Language (London, W. Stewart 1794).
393. A General and Complete Dictionary of the English Language (London, printed
for W. Peacock 1785).
394. John Ash, The New and Complete Dictionary of the English Language (London,
printed for Edward Dilly et al. 1775).
395. Nathan Bailey, A Universal Etymological English Dictionary (Edinburgh, Neill &
Co. 1783).
396. Nathan Bailey, Dictionarium Britannicum (London, printed for T. Cox 2d ed.
1736).
397. A Vocabulary, or Pocket Dictionary (Birmingham, John Baskerville 1765).
398. Benjamin Norton Defoe, A Compleat English Dictionary (Westminster, printed for
John Brindley et al. 1735).
399. Thomas Dyche & William Pardon, A New General English Dictionary (London,
printed for C. & R. Ware et al. 13th ed. 1768).
400. William Enﬁeld, A General Pronouncing Dictionary 103 (London, Plummer &
Brewis 5th ed. 1816).
401. John Entick, Entick’s New Spelling Dictionary 138 (London, printed for Charles
Dilly new ed. 1787).
402. Daniel Fenning, The New and Complete Spelling Dictionary (London, printed
for S. Crowder 2d ed. 1773).
403. A. Fisher, An Accurate New Spelling Dictionary and Expositor of the English
Language (London, printed for A. Fisher 6th ed. 1788).
404. George Fulton & George Knight, A General Pronouncing and Explanatory
Dictionary of the English Language 124 (Edinburgh, Walter & Greig 4th ed. 1814).
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• “having power to act”405
• “having power to act406
• “having the quality of executing or performing. They are the
nimblest, agil, strongest instruments, ﬁttest to be executive
of the commands of the souls. Hale”407
• “having the power to put in act the laws”408
• “that serves to execute”409
• “that which may be done, or is able to do”410
• “having power to act”411
• “that which may be done, or is able to do”412
• “having power to act, active”413
• “having the quality of executing or performing.—They are
the nimblest, agil, strongest instruments, ﬁttest to be executive
of the commands of the souls. Hale”414
• “[from execute or executoire, Fr.] . . . Having the quality of
executing or performing. Executive of the commands of the
soul. Hale”415
• “having power to act”416
• “[h]aving power to act”417

405. A Dictionary of the English Language (London, J. Jarvis 1793).
406. The Philadelphia School Dictionary of the English Language 90 (Philadelphia,
Benjamin Johnson 2d ed. 1806).
407. 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, printed for J.
F. & C. Rivington et al. 6th ed. 1785) [hereinafter, Johnson, Dictionary of the English
Language]. Johnson’s dictionaries were widely abridged by other editors. See, e.g., Joseph
Hamilton, Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language in Miniature 79 (London,
printed for Lee & Hurst 8th ed. 1797) (“Exec’utive, a. having power to act.”). I have not
included such abridgments in this list.
408. Stephen Jones, A General Pronouncing and Explanatory Dictionary of the
English Language (London, printed for Vernor & Hood 3d ed. 1798).
409. John Kersey, A New English Dictionary (London, printed for L. Hawes et al. 8th
ed. 1772).
410. James Manlove, New Dictionary of All Such English Words (London, printed for
J. Wilcox 1741).
411. A Pronouncing Dictionary of the English Language 97 (London, printed for J.W.
Myers 1796).
412. A New Complete English Dictionary 218 (Edinburgh, David Paterson 2d ed. 1740).
413. William Perry, The Royal Standard English Dictionary 229 (Worcester, n. pub. 1st
American ed. 1788).
414. 9 Encylopaedia Perthensis, supra note 388, at 215.
415. Joseph Nicol Scott, A New Universal Etymological English Dictionary (London,
printed for T. Osborne et al. new ed. 1772) [hereinafter Scott, Etymological Dictionary].
416. William Scott, A New Spelling, Pronouncing, and Explanatory Dictionary of the
English Language 114 (Edinburgh, printed for C. Elliot et al. 1786).
417. John Walker, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, printed for T.
Becket 1779).
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I have found no evidence for a specialized meaning that varied from
this core transitive concept. If an unusual or specialized term of art existed, one would expect it to emerge in deﬁnitions of “executive” as applied
to legal or governmental functions. But the notion of simple transitive
implementation persists in full and without modiﬁcation in such deﬁnitions as well:
• “having the quality of executing or performing. Active, or putting into execution, opposed to deliberative or legislative”418
• “having the quality of executing. Active, or putting into execution, opposed to deliberative or legislative”419
• “having the quality of executing or performing. Active, or putting into execution, opposed to deliberative or legislative”420
• “having the quality of executing or performing. Active, or putting into execution, opposed to deliberative, or legislative”421
• “having the quality of executing or performing; active, not
deliberative, not legislative”422
• “having the quality of executing or performing. Active, or putting into execution, opposed to deliberative or legislative”423
Deﬁnitions that offer more detail about the object of execution in a
government context are clearer still: It is the execution of law, precisely as
you would expect from the commentators and theorists on whom these
deﬁnitions drew. Here are the Founding-Era dictionary deﬁnitions of
“executive” that offer a more particularized speciﬁcation of what the
“executive” power of governance meant:
• “having power to act, or to carry laws into execution”424
• “the being invested with a power to act, do, or execute, having authority to put the laws in force”425
• “having the quality of executing. Hale.—Not legislative, having the power to put in act the laws. Swift”426

418. James Barclay, A Complete and Universal English Dictionary on a New Plan
(London, printed for John Rivington & Sons et al. 1782) (emphasis omitted).
419. Frederick Barlow, The Complete English Dictionary (London, printed for
Frederick Barlow 1772).
420. Daniel Fenning, The Royal English Dictionary (London, printed for L. Hawes et
al. 4th ed. 1771).
421. Charles Marriott, The New Royal English Dictionary (London, printed for J.
Wenman 1780).
422. William Perry, The Synonymous, Etymological, and Pronouncing English
Dictionary (London, T. Gillet 1805).
423. William Rider, A New Universal English Dictionary (London, W. Griffin 1759).
424. Alexander, supra note 387.
425. John Marchant, English Dictionary (London, n. pub. 1760).
426. Thomas Browne, The Union Dictionary (London, J.W. Myers 1800).
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• “having the quality of executing or performing. Active; having the power to put in act the laws”427
• “having the quality of executing or performing. Active; having the power to put in act the laws”428
• “Active; not deliberative; not legislative; having the power to
put in act the laws. The Roman emperors were possessed of
the whole legislative as well as executive power. Addison.
Hobbes confounds the executive with the legislative power,
though all well instituted states have ever placed them in different hands. Swift”429
• “[from execute.] Having the quality of executing or performing—Active; not deliberative; not legislative; having the
power to put in act the laws”430
• “Active; not deliberative; not legislative; having the power to
put in act the laws.—The Roman emperors were possessed of
the whole legislative as well as executive power. Addison’s
Freeholder.—Hobbes confounds the executive with the legislative power, though all well instituted states have ever placed
them in different hands. Swift”431
• “Having the power of putting in act the laws, active, not
legislative or deliberative. The legislative as well as executive
power. Addison”432
• “Having the quality of executing or performing; active, not
deliberative, not legislative, having the power to put in act
the laws”433
• “pert. to the governing body; having the power to put the
laws in force; not legislative or judicial; active”434
Now the kicker. A handful of dictionaries do reference the full phrase
“executive power” precisely as used in the Executive Power Clause: a
term of art for a conceptual authority that is capable of being vested in a
government entity. I have found ﬁve such deﬁnitions. Each of them
427. An Universal Dictionary of the English Language (Edinburgh, Alexander
Donaldson & John Reid 1763).
428. 1 J. Johnson, The New Royal and Universal English Dictionary (London, printed
for A. Millard & R. Dorsley 1763).
429. Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 407 (citing the second
deﬁnition).
430. William Kenrick, A New Dictionary of the English Language (London, printed
for John & Francis Rivington et al. 1773).
431. 9 Encylopaedia Perthensis, supra note 388, at 215 (citing the second deﬁnition).
432. Scott, Etymological Dictionary, supra note 415.
433. Thomas Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of The English Language (London, C.
Dilby 2d ed. 1789).
434. Stormonth, supra note 387, at 338. In the entry immediately previous, Stormoth
makes clear he is using “governing” in the then-usual way, to refer to the “person or body”
who “puts the laws in force.” See id.
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deﬁnes “executive power” to mean exactly what an informed reader of
Madison’s bookshelf would have expected: the power to execute plans,
instructions, and authorities.
• “EXE’CUTIVE Power, (S.) The power of putting in execution”435
• “EXECUTORY or EXECUTIVE, that serves to execute; as
The executive Power”436
• “Exécutive Power, pouvoir d’executer, potestas executorialis,
Die Vollmacht etwas zu vollstrecken”437
• “Exécutive, a. Ex. Executive power, pouvoir ou authorité
d’exécuter”438
• “The executive power. Administratio; potestas aliquid administrandi”439
Hidden meanings and counterintuitive ﬁndings are great when you
ﬁnd them. But sometimes simplest is best.
CONCLUSION
When a moderately educated eighteenth-century reader—or really
any literate American with access to a dictionary—saw the phrase
“executive power,” they would have understood it as the power to execute plans, instructions, and above all else the laws. They would have
understood the power as an empty vessel whose authority in any particular case depended entirely on the substantive decisions of the entity
(sometimes the same one that held the power to execute) which possessed the legislative power to direct executive action.
That’s certainly not to say we’ve arrived at a comprehensive
historical account of Article II as drafted. What settlement on
presidential power did the drafting Framers think they had reached?
What arrangement did the ratifying Founders think they were voting on?
Doesn’t the “Law Execution” theory of the Executive Power Clause leave

435. A Pocket Dictionary; or, Complete English Expositor (London, printed for J.
Newbery 3d ed. 1765). A number of encyclopedia-style publications (including the
Encyclopedia Brittannica) include an encyclopedia-style discussion of the political entity
“ Executive Power.” See supra note 388 and accompanying text.
436. Edward Phillips, The New World of Words: Or, Universal English Dictionary 272
(London, printed for J. Phillips et al. 1706).
437. Nathan Bailey, A Compleat English Dictionary; Oder, Vollständiges EnglischDeutsches 281 (Leipzig, Waysenhaus- und Frommannische Buchhandlung 1783).
438. Abel Boyer, Boyer’s Royal Dictionary Abridged (London, printed for Pote et al.
18th ed. 1794). The accent on the leading word indicates spoken stress. That is to say, this
is from a list of deﬁnition of English terms in French.
439. Thomas Morell, An Abridgment of Ainsworth’s Dictionary (Philadelphia, Kimber
& Conrad et al. 1st Am. ed. 1808).
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a foreign affairs gap in the constitutional text? 440 A detailed answer
requires deep engagement with a completely different set of historical
materials—and perhaps a sturdier sense of civic conﬁdence than the
Royal Residuum Thesis seems to possess. But it is surely worth saying
something about the power besides its bare semantic meaning: namely, a
word on its contemptuous reception by theorists who yearn for a king.
Because, if mere execution is all there is to it, then wasn’t this a
rather milquetoast role? When Chief Justice Vinson called the merely
executive President an “impotent” “automaton” or “messenger-boy,”441
and when the arch-royalist Filmer dripped with disdain about a mere executive power,442 weren’t they right? Didn’t at least some Founders think so
too? Take Charles Pinkney who, at the Convention, “objected to the contemptible weakness & dependence of the Executive” that was created by
Article II.443 That’s certainly Harvey Mansﬁeld’s view: “[I]f any real president conﬁned himself to this deﬁnition, he would be contemptuously
called an ‘errand boy,’ considered nothing in himself, a mere agent whose
duty is to command actions according to the law.”444
I don’t think so. Certainly it’s wrong today. The modern statutory
framework conveys a staggering amount of discretionary policy power to
the executive branch. Very few of the legal constraints imposed on these
delegated authorities are so precise as to rule out a politically plausible
policy option in the realm of national security and foreign affairs.445 But
440. A full response to the “foreign affairs gap” anxiety requires engaging
constitutional text and ratiﬁcation debates that range far beyond Madison’s bookshelf. But
because the “gap” argument features so centrally in the Royal Residuum Thesis, a few
thoughts: As a matter of signiﬁcance, such arguments-from-imperfection are misguided.
They rely on assumptions about the Founding that contradict everything we know about
human beings trying to draft complex text. As a matter of practice, the gaps suggested by
Royal Residuum theorists are, in the main, minor and administrative. And, as a matter of
practice, the Article I Necessary and Proper Clause provided a trivially constitutional basis
for Congress to ﬁll them in as they went along. As with so many other areas of national
governance, this sort of gap-ﬁlling is exactly what happened in the early Republic.
441. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 682, 708 (1952) (Vinson,
J., dissenting, joined by Reed & Minton, JJ.)
442. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
443. Notes of James Madison on the Convention (Sept. 15, 1787) (statement of
Charles Pinkney), in 2 Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 188, at
621, 632. Pinkney had changed his mind, or at least his tune, by the time he was opening
the South Carolina ratifying convention with a stirring speech on behalf of the Constitution.
See Charles Pinckney, Speech to the South Carolina Convention (May 14, 1788), in 4 The
Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, As
Recommended By the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, at 318, 329 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) (“We have . . . endeavored to infuse into this department that degree
of vigor which will enable the President to execute the laws with energy and despatch.”).
444. Harvey C. Mansﬁeld, Jr., Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern
Executive Power 2–3 (1989).
445. See Andrew Kent & Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and National
Security Power, in the Cambridge Companion to the United States Constitution 261, 291
(Karen Orren & John W. Compton eds., 2018) (discussing constitutional and statutory
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it was obtuse in the eighteenth century as well: The executive power has
never been anything less than the nation’s force mustered in service of
the nation’s will. That was why many authors saw England not only as
being the freest and happiest of countries446 but also as the country
whose ruler was in fact the most powerful. Indeed, and perhaps ironically, the Crown could direct the power of a peerlessly vigorous nation
that ﬂourished precisely because of the various formal limitations on
royal authority. By this measure, the American President would soon be
stronger still. At a minimum, James Wilson observed, the President’s
powers were clearly “of such a nature as to place him above expressions
of contempt.”447 Some Antifederalists made far less sanguine versions of
the same point: “[T]hough not digniﬁed with the magic name of King,
he will possess more supreme power, than Great Britain allows her hereditary monarchs . . . .”448
Even Madison (who, it turns out, had read the books on his
bookshelf) saw what was coming. He warned that the President would
likely wind up with tyrannical power in his executive capacity if Congress’s
legislative authority were not limited:
One consequence must be, to enlarge the sphere of
discretion allotted to the executive magistrate. Even within the
legislative limits properly deﬁned by the [C]onstitution, the
difficulty of accommodating legal regulations to a country so
great in extent, and so various in its circumstances, has been
much felt; and has led to occasional investments of power in the
executive, which involve perhaps as large a portion of discretion, as can be deemed consistent with the nature of the
executive trust. In proportion as the objects of legislative care
might be multiplied, would the time allowed for each be diminished, and the difficulty of providing uniform and particular
regulations for all be increased. From these sources would
necessarily ensue a greater latitude to the agency of that department which is always in existence, and which could best mould

constraints on the President’s national security powers); see also, e.g., Edward S. Corwin,
Total War and the Constitution 39–40 (1947) (describing the “delegation of vast
discretionary powers to the President to deal with a broadly deﬁned subject-matter in
furtherance of objectives equally broad”); Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship:
Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies 269 (1948) (describing World War I– and
World War II–era statutes that conferred “extreme discretionary authority upon the
President or his administration”).
446. See supra notes 183–186 and accompanying text.
447. James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratiﬁcation Debates (Dec. 11, 1787; morning
session), reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 568.
448. Tamony, Va. Indep. Chron., Jan. 9, 1788, reprinted in 8 Documentary History,
supra note 70, at 286, 287. “Tamony” expressly connected this presidential power to
foreign affairs authorities conveyed pursuant to the legislative power. See id.
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regulations of a general nature, so as to suit them to the
diversity of particular situations.449
Yes, the immediate post-Revolutionary period saw the executive power
either mismanaged by committee or left under the thumb of a multimember legislature riven by squabbles. But once the executive power was
conferred on a single President, and once that President was given a veto
to inﬂuence the content of the legislative instructions he would effectuate—watch out. Because the result was a massively powerful institution.
Just not one with an indefeasible foreign affairs power, or indeed any
other power not speciﬁcally listed in the Constitution. The particulars of
that settlement and its implications for modern controversies, however,
must wait for another day.

449. Report of the Virginia Resolves 1800, reprinted in 17 The Papers of James
Madison, supra note 268, at 316.

